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The annual average cost of healthcare for services utilization by a Medicare 
beneficiary is projected to grow from about $10,000 to over $16,000 by 2023. As an 
ongoing initiative to address this trend, the federal government contracts with private 
insurance companies and other entities, called Medicare Advantage Organizations 
(MAOs), to develop and administer alternative health insurance plans designed to 
contain service utilization and costs. One feature of some Medicare Advantage plans 
is the presence of risk-bearing contracts with primary care physician organizations 
that voluntarily accept financial responsibility for the overall cost of care for patients 
attributed to them. In this arrangement, the MAO delegates medical care, care 
management oversight, and discretionary spending authority to the physician 
organization. For services rendered, the physician organization accepts as payment the 
surplus or deficit derived from annual budgetary results (as negotiated in their contract 
with the MAO) rather than the traditional per-encounter or service-specific payments 
associated with fee-for-service payment schemes. This study uses an extensive and novel 
data set from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, as well as third-party 
sources, to examine how Missouri beneficiary’s attributes (age, gender, race, and health 
status), presumed financial resources and education, access to doctors and hospitals, and 
Medicare plan choices help to predict services utilization. We use summary statistics, 
tests of differences in means, CHAID decision trees, and Poisson regression to analyze 
beneficiaries’ utilization of five service categories (inpatient care, skilled nursing care, 
outpatient services, home health services, and other provider services, including 
physicians). The study reveals three critical findings. First, specific beneficiary attributes 
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such as age and race, and beneficiary access to doctors and hospitals are predictors of 
one’s chosen Medicare plan. Notably, some Medicare beneficiary groups are more likely 
to enroll in a Medicare Advantage plan rather than others. Second, beneficiary 
characteristics, doctor and hospital access, and plan choice collectively have a strong 
association with service utilization. Those enrolled in Medicare Advantage plans use 
fewer services than their Traditional Medicare counterparts. Lastly, beneficiaries enrolled 
in a Medicare Advantage plan that engages risk-bearing primary care physician groups 
use fewer services than beneficiaries in other plans. 
 
Keywords: Medicare, Advantage, health insurance, utilization, risk, contracts, 
physicians, capitation 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Scope 
 
 The United States has the most expensive health care system of any developed 
nation (Nahass and Rodriguez, 2015). As shown in Exhibit 1, its nearly $10,000 per 
capita, annual health expenditure far exceeds that of the other thirty-four members of the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The U.S. costs per 
capita are more than twice the OECD average. 
 Furthermore, U.S. healthcare costs are escalating, in part, because of an increasing 
population of older adults who receive health insurance from a federal government 
program known as Medicare. Annual Medicare expenditures are projected to exceed one 
trillion dollars by 2023, equating to more than $16,000 per beneficiary per year (Keehan 
et al., 2020). To help combat these rising healthcare service costs, the government’s 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has implemented a strategy of 
encouraging Medicare-eligible beneficiaries to enroll in Medicare Advantage plans, also 
known as Medicare Part C, rather than the Traditional Medicare program.   
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 To implement its strategy, CMS, as the principal, relies on contracts with private 
insurers, known as Medicare Advantage Organizations (MAOs), who serve as CMS’ 
agents and accept the operational and financial risk of their attributed enrollees. MAOs, 
in the role of principals, seek to delegate clinical care duties and shift financial risk to 
their agents, which include risk-bearing (RB) providers such as primary care physician 
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(PCP) groups. MAOs and RB providers understand that their financial success is 
dependent on effective management of patient services. 
 CMS mandates that Medicare Advantage beneficiaries receive equal or better 
benefits than those received by beneficiaries in the Traditional Medicare plan. Also, 
MAOs are required to meet or exceed standards imposed by CMS to assure that 
beneficiaries receive adequate access to healthcare providers and services. In 
response to those mandates, many MAOs offer plan features that include expanded 
benefits schedules at lower costs, thus enticing beneficiaries both to enroll in their 
Medicare Advantage plans and to engage in better health practices. 
 MAOs receive a fixed monthly payment from CMS for each beneficiary 
enrolled in their plans, thus placing the MAO at financial risk for the volume and 
cost of services attributable to its insured members. MAOs create service delivery 
networks in part by entering into agreements with medical providers who render 
services in exchange for payment. Payment methods vary and may include fee-for-
service (FFS), modified FFS, capitation, or other RB arrangements.  
 FFS payments originate from pre-determined fee schedules that typically are 
the product of negotiations between MAOs and providers. An FFS payment 
generally is a one-time-only, lump-sum payment for a service such as a surgical 
facility fee or physician office visit. In this arrangement, there is little compensation 
risk to the provider because a known payment amount is earned for a rendered 
service. 
 Modified FFS payments sometime incorporate both lump-sum payments and 
bonus payments based on the achievement of pre-defined metrics. For example, a 
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PCP might receive from the MAO a $100 payment for rendering a comprehensive 
physical examination to a patient during an office visit, and then later receive a $50 
bonus from the MAO for submitting written documentation that the patient received 
all required elements of that comprehensive exam. In this hypothetical example, a 
third of the physician’s potential compensation is subject to risk (e.g., failure to 
satisfy the comprehensive exam requirements, not submitting appropriate 
documentation). 
 Capitation typically takes the form of a negotiated, monthly payment to a 
physician, physician group, health system, or other provider entity for each patient 
assigned to the entity. The capitation payment is expected to cover the costs of a 
defined schedule of medical services, both within and outside the entity, available to 
the patient. If the patient’s medical costs exceed the capitation amount, the entity is 
responsible for paying for the excess. If the costs are less than the capitation amount, 
the entity enjoys retention of the surplus. In effect, the MAO transfers to the entity 
the financial risks attributable to patient care costs predicted by the capitation 
payment. The entity accepts that risk with an expectation that medical services and 
costs can be managed more efficiently than the capitation payment implies. In some 
arrangements, the MAO also may supplement the capitation payments with incentive 
bonuses tied to the achievement of clinical outcomes or utilization benchmarks 
associated with the pool of attributed patients. These supplemental payments can link 
to such metrics as the percentage of patients complying with prescribed medications, 
the percentage of male patients receiving annual prostate cancer screenings, or the 
percentage of female patients receiving mammograms. 
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 Another form of capitation agreement occurs when an MAO and provider 
enter into a shared-risk arrangement. In this scenario, each party accepts a percentage 
of the deficits or surpluses stemming from the capitation revenue and medical costs 
of the attributed patients. In Appendix A, we present a discussion of how RB 
payment methods between MAOs and the PCPs in their networks are structured. 
 In this introduction, we highlighted several elements of the Medicare health 
system that potentially influence healthcare service utilization. They include the 
steerage of beneficiaries from Traditional Medicare to Medicare Advantage plans, 
the financial risk shift from CMS to MAOs, the financial risk shift from MAOs to 
providers, and an expectation that efficient service utilization will yield favorable 
financial results. To these macro elements, we introduce other factors that potentially 
affect service utilization. They include beneficiary characteristics (e.g., age, gender, 
race, health status, wealth, and level of education) and access to providers (hospital 
proximity, number of physicians). Accordingly, we obtained data for all of these 
elements in our quest to understand their effects on service utilization. The sources 
and uses of data are described in Chapter 4. 
1.1 Research Question  
 Recent literature and commentary suggest that, compared to Traditional 
Medicare, some MAOs deliver better outcomes at lower costs by emphasizing 
primary, preventative care, along with the elimination of duplicative or unnecessary 
services, or using less costly services and service providers (Bazemore, Phillips, 
Glazier, & Tepper, 2018; Curto, Einav, Finkelstein, Levin, & Bhattacharya, 2017; 
Landon, Zaslavsky, Saunders, Pawlson, Newhouse, & Ayanian, 2012; Pham & 
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Moffit, 2018). Also, to instill incentives for efficient care, some MAOs implement 
RB agreements with PCPs willing to forgo traditional FFS payments. As described 
later in this paper, there are considerable, practical difficulties in gaining access to 
the terms, conditions, and financial results attributable to RB agreements between 
MAOs and the PCPs in their networks. Therefore, researchers may find it 
challenging to conduct this portion of the research. Fortunately, our association with 
a network of PCPs receiving both FFS and RB payments provides a rare and 
invaluable opportunity to understand the structure of RB agreements, as well as the 
arrangements between CMS and MAOs. That knowledge is useful when interpreting 
the results from our quantitative analyses. 
 In summary, with this study, we attempt to answer our fundamental research 
question: What elements affect a Medicare beneficiary’s utilization of healthcare 
services? Related to this primary research question are several corollary questions. 
Do specific beneficiary attributes help predict choice of Medicare plan? Does a 
beneficiary’s access to doctors and hospitals relate to choice of Medicare plan? Does 
the Medicare plan chosen help to predict service utilization? Do beneficiary 
characteristics help to predict service utilization? Moreover, do Medicare Advantage 
plans with RB PCPs show lesser utilization than other plans?  
 To answer these questions, we obtained data from several sources. Our  
Medicare data come from CMS following a formal, multi-month application process 
designed to assure that research data are appropriately used and protected. We 
requested and received 2016 health records for a random sample of 999,999 
beneficiaries residing in the state of Missouri. At the time of this investigation, 2016 
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is the only year with the comprehensive Medicare data. For the identification and 
location of Missouri hospitals, we use public data from the Missouri Department of 
Health and Senior Services’ Office of Primary Care and Rural Health. The Missouri 
Department of Professional Registrations is our data source for identifying the 
locations of licensed physicians. Lastly, through the University of Missouri Office of 
Social and Economic Data Analysis, we obtained Missouri demographical data 
distributed by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. Discussion of the sources and uses of 
data are contained in Chapter 4. 
 Summary statistics, tests of differences in means, CHAID decision trees, and 
Poisson regression are used to evaluate service utilization patterns influenced by 
patient characteristics, access to healthcare providers (hospitals and doctors), and 
choice of Medicare plan types. We also look for evidence to determine if the 
presence of RB PCPs in a Medicare Advantage plan impacts the number of 
healthcare services received by beneficiaries in that plan. 
1.2 Significance 
 The Medicare program, a federal health insurance program administered by the 
United States Department of Health and Human Services’(HHS) Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services (CMS), provides health insurance coverage to nearly 60 million 
U.S. residents: approximately 50 million people ages 65 and over, and 10 million people 
with permanent disabilities (KFF, 2018). Through various initiatives such as the 
promotion of Medicare Advantage plans, CMS, in partnership with private insurance 
companies, implements payment innovation as one means of addressing the high costs of 
healthcare financing and delivery. 
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 Private insurers have participated in the Medicare program since 1966. However, 
it was not until the Social Security amendments in 1972 that any insurer entered into an 
RB contract with Medicare (Patel & Guterman, 2017).  In 1982, the Tax Equity and 
Fiscal Responsibility Act set the stage for capitated payments from Medicare to MAOs, 
serving as an early impetus for MAOs to introduce RB arrangements to their network 
providers.  
 Interest in Medicare Advantage plans has grown significantly since its 
introduction in the early 1980s. In contrast to Traditional Medicare, in many cases, 
Medicare Advantage offers expanded benefits schedules for those who elect to obtain 
coverage from such plans. The expanded benefits incentivize Medicare-eligible members 
to switch from Traditional Medicare coverage to Medicare Advantage plans. In 2018, 
approximately twenty million persons enrolled in Medicare Advantage plans, 
representing about one-third of all Medicare beneficiaries (Kaiser Family Foundation 
2018). See Exhibit 2 for Medicare enrollment from 1999 to 2018 (with the number of 
beneficiaries enrolled on the left scale, and the percentage of total Medicare enrollment in 
an MA plan on the right scale).  The enrollment trend since 2004 indicates an increasing 
preference for Medicare Advantage, given its fifteen consecutive annual increases in 
enrollment. Consequently, research into the nature of the relationships between MAOs 
and providers (such as PCPs), and the characteristics of the patients served, is of 
increasing relevance and importance. 
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Exhibit 2. Medicare Advantage 20-year Enrollment Trend 
 
Source: Kaiser Family Foundation, 2018 
 
 Some MAOs enter into contracts with PCP groups that voluntarily accept up to 
100% of the medical cost risk attributable to the beneficiaries assigned to them. This 
arrangement contrasts with the traditional reimbursement methodology, whereby 
physicians receive a predetermined FFS payment. In Missouri, we are aware of the 
existence of RB contracts as early as 1995, when local health systems and medical groups 
first engaged in such arrangements with MAOs (Deaconess, 1995). The current level of 
financial risk borne by physician groups varies with its contracts. We know of one 
current arrangement whereby a PCP network has responsibility for up to 80% of the total 
medical expenses of its attributed beneficiaries, as driven by the insurance benefit 
schedule. 
 Given the growing Medicare population and CMS’ effort to steer beneficiaries 
into Medicare Advantage plans, we believe it is vitally important to understand the 
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implications of assigning medical care responsibilities to MAOs and their providers, both 
of whom assume financial risk in this healthcare delivery model.  Further, we also believe 
it is critical to acknowledge the presence of the beneficiaries’ attributes, their access to 
hospitals and doctors, and their Medicare plan choices as potentially relevant factors for 
assessing service utilization within the Medicare program. 
We wish to note that in CMS literature, Medicare Advantage plans sometimes are 
called Health Maintenance Organizations (HMO). CMS’ use of the HMO moniker is 
somewhat of a misnomer (as reported by CMS) because Medicare Advantage plans can 
be HMOs, preferred provider organizations (PPOs), exclusive provider organizations 
(EPOs), special needs plans (SNP), and other plan types. Nevertheless, in this study, we 
follow CMS practice in their data processing and refer to any Medicare Advantage plan 
as an HMO plan. We also refer to the Traditional Medicare plan as the FFS plan.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
 For this study, we investigate the effects of several Medicare beneficiary 
characteristics on plan selection and utilization. In this chapter, we offer some 
background information that underscores the importance of this study, discuss our choice 
of explanatory variable selections, and present a theoretical underpinning for our 
investigation. We conclude with a discussion of a previous study that we contrast with 
our own. 
2.1 Services Utilization 
 Our literature search uncovered various articles describing the need to re-design 
or re-align healthcare organizations to move away from traditional FFS reimbursement. 
Generally, value-based alternatives, such as requiring healthcare providers to assume a 
degree of financial risk based on patient care outcomes, are advocated. Some literature 
cites health systems’ contractual or employment schemes and insurance company 
mandates that attempt to modify physician behavior to yield a more value-oriented 
clinical practice of medicine. Examples of these types of administrative initiatives include 
compensation linked to performance (rather than volume); pre-authorization of patient 
referrals to specialists and facilities; implementation of pharmaceutical formularies; third-
party oversight and intervention of pre-specified patient care activities; and publication of 
physicians’ clinical performances  These efforts to slow the growth of Medicare spending 
“more generally, have had limited success, and gaps in the quality of care remain” (Fisher 
et al., 2009).  
 Some research emphasizes the emerging importance of recruiting and organizing 
an educated and engaged core of primary care physicians to drive desired changes 
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inherent in value-based reimbursement structures. These physicians will play the most 
critical role in clinically integrated networks as primary team leaders making the 
transition to accountable care and population health management (Floyd, 2014). 
However, existing literature appears to fall short in describing precisely what incentivizes 
PCPs to become educated and engaged in such structures, and more importantly, why 
they might choose, perhaps be compelled, to do so voluntarily.  
2.2 Demographics  
 Age, gender, race, and level of education and wealth are variables frequently 
examined in studies of all types. These data are captured by various means such as 
census-taking, market research, and surveys. In healthcare-based research, patient health 
status is an often-used variable, with the Charlson Co-morbidity scores frequently cited 
as a measure of health. Here we present some preliminary background information about 
the variables used in this study. Additional information appears in Chapter 4. 
 CMS deems a beneficiary’s health status as an essential consideration when 
determining capitation payments to MAOs. Conceptually, a healthier beneficiary requires 
fewer healthcare services, and a beneficiary with several diseases, also called co-
morbidities, requires more services. To calibrate each capitation payment to reflect each 
beneficiary’s health status, CMS devised a risk adjustment score (RAS) as an essential 
mechanism built into the capitation payment calculation. These risk scores “are 
calculated by statistical analysis of diagnoses and expenditures for ‘fee-for-service’ 
patients” (American Action Forum, 2015). This results in MAOs receiving less capitation 
for patients with fewer health risks (i.e., lower RAS score) and more capitation for 
patients with more significant health risks (i.e., higher RAS score).  
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 Unfortunately, CMS has not released to researchers the individual beneficiary 
RAS scores for 2016. As a proxy, we incorporate a version of the Charlson Co-morbidity 
Index (CCMI) as an alternative means to quantify the health status of a beneficiary. We 
identified several studies (e.g., Sundararajan, Henderson, Perry, Muggivan, Quan, & 
Ghali, 2004; Bottle & Aylin, 2011; Austin, Wong, Uzzo, Beck, & Egleston, 2015) 
validating the use of CCMI as a means for defining patient health status by predicting the 
patient’s one-year mortality rates. Moreover, a critical review of various scoring methods 
conducted by Groot, Beckerman, Lankhorst, and Bouter (2003) offers a compelling 
argument that CCMI is one of the more reliable means for measuring comorbidity and, 
therefore, is sufficient for research purposes. Other methodologies (e.g., Kaplan, 
Elixhauser) for determining patient health status are available, but given the general 
acceptance of CCMI as reported by the researchers mentioned above, and the relative 
ease of applying CCMI algorithms to our data, we chose CCMI as the best option. The 
CCMI score is the variable that allows us to account for the effect of the beneficiary’s 
health status on their healthcare services utilization.  
 The CMS RAS, and by extension, the CCMI, are not without controversy. 
Reports suggest that MAOs (and their contracted healthcare providers) more 
comprehensively report the patient diagnosis codes than do FFS providers. For example, 
in its March 2018 report to Congress, the Medicare Payment Advisory Commissions 
(MedPAC), a federal agency that advises Congress on Medicare matters, states that 2016 
data show that Medicare Advantage beneficiaries’ RAS results were 8% higher than 
those of comparable Traditional Medicare beneficiaries. Consequently, Congress now 
requires CMS to apply annual downward adjustments to Medicare Advantage capitation 
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payments to account for the differences in coding patterns submitted by providers. From 
2010 through 2018, this downward adjustment is created by applying an annual coding 
intensity adjustment factor ranging from -3.41% to -5.91% (Better Medicare Alliance, 
2017) to reduce the Medicare Advantage coding results to be more in line with 
Traditional Medicare results for comparable patients. Meanwhile, efforts are underway 
by CMS to continuously improve the RAS formula (and its application to the capitation 
payment formula), including the solicitation of input from industry stakeholders (CMS, 
2018). 
 Given the importance of defining a beneficiary’s health status in the forecasting of 
service utilization (and capitation payments), and in the absence of RAS scores in our 
CMS files, we embrace the CCMI alternative. Our careful construction of a CCMI score 
for each service category for each beneficiary, we believe, offers a sound methodology 
that produces a reasonable surrogate for the unpublished RAS data. 
2.3 Access to Doctors and Hospitals 
 CMS considers the effects of healthcare provider availability in each county when 
considering whether to approve an MAO’s application to operate in a county (CMS HDS, 
2016). In any such application, an MAO must demonstrate that its provider network 
provides reasonable distance and drive time access for at least 90% of the beneficiaries 
residing in the county. However, exceptions can be granted and, therefore, provider 
availability may be differently defined in various regions. Consequently, we believe that 
healthcare service utilization likely is impacted by the presence or non-presence of 
healthcare providers and the beneficiaries’ ability to access them. In this study, we 
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include hospital proximity and physician counts for each county as variables to account 
for beneficiaries’ access to healthcare providers. 
2.4 Financial Barriers  
 Some research focuses on a Medicare beneficiary’s ability to access medical care 
(Kurichi et al., 2017). Barriers to care may affect a beneficiary’s utilization of services, 
thus impacting the medical outcomes. Among their findings, Kurichi et al. found a 
significant relationship between a Medicare beneficiary’s financial resources and their 
ability to obtain healthcare services. They also found that financial resources are strongly 
related to a beneficiary’s decision to delay healthcare services. Accordingly, we 
incorporate median home value in the vicinity of the beneficiary’s place of residence  as a 
surrogate “wealth” variable representing a beneficiary’s ability to pay for healthcare 
services. 
2.5 Risk-bearing Compensation  
 One element of this study examines the possibility that provider compensation 
structures, specifically risk-bearing (RB) arrangements, affect service utilization. An RB 
compensation model for healthcare service payment also is known as “fee-for-value,” 
“value-based,” “risk-sharing,” or “risk-based” reimbursement. Hosseinian and 
Carmichael (2013) offer another apt description -- “gainshare/painshare” -- in their 
discussion of alliances like that between CMS and its MAOs, or between an MAO and a 
PCP group. In RB arrangements, CMS contracts with an MAO to provide medical care 
insurance and overall administrative management of patients assigned to the MAO. In 
turn, the MAO delegates significant medical care, care management oversight, and 
discretionary spending authority to groups or networks of providers. In return, the 
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providers’ patient care revenue emanates from budgetary surpluses or deficits and other 
performance incentives (as negotiated in their contracts with the MAO) rather than the 
per-encounter or service-specific payments associated with traditional FFS payment 
schemes. Presumably, this global approach to patient care and payment yields better 
results for all stakeholders, including MAOs, physicians, and patients (James & Poulson, 
2016). 
2.6 Agency Theory 
 One theory particularly useful in examining the financial risk-shifting that occurs 
from CMS to MAOs to providers is Jensen and Meckling’s Agency Theory of the Firm, 
sometimes referred to as Principal-Agent Theory. It helps to explain several dynamics 
that exist in healthcare financing and delivery environs. An agency relationship is “a 
contract under which one or more persons (the principal) engage another person (the 
agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision 
making authority to the agent” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 308). Examples include a 
board of directors hiring a chief executive officer to lead a company, or a house builder 
contracting with a plumbing company to assist with home construction. In both cases, 
principals delegate authority to their agents, and agents act on behalf of principals, 
typically in exchange for some form of compensation. Agency Theory predicts this 
relationship poses potential problems such as the moral hazard of the agent’s self-interest, 
the agent’s unwillingness to assume the same level of risk that the principal is willing to 
accept, and the problem of asymmetric information. Asymmetric information is any data, 
communication, or knowledge held by one party that is not immediately available to the 
other. Agency Theory proposes that these types of problems potentially represent 
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inefficiencies and costs and, therefore, efforts to minimize or mitigate them should be 
addressed in the principal-agent contractual arrangement. Gormey and Matsa (2016) 
support such a viewpoint in discussing agency theory and managerial preferences. 
 When considering the problems posed by Agency Theory, researchers might find 
it is useful to understand how agreements among CMS, MAOs, and provider groups are 
sustainable. That understanding is an essential element of this research. Health plans, 
provider groups, and individual providers will seek or attract various populations, and the 
attributes of those populations potentially relate to plan choice and service utilization. 
Therefore, we begin with an examination of the healthcare financing and delivery 
continuum. 
 Conrad (1999) offered an early but somewhat rudimentary depiction of the 
hierarchy of healthcare risks and costs (see Exhibit 3). We interpret this model as follows. 
“The Health Plan” represents an MAO.  “The Provider Network/Intermediary” represents 
a healthcare provider network or group entering an RB contract with the MAO. “The 
Independent Provider Organization” equates to a legal entity such as a primary care 
medical practice corporation that is an owner of, or participant in, the provider network. 
“The Individual Primary Care Physician” is an owner or member of the medical practice 
corporation to which specific patients are attributed. “The Non-primary Care Specialist” 
is a physician to which a PCP would refer a patient for medical care that cannot be 
provided by the PCP. 
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Exhibit 3. Conrad’s Risk-bearing Hierarchy 
  
 
Exhibit 3. Obtained from “Risk-bearing arrangements and capital financing strategies for 
integrated health systems : Conceptual framework and case examples,” by D. Conrad, 
1999, The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Volume 39(4) Winter 1999, p. 
451. Copyright 1999 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois. 
 
 In Exhibit 4, we present an updated and expanded view of the RB hierarchy by 
defining the many principal-agent relationships within a typical Medicare Advantage plan 
structure. Here we display a series of cascading relationships whereby many players 
simultaneously perform in the role of principal and agent. From the cascade’s beginning 
to its end, the delegation of authority and funds dissemination diminishes with each step. 
Why does this model hold up? For example, it is unclear what effect, good or bad, the RB 
PCP compensation model has on the Medicare Advantage program. Nevertheless, we 
know that this compensation model has been in place for MAOs and PCPs in the St. 
Louis, Missouri, market for more than 20 years (Deaconess, 1995). This history raises 
questions. Are agency theory’s predicted problems somehow mitigated within the 
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cascade? Is there the presence of bounded self-interest as discussed by Bosse and Phillips 
(2018) wherein the RB PCPs perceive their MAOs to be fair, resulting in behavior that is 
rewarding to both parties? Does this RB compensation model contain incentives 
compatible with the desired outcomes as contemplated by the Theory of Value-based 
Payments in Conrad’s later research (2016)?  Let us further examine these relationships. 
  
Exhibit 4. The Cascading Principal-Agent Relationships of Medicare Advantage 
  
Exhibit 4. Author’s creation. 
 
 P1-A2. The beneficiary is the insured person who relies upon the Federal 
Government, the agent, to provide access to Medicare medical benefits and health 
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insurance coverage. The beneficiary pays for these services via federal income tax dollars 
and Medicare Part B premiums to the Federal Government’s Internal Revenue Service. 
 P2-A3. The Federal Government assumes the role of the principal as it delegates 
the benefits and insurance coverage responsibility to its agent, HHS. HHS receives 
funding via an appropriation in the annual federal budgeting process. 
 P3-A4. HHS assumes the role of the principal as it delegates the benefits and 
insurance coverage responsibility to its agent, CMS, a unit of HHS. CMS receives 
funding via general revenue, payroll taxes, and beneficiary premium payments, all of 
which are collected by the federal government. 
 P4-A5. CMS becomes a principal as it delegates some of its responsibilities to its 
agents, the private health insurance companies approved by the Medicare Advantage 
program. These insurance companies are called Medicare Advantage Organizations 
(MAOs). They receive a monthly capitation payment for each beneficiary insured in their 
plan. The payment amounts derive from a multi-faceted methodology that incorporates 
various factors such as a bidding process, patients’ health statuses, average annual costs 
of care, and geographical locations. 
 P5-A6. The MAO, in the role of principal, delegates medical care responsibilities 
to their agents, the provider networks that enter into various payment arrangements, 
including RB compensation, with the MAOs. A provider network can take many forms, 
such as a contracting group representing several primary care medical practices, or a 
large, clinically integrated network comprising entities such as hospitals, outpatient 
facilities, medical practices, and ancillary service providers.  
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 P6-A7. The provider network, as principal, engages PCPs as its agents, either 
through sub-contracts or employment. Many MAOs require the beneficiary to select a 
provider network PCP as their medical gatekeeper. The PCP directly or indirectly (via the 
provider network) receives payments from up to five sources: the patient (from 
deductibles, co-payments, and fee-based services); a monthly capitation payment; a share 
of the surplus (or deficit) from the medical budget; and various outcomes incentive 
payments from the MAO.   
 Other relationships after A7. PCP gatekeepers, as principals, refer patients to 
other providers, their agents, as appropriate, with those provider payments assessed 
against the RB budgets. These referrals typically occur when the patient’s medical needs 
are beyond the clinical competency of the PCP or the service capabilities within the 
PCP’s medical practice. It is from these referral and payment arrangements that the RB 
model of compensation occurs. We shall later describe the specifics of this arrangement. 
Downstream providers may engage other providers (e.g., hospitals contracting with 
emergency medicine physicians for coverage in the emergency department) and so on. 
These principal-agent relationships continue along the healthcare continuum until the 
patient’s medical needs are satisfied.  
 Also, we note two other principal-agent associations. First is the beneficiary’s 
selection of the MAO to provide a selection of Medicare Advantage plans that include 
access to provider networks. Second is the beneficiary’s selection of a PCP gatekeeper 
(typically required by the MAO plan). In both cases, the beneficiary is the principal 
delegating authority and facilitating funding to its agents. 
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 It is this cascade of relationships from the beneficiary to the final healthcare 
provider on the medical care continuum that demonstrates a robust presence of principal-
agent arrangements in the MA industry. We believe this business environment supports 
our selection of Agency Theory as the context for this research. 
 Eisenhardt’s Agency Theory Overview offers additional support to our theoretical 
approach. In our view, each of the seven elements described in her overview applies to 
the MAO/PCP arrangement. In Exhibit 5, we offer our application for each of 
Eisenhardt’s constructs as they relate to the MAO/PCP relationship. 
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Exhibit 5. Eisenhardt’s Agency Theory Overview 
  
  
Element  Eisenhardt’s Constructs 
Our Application to the 
MAO/PCP Relationship 
    
Key Idea  Principal-agent relationships should reflect 
efficient organization of information and risk-
bearing costs. 
Information exchange is encouraged by both 
parties as they seek to minimize risk, reduce the 
cost of care, and optimize financial 
performance. Much information exchange 
occurs during joint conferences and via website 
portals. The MAO and PCP share the enrollee’s 
medical costs via mutual agreement. 
    
Unit of Analysis  Contract between principal and agent There is a formal agreement signed by the 
MAO and PCP.  
    
Human assumptions  Self-interest 
Bounded rationality 
Risk aversion 
An MAO’s contractual agreement with the PCP 
imposes terms, conditions, incentives, and 
compromises designed to address PCP’s self-
interests, bounded rationality, and risk aversion.  
    
Organization 
assumptions 
 Partial goal conflict among participants 
Efficiency as the effectiveness criterion 
Information asymmetry between principal and 
agent 
An MAO typically is a large corporation with 
abundant resources, formal processes, and a 
structured hierarchy. A PCP generally operates 
in a smaller, autonomous environment with 
limited resources. Cultural and operational 
differences likely exist. 
 
    
Information 
assumption 
 Information as a purchasable commodity MAOs and providers can invest in technology 
and human resources to capture and exchange 
information. Both seek timely information 
capture and exchange. MAOs also invest in 
monitoring activities to ensure adequate 
information capture. 
    
Contracting problems  Agency (moral hazard and adverse selection) 
Risk sharing 
MAOs and PCPs attempt to address these 
concerns through prolonged contract 
negotiations, complex terms and conditions, and 
risk-sharing formulas designed to drive the 
intended behaviors and outcomes.  
    
Problem domain  Relationships in which the principal and agent 
have partly differing goals and risk preferences 
(e.g., compensation, regulation, leadership, 
impression management, whistle-blowing, 
vertical integration, transfer pricing) 
The MAO desires for the PCPs to undertake 
every possible action to optimize each 
enrollee’s health while minimizing costs. The 
PCPs have multiple patients, busy practices, 
multiple payer agreements with MAOs, and 
limited resources. Goal conflicts, inefficiencies, 
and information exchange challenges are 
inevitable. It is through contract terms and 
information exchange that the parties seek to 
engage productively with one another. 
  
Exhibit 5: Adapted from “Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review,” by Kathleen M. 
Eisenhardt, 1989, The Academy of Management Review 14(1), p. 59. Copyright 1989 by 
the Academy of Management. 
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 To further validate our selection of Agency Theory as the context for this study, 
we found several examples of researchers incorporating Agency Theory into their works 
related to healthcare subject matter.  Schneider & Mathios (2006) use the principal-agent 
framework in their study of healthcare utilization and the associated monitoring costs 
incurred by healthcare insurers. Their discussion places the insurer as the principal and 
the physician as the agent. A stylized model of the principal-agent relationship is 
proposed by Kantarevic & Kralj (2015) to investigate physician payment contracts. They 
identify “payers” as the principals and the physicians as the agents. Sinclair-Desgagne’ & 
Spaeter (2017) examine incentive compensation in a “static principal-agent moral hazard 
setting.” They identify the patient as a principal who engages the actions of a physician as 
their agent. Fuloria & Zenios identify principal-agent problems involving treatment 
intensity. Their principals are the purchasers of healthcare services, and the agents are the 
providers of healthcare services. Jiang, Pang, & Savin evaluate principal-agent 
contracting models for the allocation of outpatient capacity. In their model, purchasers of 
healthcare services are the principals, and healthcare providers are the agents. Each of 
these studies examines various aspects of predicted principal-agent problems such as 
asymmetric information, incentive alignment, and inefficiency. In conclusion, we find 
that the use of Agency Theory as a theoretical underpinning in healthcare research is not 
uncommon.  
2.7 Other Research 
 Our research uncovered only one study (Landon et al. 2012) that offered a 
comprehensive comparison of Traditional Medicare and Medicare Advantage services 
utilization. The study concluded that Medicare Advantage beneficiaries utilize fewer 
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services than those in Traditional Medicare. Like ours, that study controlled for attributes 
such as race/ethnicity, age, sex, residence zip code, and expected socio-economic status. 
Each beneficiary’s race/ethnicity, age, sex, and residence zip codes were extracted from 
the CMS Master Beneficiary Summary Files. One of the study’s two socio-economic 
variables was “beneficiaries age greater than 65 living below the federal poverty level.” 
The second socio-economic variable was “urban.” While there is no mention of the data 
sources, we surmise that the beneficiaries’ residences zip codes likely were the bases for 
those determinations. 
 Because they lacked the diagnostic codes for individual Medicare Advantage 
patients and were unable to calculate risk adjustment scores, the researchers used data 
from the Medicare Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems surveys 
as a proxy for the beneficiaries’ health statuses. Over several years, the surveys were 
conducted by mail with telephone follow-up to secure random, representative samples of 
the Traditional Medicare and Medicare advantage populations. The survey respondents 
were asked to report their general and mental health statuses using a scale of excellent to 
poor. This health status proxy is cited as a limitation in the study.  
 The study also did not consider the compensation arrangements of PCPs. The 
authors suggested that more research is needed to understand the management practices 
of Medicare Advantage plans, the plan designs, and how they relate to healthcare 
financing and delivery reform. Nevertheless, our literature review suggests that this was 
the first and perhaps only comprehensive study that compares service utilization patterns 
for Traditional Medicare and Medicare Advantage beneficiaries, and does so with 
consideration to beneficiary characteristics. 
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 Our study contrasts with this previous research. First, we identify all major 
stakeholders in the Medicare program to better understand the critical players in the 
federal government’s effort to reform healthcare and how that relates to the growth of 
Medicare Advantage enrollment. Second, we incorporate a theoretical basis, Agency 
Theory, to understand the relationships, issues, and challenges among those stakeholders. 
Third, from our field research and physician interviews, we describe the nature of RB 
compensation arrangements between MAOs and PCPs. Fourth, by calculating the CCMI 
score for each service category for each beneficiary using the reported diagnostic codes 
from patients’ medical claims and encounter records, we present an improved method for 
defining the beneficiary’s health status. Fifth, we incorporate values for hospital 
proximity and physician presence to control for health services availability and to assess 
their impact on plan choices and services utilization. Sixth, we consider the impact of 
various Medicare plan choices on beneficiary services utilization. Seventh, by limiting 
our study to a regional market, in this case, the state of Missouri, we incorporate a known 
RB PCP compensation arrangement (gleaned from our field research) as a variable that is 
useful in assessing the effect of that arrangement on service utilization. Lastly, our access 
to 2016 data allows us to conduct analyses based on recent information. With these 
enhancements, we construct an improved framework for understanding many inner 
workings of the Medicare program while investigating the effects of a beneficiary’s 
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Chapter 3: Initial Research and Hypotheses 
 
 Early in this research, we undertook two initiatives. First, we conducted a limited, 
qualitative research project with a PCP group to better understand the research domain, 
especially concerning what incentivizes them to engage in RB contracts and to learn 
more about the nature of those contracts. As part of that experience, we attended several 
meetings between the group and two MAOs. In all meetings, the parties discussed 
performance metrics and related information. Second, we developed a model (see 
Appendix A for additional discussion) that simulates many of the financial elements of 
RB contracts that might exist between MAOs and PCPs. The following section 
summarizes these efforts. 
3.1 Incentives for PCPs to engage in risk-bearing contracts 
 To enhance our domain knowledge, on four occasions during the year prior to the 
start of this study, we observed business meetings of Harmony IPA, LLC (Harmony), an 
independent physician association (IPA) operating in the St. Louis, Missouri, 
metropolitan area. Harmony’s membership is comprised of ten Board-certified, primary 
care physicians. Harmony is a physician-owned, physician-led firm created for the 
exclusive purpose of contracting with Medicare Advantage plans and managing the care 
of the attributed patients. A “sub-agency” relationship exists between Harmony and each 
physician member who contractually agrees to accept the terms and conditions in the 
agreements between Harmony and the MAOs.  
 All members were invited to attend their business meetings (each lasted about two 
and a half hours), and a majority did during our presence. At these business meetings, 
among other agenda items, we discussed our research, their experience with risk-based 
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compensation, and their relationships with MAOs. During three meetings, part of the 
agenda was devoted to discussions with representatives from MAOs, an exercise known 
as the Joint Operation Committee (JOC) meetings. Separately, we also conducted a semi-
structured interview with each of the Harmony PCPs. The interviews were designed 
principally to encourage each PCP to discuss their understanding of their RB agreements, 
their relationships with the MAOs, and the impact of Medicare Advantage plans on their 
IPA, medical practices, and patients.  
 Harmony has about 3,000 Medicare Advantage beneficiaries attributed to them by 
two different MAOs, and its PCPs accept up to 80% of the medical cost risk associated 
with those beneficiaries. Harmony PCPs say this is because the St. Louis area was an 
early adopter of Medicare Advantage plans. Most Harmony PCPs, through various 
corporate structures, have participated in RB payment arrangements for more than 20 
years. Some of the Harmony physicians spoke of their association with Deaconess 
Hospital and its St. Louis Medical Group dating to the early 1990s when the organization 
contracted with Medicare Advantage plans when they first appeared in the area. The 
PCPs tell us that their experience and financial success with RB agreements offer 
confidence and comfort to continue with those engagements. 
 We note that MAOs, depending on the laws in the states where they operate, may 
have the option of employing their medical providers or otherwise owning medical 
practices, rather than contracting with entities like Harmony to provide such services. In 
Missouri, the MAOs could do so because there is no statutory prohibition against the 
corporate practice of medicine (“Health care regulatory primer,” 2017). From the PCPs 
and MAOs’ representatives we have interviewed, we conclude that the MAOs in the St. 
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Louis area generally prefer the third party arrangement, hence the agency relationship 
with Harmony and other provider organizations. 
  Based on our interviews with Harmony physicians and witnessing their 
interactions with MAOs, we offer three observations. First, MAOs enter into contracts 
with CMS because the MAOs believe they have the expertise needed to care for a defined 
patient population, and can do so profitably. The two MAOs that contract with Harmony 
are large corporations, one with a national presence and one with a regional presence. In 
Missouri, these two MAOs enroll about 27% of the Medicare Advantage beneficiaries. 
They each have local offices staffed with dozens of professionals that include but are not 
limited to administrators, marketers, provider recruiters, information technologists, nurse 
case managers, auditors, actuaries, and clerical support staff. The MAO representatives 
stated that the St. Louis-area operations are among the most profitable in their companies. 
 Second, the Harmony PCPs report there are significant financial incentives to 
manage aggressively the overall cost of care for the Medicare Advantage patients 
assigned to them. Consequently, they must proactively monitor patient care activity both 
inside and outside of their medical practices. For example, they insist that facilities and 
specialists to whom they refer patients provide regular updates or reports that inform each 
patient’s status. Another example is the importance of timely communications from 
hospital emergency department physicians who attend to the PCPs’ patients.  In both 
cases, they expect to participate in the care management planning for their patients to 
avoid duplicative testing, clinically unnecessary procedures, and unmanaged referrals. 
During their interviews, several Harmony PCPs told us that they believe their care 
management techniques carry over to their Traditional Medicare patients. They have 
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adopted these disciplines as part of their ordinary office operations even though the 
financial rewards are significantly less. Third, within a PCP’s medical practice, a PCP 
will have a more exceptional ability to manage the overall cost of care for Medicare 
Advantage patients than their Traditional Medicare patients because they (PCPs) receive 
informational and operational support from the MAOs. This type of support includes the 
MAO’s provision of a website portal where PCPs and their staff can access timely 
clinical and financial information about their attributed patients. Other examples include 
but are not limited to: a) assistance with on-site medical record audits and documentation 
to assure that procedure and diagnostic codes are adequately documented, b) MAO-
generated prompts that remind PCPs and their staff to encourage patients to schedule 
appointments for routine care such as annual physical exams or specialized care such as 
eye examinations for diabetic patients, c) identification of patient care opportunities that 
lead to improved financial results and d) access to price information that is useful when 
considering where to refer patients. They do not receive this same level of support from 
the Traditional Medicare program because there is not an administrative infrastructure in 
place to do so. 
 Related to PCP care management activity, including referral patterns and 
communication with other providers, is the composition of an MAO’s provider network. 
CMS guidelines state: 
“CMS requires that organizations contract with a sufficient number of providers 
and facilities to ensure that at least 90 percent of enrollees within a county can 
access care within specific travel time and distance maximums” (cms.gov, 
2017).” 
 
CMS’ health service delivery manual entitled “CY2016 MA HSD Provider and Facility 
Specialties and Network Adequacy Criteria Guidance” describes expectations for the 
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minimum number of doctors, hospitals, and other service providers that must be present 
in each county of the MAO’s plan coverage area. Those expectations are based on county 
type. There are five county types: a) Large Metro, b) Metro, c) Micro, d) Rural and e) 
Counties with Extreme Access. Doctor coverage, for example, also includes requirements 
for each of several specialties. Other service requirements may be defined as programs, 
provider affiliations, or facilities. Each minimum coverage requirement generally is 
stated as a ratio per 1,000 beneficiaries residing in a county. For example, CMS set a 
standard of 12.2 inpatient hospital beds per 1,000 beneficiaries in a county.  MAOs make 
these various calculations when submitting their plan applications to CMS. They also 
must submit justifications for any guideline exceptions. According to CMS, some 
exceptions are allowed. Consequently, the composition of provider networks may differ 
among MAO plans, and provider access may vary by county within a plan coverage area.  
Therefore, we conclude that an MAO’s plan profile is shaped, in part, by its provider 
network, and that affects a beneficiary’s access to and use of doctors and hospitals.  
 From our research, fieldwork, contract reviews, and industry experience, we 
propose in Exhibit 6, a conceptual design of the relationships and processes existing 
among the players in this environment. It also demonstrates how those relationships 
affect patient health status, services utilization, and financial outcomes (note: the 
author is a healthcare administrator with thirty-five years’ experience that includes 
negotiating several Medicare Advantage agreements between insurers and providers). 
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The boxes in Exhibit 6 diagram indicate factors in the healthcare financing and 
delivery environment that affect Medicare Advantage stakeholders. The initiating 
party, CMS, supplies contract terms and conditions that define the various Medicare 
plan choices. The CMS contract terms influence the MAO’s plan contracts with the 
beneficiaries and providers recruited by the MAO for participation in its plan. The 
characteristics of the beneficiary, plan, and PCPs influence the process by which 
PCPs render healthcare services (including mix and quantity) to each beneficiary. 
The mix and quantity of services consumed by the beneficiary influence the 
beneficiary’s health status and potentially drive successive service utilization events. 
Service utilization also impacts the beneficiary’s out-of-pocket costs, the MAO’s 
financial results, and the compensation paid to PCPs, all of which are related to the 
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contract terms first initiated in the process. The process concludes with reconciled 
payments from the MAO to PCP. This basic diagram is useful in exposing the 
various financial risks assumed by the parties. 
3.2 Financial Risk Models 
 Our understanding of financial risk comes from a review of current service 
agreements between Harmony and two MAOs. The definition is also informed by 
previous payer-provider negotiations experience. The contract language within these 
agreements, combined with Harmony’s internal risk-assignment protocols, reveals 
numerous and complex terms whereby the PCPs collectively and individually incur 
financial risk. We also discovered that these contracts contain confidentiality statements 
that prohibit public and private disclosure (even for research purposes) of the specific 
terms and conditions, the MAOs’ proprietary information, and Harmony’s financial 
performance resulting from the contracts. Nevertheless, from our interviews with 
Harmony participants, our contract reviews, our fieldwork, and our thirty-five years’ 
healthcare administration experience, we can extract distinctive features of these types of 
agreements. These features reveal representative components of the compensation paid to 
RB PCPs that care for Medicare beneficiaries. In Exhibit 7, we display a prototypical 
model that incorporates several of these features. Also, see Appendix A for more 
discussion of PCP RB compensation arrangements with MAOs. 
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Exhibit 7. Author’s Depiction of RB Funds Flow 
*For payment of services provided by Physicians (PCPs and Specialists), Hospitals and 
Other Facilities, Ancillary Service Providers, Durable Medical Equipment, Home 


















































 In Exhibit 7, the solid boxes represent the stakeholders, the arrows represent the 
flow of dollars, and the shaded box represents the pool of funds available to pay the 
beneficiary’s medical costs. The model demonstrates how the PCP organization may 
generate revenue from any of five sources: a) MAO’s advances, b) MAO bonus 
payments, c) FFS payments, d) share of surplus or deficit, and e) beneficiary co-payments 
or unmet deductible obligations. Financial risk resides with the Medical Expense Pool. 
 The complexity of the model is due to various contractual terms that incorporate 
several pages of definitions, formulas, and inter-related payment methods that 
collectively determine the PCPs’ compensation. For example, an MAO-PCP contract 
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may include advance capitation payments that must be return in full or part if the medical 
pool reconciles to a deficit position. Another example concerns the percentage share of a 
pool surplus. The PCP’s share may be determined, in part, by the achievement or non-
achievement of benchmarks for clinical outcomes or service utilization. These types of 
post-service delivery arrangements can materially affect the amount of financial risk 
assumed by the PCP. Consequently, the RB funds flow model is much more complicated 
than the FFS model (see Exhibit 8), whereby PCPs generate revenue from any of three 
sources: a) FFS payments, b) incentive bonuses, and c) beneficiary co-payments or unmet 
deductible obligations. 
 




 Table 1 contrasts these two forms of payment (RB and FFS). The dollar amounts 
and quantities of services shown are hypothetical, but they reasonably approximate actual 
data. Let us assume that CMS actuaries have determined that a specific patient is allotted 














Co-pays and Unmet Deductibles
Premium
Payment
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upcoming calendar year. This amount stems from an algorithm based on several factors, 
such as the patient’s gender, age, health status, and place of residence, as well as the 
average historical cost of care demographically comparable Medicare patients. In the FFS 
program, a patient may see a PCP four times per calendar year. In this illustration, the 
payment from CMS to the PCP averages $120 per visit, totaling $480 annually (4 visits at 
$120 each) and leaving a balance of $9,520 for payments to other healthcare services. 
The $480 total payments equate to an average of about $40 per month. If more than 
$10,000 of budgeted costs are incurred in this calendar year, CMS incurs them. If less 
than the budgeted costs are incurred in the calendar year, CMS retains the unspent funds. 
 In the RB model, the calendar year budget is paid in monthly installments by 
CMS to the MAO for each beneficiary enrolled with the MAO. In this illustration, the 
annual payment for one specific patient is $10,000.  The MAO typically retains a portion 
of the budget, say 15%, to cover its operating costs, to pay for some specialized services 
for the patients, to establish reserves for unexpected losses, and, presumably, to capture a 
profit. The PCP group may or may not receive from the MAO any direct payments for 
services rendered to the patient. Any direct payments are defined by the contract terms 
between the PCP group and the MAO. In this illustration, a PCP group member assigned 
as the patient’s medical gatekeeper aggressively manages the patient’s care, offers 
abundant services in the primary care setting, and limits patient referrals to only the most 
efficient and effective healthcare providers outside the PCP’s medical practice location. 
As a result, the total amount paid to all providers is $6,500 for the calendar year. That 
amount, added to the $1,500 MAO’s retention, totals $8,000, leaving a $2,000 surplus. In 
this hypothetical contract between the MAO and the PCP group, the MAO apportions 
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80% of the surplus (or deficit) to the PCP group. In this case, the $2,000 annual surplus 
yields a $1,600 total annual payment to the group, for a monthly average of $133 for this 
one patient. The distribution of the surplus within the group is a function of contractual 
payment arrangements agreed upon by the group’s members. The balance of the surplus 
is retained by the MAO, which, in this case, is $400 annually or about $33 per month. 
 
Table 1 FFS vs. RB Compensation Illustration 
FFS vs. RB Compensation Illustration  











MAO Retention n/a  1,500 
PCP FFS Payments 480  0 
Other Provider Payments 9,520  6,500 








PCP Share of Surplus/Deficit n/a  80% 
PCP Earnings n/a  1,600 
PCP Average Earnings per Month 40  133 
    
Note: n/a = not applicable 
 
By comparing the average monthly earnings for the two scenarios, one observes that the 
RB PCP earns approximately three times the FFS arrangement. To put this in further 
perspective, we reviewed actual data indicating that Harmony PCPs averaged more than 
$170 per member (beneficiary) per month for fourteen years with one of the MAOs. For 
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example, a Harmony physician having 100 patients in this plan would realize annual 
revenue of approximately $204,000 (100 patients x $170/month x 12 months) based on 
this MAO’s contract with Harmony. Furthermore, this revenue (i.e., $204,000) is in 
addition to earnings received from the other patients in the medical practice. This level of 
financial success suggests that the principal-agent relationship, and corresponding 
contract, must be mutually beneficial because both parties continue in a similar 
contractual relationship today. Furthermore, it suggests the contract terms and the parties’ 
relationship with one another mitigates problems predicted by agency theory. 
3.3 Hypotheses 
 We formulate the following hypotheses based on the collective insights gleaned 
from our literature review, fieldwork, contract reviews, funds flow models, and 
compensation comparisons.  
 Hypothesis 1. We expect that a beneficiary’s traits of age, gender, race, and 
health status (as defined by their CCMI score) will have statistical relevance to the 
Medicare plan choice. Also, we expect a beneficiary’s access to medical care (as defined 
by their proximity to hospitals and the number of doctors in their county) is a significant 
factor in plan choice. Further, it is believed that a beneficiary’s presumed income and 
educational attainment, as determined by their residence zip code and county, are 
additional factors that also affect plan choice. Accordingly, we state H1: Medicare plan 
choice is statistically related to a beneficiary’s traits, access to healthcare, and presumed 
levels of income and education. 
 Hypothesis 2. Medical services received by Medicare beneficiaries will vary 
according to beneficiary characteristics, access to medical care in their county of 
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residence, the demographic characteristics of individuals who reside in the same Postal 
Zip code, and the choice of Medicare plans. Therefore, we propose H2: A beneficiary’s 
traits, access to healthcare, presumed levels of income and education, and Medicare plan 
choice collectively are statistically related to service utilization. 
 Hypothesis 3. RB PCPs pro-actively engage in medical care and care 
management activity designed for efficient care delivery both inside and outside their 
medical practice locations. They also receive operational support from the MAO’s with 
whom they have contracts. Accordingly, we state H3 as follows: Beneficiaries of HMO 
plans that contract with RB PCPs as medical gatekeepers use fewer healthcare services 
than do beneficiaries of other plans, and those differences are statistically significant.  
 In Exhibit 9, we insert these hypotheses into the significant factors model to 
demonstrate their presence in the model. 
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To summarize, we predict that beneficiary personal attributes, access to doctors and 
hospitals, and presumed levels of income and education all are statistically relevant to 
Medicare plan choices (H1). Furthermore, we predict that the explanatory variables in 
H1, along with Medicare plan choice, are statistically related to service utilization (H2). 
We also expect that the presence of RB PCPs results in fewer, per-beneficiary services 
utilization as compared to the FFS model (H3). Operationally, we propose that these 
significant factors have downstream implications, namely the beneficiary’s ongoing 
health status and the stakeholders’ financial results. 
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Chapter 4: Methods 
 This research requires an in-depth understanding of the Medicare system and the 
technical data contained in the research files. There are dozens of Medicare plan options, 
hundreds of unique variables, and tens of thousands of standardized diagnosis and 
procedure codes. Some of the data describe each beneficiary’s attributes, insurance plan, 
and the schedule of benefits received from their insurance plans. Other data describe the 
disease diagnoses, medical procedures, the places of those procedures, and incurred costs 
attributable to each beneficiary. There are numerous instructions, data dictionaries, and 
record layout files, both public and private, compiled to guide researchers in the proper 
use and interpretation of these data.  Also, the research data have some limitations that, if 
ignored, might result in spurious conclusions from statistical analysis. In this chapter, we 
offer an overview of many of the essential data elements that compose the Medicare 
research files. We also discuss the approach for our study. 
4.1 Medicare Data 
 CMS produces more than fifty archival data files for use in research. It contracts 
with a third party to operate the Research Data Assistance Center (ResDAC), a resource 
agency designed to assist researchers in facilitating requests for research data and 
interpreting that data. ResDAC, located at the University of Minnesota in Minneapolis, is 
staffed by faculty and staff to assist researchers with their CMS-related projects. The FFS 
data are derived from insurance claims processed by CMS third-party contractors, 
and the HMO data come from encounter data reported by MAOs. All data are stored 
in and retrieved from CMS’ data repository called the Chronic Conditions 
Warehouse. Researchers may access the data via an interactive, online capability 
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made available by CMS. Alternatively, a researcher may request to purchase the data 
placed on an external storage medium shipped to the researcher -- the method 
selected for this study.  
 The CMS file structure complexities, and the quantity of data elements contained 
therein, can be daunting to researchers. Fortunately, ResDAC also offers an instructional 
website and annually hosts several workshops to educate researchers. We attended two of 
the multi-day workshops. One workshop focused on using Traditional Medicare data and 
the other on the use of Medicare Advantage data. The information disseminated at these 
workshops, coupled with the staff’s technical guidance, was instrumental in our 
successful application and receipt of Medicare research data.  
4.2 Medicare Codes 
 CMS utilizes various coding systems in its administration of health insurance 
benefits programs, including the Medicare programs. Coding is integral to administering 
both Traditional Medicare and Medicare Advantage programs because it is the basis for 
reporting types and volumes of services rendered by healthcare providers. Further, the 
research data from CMS incorporates the entirety of each coding system. Because we 
organize some of the research data using standard grouping conventions and apply those 
conventions to the development of some variables, it is essential to provide an overview 
of these coding systems. 
 4.2.1 ICD Diagnosis codes. The World Health Organization (WHO) is 
responsible for defining and continuously updating a code set known as the International 
Classification of Diseases (ICD). According to WHO, the 
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“ICD is the foundation for the identification of health trends and statistics 
globally, and the international standard for reporting diseases and health 
conditions. It is the diagnostic classification standard for all clinical and 
research purposes. ICD defines the universe of diseases, disorders, injuries and 
other related health conditions, listed in a comprehensive, hierarchical fashion 
…”  
Virtually every hospital, outpatient, and physician encounter record within CMS’ massive 
data warehouse contains one or more ICD codes representing the injuries and diseases 
experienced by each beneficiary. 
 In the third quarter of 2015, the ICD codes underwent a significant revision that 
expanded the number of codes from about 14,000 codes (identified as the ICD 9th 
revision or ICD-9) to approximately 68,000 codes and sub-codes (identified as the ICD 
10th revision or ICD-10). Consequently, in 2015 and 2016, some CMS records contain 
both ICD-9 codes and ICD-10 codes. Fortunately, the codes can be placed into general 
groupings that allow researchers to aggregate the individual codes into logical categories 
(see Table 2). Also, because ICD-9 codes and ICD-10 codes contain different prefixes, 
we can identify codes from either version. 
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Table 2 International Classification of Diseases (ICD) Versions 9 & 10 
International Classification of Diseases (ICD) Versions 9 & 10 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Version 9 Version 10 Description 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
001-139   A00-B99 Infectious and Parasitic Diseases 
140-239   C00-D49 Neoplasms 
240-279   E00-E89 Endocrine, Nutritional and Metabolic Diseases, and Immunity 
Disorders 
280-289   D50-D89 Diseases of the Blood and Blood-Forming Organs 
290-319   F01-F99 Mental Disorders 
320-389   G00-H95 Diseases of the Nervous System and Sense Organs 
390-459   I00-I99  Diseases of the Circulatory System 
460-519   J00-J99  Diseases of the Respiratory System 
520-579   K00-K95 Diseases of the Digestive System 
580-629   N00-N99 Diseases of the Genitourinary System 
630-677   O00-O9A  Complications of Pregnancy, Childbirth, and the Puerperium 
680-709   L00-L99 Diseases of the Skin and Subcutaneous Tissue 
710-739   M00-M99 Diseases of the Musculoskeletal System and Connective Tissue 
740-759   Q00-Q99 Congenital Anomalies 
760-779   P00-P96 Certain Conditions Originating in the Perinatal Period 
780-799   R00-R99 Symptoms, Signs, and Ill-Defined Conditions 
800-999   S00-T88 Injury and Poisoning 
V01-V86   Z00-Z99 Supplementary Classification of Factors Influencing Health 
Status and Contact with Health Services 




Note: Adapted from ICD-10-CM, International Classification of Diseases, 9th & 10th Revisions, p. vi. 
Copyright 2014 by Practice Management Information Corporation. 
 
  
 4.2.2 ICD Procedure codes. Related to the ICD-9 and ICD-10 diagnostic codes 
are the ICD-9 and ICD-10 procedure codes.  The Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) mandated that providers submit these procedure 
codes on all inpatient medical claims submitted to Medicare (American Hospital 
Association, 2009). In the Medicare programs, there are no other required uses of these 
codes. ICD-9 procedure codes are identified as Volume 3 codes and contain three to four 
MEDICARE PLAN ATTRIBUTES  56 
 
digits (including two decimals). There are approximately 3,800 such codes. ICD-10 
procedure codes are identified as Procedure Coding System (PCS) codes and contain 
seven alpha-numeric characters. There are more than 70,000 ICD-10 PCS codes. Tables 3 
and 4 demonstrate the code groupings from the two ICD coding systems in effect 
beginning in 2015. 
 
Table 3 2015 ICD-9 Volume 3 Procedure Code Groups 






00-00 Procedures and Interventions, Not Elsewhere Classified 
01-05 Operations on the Nervous System 
06-07 Operations on the Endocrine System 
08-16 Operations on the Eye 
17-17 Other Miscellaneous Diagnostic and Therapeutic Procedures 
18-20 Operations on the Ear 
21-29 Operations on the Nose, Mouth, and Pharynx 
30-34 Operations on the Respiratory System 
35-39 Operations on the Cardiovascular System 
40-41 Operations on the Hemic and Lymphatic System 
42-54 Operations on the Digestive System 
55-59 Operations on the Urinary System 
60-64 Operations on the Male Genital Organs 
65-71 Operations on the Female Genital Organs 
72-75 Obstetrical Procedures 
76-84 Operations on the Musculoskeletal System 
85-86 Operations on the Integumentary System 
87-99 Miscellaneous Diagnostic and Therapeutic Procedures 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note: Adapted from International Classification of Diseases 9th Revision, p. vi. Copyright 2014 by Practice 
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Table 4 ICD-10 PCS Procedure Code Groups 
ICD-10 PCS Procedure Code Groups 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Codes    Descriptions 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
0016070-0YWBXYZ Section 0 - Medical and Surgical 
102073Z-10Y07ZY Section 1 - Obstetrics 
2W00X0Z-2Y55X5Z Section 2 - Placement 
30230AZ-3E1Y38Z Section 3 - Administration 
4A0002Z-4B0FXVZ Section 4 - Measurement and Monitoring 
5A02110-5A2204Z Section 5 - Extracorporeal or Systemic Assistance and 
Performance 
6A0Z0ZZ-6ABT0BZ Section 6 - Extracorporeal or Systemic Therapies 
7W00X0Z-7W09X9Z Section 7 - Osteopathic 
8C01X6J-8E0ZXY6 Section 8 - Other Procedures 
9WB0XBZ-9WB9XLZ Section 9 - Chiropractic 
B00B0ZZ-BY4GZZZ Section B - Imaging 
C0101ZZ-CW7YYZZ Section C - Nuclear Medicine 
D0000ZZ-DWY6FZZ Section D - Radiation Therapy 
F003GKZ-F15Z7ZZ Section F - Physical Rehabilitation and Diagnostic Audiology 
GZ10ZZZ-GZJZZZZ Section G - Mental Health 
HZ2ZZZZ-HZ99ZZZ Section H - Substance Abuse Treatment 
X2A5312-XY0VX83 Section X - New Technology 
02VW0DJ-XNS4432 -/+ Deleted, Replaced, Expanded Codes 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note: Information obtained at https://www.findacode.com/code-set.php?set=ICD10PCS 
  
 4.2.3 HCPCS Procedure codes. CMS, in coordination with the American 
Medical Association, publishes the Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System 
(HCPCS). “HCPCS is a collection of standardized codes that represent medical 
procedures, supplies, products, and services. The codes are used to facilitate the 
processing of health insurance claims by Medicare and other insurers… HCPCS is 
divided into two subsystems, Level I and Level II. Level I comprise Current Procedural 
Terminology® codes (CPT), each consisting of five numeric digits, some containing an 
additional two-digit modifier that helps to describe additional or unusual services or 
circumstances. Level II HCPCS codes identify products, supplies, and services not 
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included in CPT. Level II codes consist of a letter followed by four numeric digits” 
(National Institute of Health, 2020). 
 Additionally, CMS organizes the HCPCS codes into medical service groups (see 
Table 5). Our research utilizes these groups to organize and simplify the data used in our 
study. For reference only, we also include a detailed listing of the HCPCS Level II codes 
(see Table 6). 
 
Table 5 HCPCS Level I Code Groupings 










80047-89398 Pathology and Lab 
90281-99199 Medicine 
A0001-Z9999 Level II (transportation, materials, supplies) 
All other Other or not-defined 
________________________________________________ 
 
Note: Adapted from two sources. CPT Standard Edition 2015, p. xii. Copyright 2014 by American Medical 
Association. HCPCS National Level II Medicare Codes 2014. Copyright 2013 by Practice Management 
Information Corporation. 
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Table 6 HCPCS Level II Code Sections 
HCPCS Level II Code Sections 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 




A4000-A7509 Medical and Surgical Supplies 
A9000-A9999 Miscellaneous and Experimental 
B0000-B9999 Enteral and Parenteral Therapy 
C0000-C9999 Temporary Hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment System 
D0000-D9999 Dental Codes 
E0000-E9999 Durable Medical Equipment 
G0000-G9999 Temporary Procedures and Professional Services 
H0000-H9999 Rehabilitative Services 
J0000-J8999 Drugs Administered Other Than Oral Method 
J9000-J9999 Chemotherapy Drugs 
K0000-K9999 Temporary Codes for Durable Medical Equipment Regional Carriers 
L0000-L4999 Orthotic Services 
L5000-L9999 Prosthetic Procedures 
M0000-M9999 Medical Services 
P0000-P9999 Pathology and Laboratory 
Q0000-Q9999 Temporary Codes 
R0000-R9999 Diagnostic Radiology Services 
S0000-S9999 Private Payer Codes 
T0000-T9999 State Medicaid Agency Codes 
V0000-V2999 Vision Services 
V5000-5999 Hearing Services 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note: Adapted from HCPCS National Level II Medicare Codes 2014, pp. 2-3. Copyright 2013 by Practice 
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 4.2.4 Diagnostic related groups. Hospitalized patients are classified into 
clinically comparable groups using categorizations called Diagnostic Related Groups 
(DRGs) that acknowledge each patient’s illness severity, prognosis, treatment difficulty, 
need for intervention, and resource intensity. These categories collectively represent 
degrees of clinical care complexity. According to CMS: “The DRGs are a patient 
classification scheme which provides a means of relating the type of patients a hospital 
treats (i.e., its case mix) to the costs incurred by the hospital” (CMS, 2019). Table 7 
displays the categorization of DRG code groupings. 
 
Table 7 Diagnostic Related Group Codes 
Diagnostic Related Group Codes 
 
Codes Range Description 
001-017 Pre-MDC 
020-103 Diseases & Disorders of the Nervous System 
113-125 Diseases & Disorders of the Eye 
129-159 Diseases & Disorders of the Ear, Nose, Mouth & Throat 
163-208 Diseases & Disorders of the Respiratory System 
215-320 Diseases & Disorders of the Circulatory System 
326-395 Diseases & Disorders of the Digestive System 
405-446 Diseases & Disorders of the Hepatobiliary System & Pancreas 
453-566 Diseases & Disorders of the Musculoskeletal System & Connective Tissue 
570-607 Diseases & Disorders of the Skin, Subcutaneous Tissue & Breast 
614-645 Endocrine, Nutritional & Metabolic Diseases & Disorders 
652-700 Diseases & Disorders of the Kidney & Urinary Tract 
707-730 Diseases & Disorders of the Male Reproductive System 
734-761 Diseases & Disorders of the Female Reproductive System 
768-833 Pregnancy, Childbirth & the Puerperium 
790-795 Newborns & Other Neonates with Conditions Originating in the Perinatal Period 
799-816 Diseases & Disorders of Blood, Blood Forming Organs, Immunologic Disorders 
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820-849 Myeloproliferative Diseases & Disorders, Poorly Differentiated Neoplasms 
853-872 Infectious & Parasitic Diseases, Systemic or Unspecified Sites 
880-887 Mental Diseases & Disorders 
895-897 Alcohol/Drug Use & Alcohol/Drug-Induced Organic Mental Disorders 
901-923 Injuries, Poisonings & Toxic Effects of Drugs 
927-935 Burns 
939-951 Factors Influencing Health Status & Other Contacts with Health Services 
955-965 Multiple Significant Trauma 
969-977 Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infections 
981-989 O.R. Procedure Unrelated To Principal Diagnosis With or Without CC / MCC 
998-998 Principal Diagnosis Invalid As Discharge Diagnosis 
999-999 Ungroupable 
 
Note: Adapted from information obtained at https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-
Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/MedicareFeeforSvcPartsAB/downloads/DRGdesc08.pdf 
 
 Another means of organizing DRGs is to assign each code to either of two 
categories: surgical and medical. These categorizations enable researchers to differentiate 
between these two basic types of hospital admissions based on the DRG code assigned 
for each admission (see Table 8). 
 
Table 8 DRGs Sorted by Admission Type 
DRGs Sorted by Admission Type 
 





















































Note: Adapted from information obtained at https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-
Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/MedicareFeeforSvcPartsAB/downloads/DRGdesc08.pdf 
 
4.3 Medicare Data Sources 
 Our study uses restricted, highly protected data available from CMS. These 
restricted datasets, called Research Identifiable Files (RIF), contain actual data from all 
Medicare beneficiaries’ reportable healthcare service activities. These are the most 
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comprehensive datasets available for our study. CMS maintains these files in its Chronic 
Conditions Warehouse, a virtual data repository for researchers. Access to RIFs requires 
a formal, multi-month application process that includes research justification and data 
management and security plans that must receive approval by representatives from CMS 
and its designated contractors. 
 Traditional Medical data come from the providers’ (e.g., hospitals, doctors, home 
health agencies) claims submitted to CMS and its contractors and contain demographical, 
clinical coding, and financial data. The claims submittal and payment processes, also 
called “adjudication,” are complex, comprehensive, and differing among the provider 
types. A detailed examination of the process is available at 
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-
Guidance/Guidance/Manuals/downloads/clm104c01.pdf. Exhibit 10 offers a simplified 
portrayal of the claims submission and payment process. 
 







 Traditional Medicare adjudicated claims data include several financial variables such as 
the providers’ submitted charges, the allowed payments from Medicare, the amounts paid 
to providers, and the patients' amounts due. Service start dates and stop dates enable 
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 Medicare Advantage information, called encounter data, is received from the 
MAOs (i.e., the private insurers). As a condition of participation in the MA program, the 
MAOs must report to CMS specific patient-provider encounters and related information 
during the contract period. In turn, the MAOs require each contracted provider to submit 
to them their patient encounter data. A detailed description of the process is available in 
the Medicare Managed Care Manual (www.cms.gov, 2020). Exhibit 11 is a simplified 
portrayal of CMS’ encounter data collection and storage process. 
 



























One of the Medicare Advantage data limitations is that provider payments and cost 
information are not included. Instead, the files include the dates, counts, and descriptions 
of service types received by the beneficiaries and plan and demographical information.  
 Our conversations with MAOs inform us that Medicare Advantage fee payments 
to their networks’ non-RB providers are approximately comparable to Traditional 
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Medicare fee payments to providers. A recent study by a prominent research group 
reported a similar finding (Curto, Einav, Finkelstein, Levin, and Bhattacharya, 2017). 
Therefore, one may choose to use Traditional Medicare fees as proxies for the cost of 
Medicare Advantage services to estimate some of the economic effects of the various 
plan choices. 
 4.3.1 Medicare Data Sample. Data for this dissertation were acquired to support 
a four-year program of research under strict protocols approved by the Center for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services.  Following a six-month process for approval of the 
research plan and data protection practices, we received our data in the form of 396 
encrypted, compressed RIFs, equating to approximately 55 gigabytes and representing 
the healthcare records for 999,999 of Missouri’s 1,160,093 Medicare beneficiaries. They 
were installed on the dedicated HIPAA-compliant server for this research program at the 
University of Missouri-St. Louis,  
  The CMS provides an encrypted beneficiary ID, a pseudo-identifier to enable 
researchers to link records in various files to individual beneficiaries while protecting 
their privacy. An annual “master beneficiary summary file” contains high-level 
summaries of patients’ demographics, residential status, types of Medicare coverage over 
the year, service utilization, and costs of service delivered under FFS reimbursement.   In 
separate files, encounter and diagnostic data are provided under five service categories:  
a) inpatient, b) hospital-based outpatient, c) carrier (doctors and other non-hospital 
suppliers), d) home-health assistance, and e) skilled nursing facility.    
 Several records in the encounter files often apply to the same service encounter. 
For each type of service, we generally considered all records ascribed to a particular date 
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as representing a single incident of related service activity in a particular category. We 
constructed summaries of procedures and diagnoses ascribed to each day of the year for 
each of the five services and merged them with the Master Beneficiary summaries and 
complementary information from other sources to build a consolidated record for each 
Medicare beneficiary. The consolidated record thus indicates medical services received, 
diagnostic information, access to medical services, and demographic data tied to 
individuals’ place of residence.  We used SAS 9.4 for data consolidation and 
transformation and for most of the statistical analysis. Exhibit 12 displays a schematic 
that depicts the sources and uses of data for this research.  
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Exhibit 12. Sources and Uses of Data 
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 4.3.2 Beneficiary record development. Our research requires a complete, annual 
healthcare record for each beneficiary that reflects services covered under the insurance 
plan while the person is resident in the same location over the entire year.  Mid-year 
changes to coverage and plan types could introduce bias into the study.   From the plan 
identification numbers, along with the beneficiary’s months of coverage under each plan, 
we could determine if a beneficiary was in the same plan for the entire year. For our 
study population, we, therefore, excluded the records of beneficiaries not having a 
consistent 12-month coverage in the same plan. We also excluded beneficiaries under age 
65, those with address changes, and those in hospice or experiencing an end-stage renal 
disease. The reasons for exclusions are described in Table 9. 
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Table 9 Beneficiary Records Excluded from the Study 
Beneficiary Records Excluded from the Study 
 
Excluded Group Reason for Exclusion 
  
Beneficiaries under age 65 To focus the study on the elderly population by  
omitting younger beneficiaries who receive 
Medicare coverage due to their physical disabilities 
  
Beneficiaries with either non-Missouri residences 
or non-Missouri mailing addresses 
To eliminate the effects of healthcare utilization that 
may occur outside of the state 
  
Beneficiaries with mid-year zip code changes To eliminate the effects of possible changes in 
provider access 
  
Beneficiaries with mid-year plan changes To eliminate the effects of possible changes in 
provider access and benefits coverage 
  
Beneficiaries receiving hospice care Medicare Advantage plans generally do not pay for 
hospice care benefits 
  
Beneficiaries experiencing end-stage renal disease Beneficiaries in this category may receive care 
through a special needs program (SNP), and access 
to SNP plans varies throughout the state 
 
 In Table 10, we display the counts and percentages of total Missouri Traditional 
Medicare (FFS) and Medicare Advantage (HMO) enrollees, the counts and percentages 
for the random sample records, and the counts and percentages for the normalized records 
used in our study. We note that the FFS program provides insurance coverage and 
benefits for special classes of patients (e.g., hospice, end-stage renal disease) that may be 
different from those generally available in the HMO plans. Consequently, compared to 
the HMO population, a higher proportion of FFS beneficiaries are excluded from the 
study. This adjustment helps to assure that the FFS and HMO study populations have 
comparable, basic schedules of benefits. Our study population includes 55.7% of all 
Missouri Medicare beneficiaries, thus enabling a robust study with a very high 
confidence level.   
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Table 10 Beneficiary Counts 
Beneficiary Counts (2016) 
   
 
  
We created summaries of annual service tallies that show mean usage by both the 
included and excluded populations for FFS and HMO beneficiaries (see Tables 11 and 
12). The tables reveal material differences in the means for several service categories 
(also see SAS output in Appendices J and K). Reasons for the differences vary. Among 
those excluded are individuals who died during the year, those who had partial coverage 
for some other reason, and individuals who moved to another geographic area.  
 
Table 11 Difference in Means for FFS Study Populations 
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Table 12 Difference in Means for HMO Study Populations 




 Plan type and demographical information. Using the pseudo-identifier, we 
extract from the Master Beneficiary Summary File (MBSF) the desired variables to 
construct a relevant portion of each Traditional Medicare and Medicare Advantage 
beneficiary’s demographical record. The complete listing of MBSF variable names and 
descriptors are in Appendix B.   
 Table 13 displays the names and descriptions of the variables used to develop 
each beneficiary’s demographical and plan type profiles. The demographics include each 
beneficiary’s unique identifying number, year of coverage (2016), gender, race, and place 
of residence as defined by county, state, and zip code. The insurance plan variables are 
used to describe the type of insurance coverage(s), as defined by an insurance plan 
contract number, maintained by each beneficiary, and the length of time, in months, that 
the coverage(s) was(were) in force. 
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Table 13 Demographical and Insurance Plan Variables 
Demographical and Insurance Plan Variables 
 
Group SAS Variable Long Name  Description 
   
Demographics BENE_ID Beneficiary identification number (encrypted) 
 RFRNC_YR Reference year (2016) to confirm that 
beneficiary’s data is for the study period 
 AGE_AT_END_REF_YR Beneficiary age at year-end 
 SEX_IDENT_CD Beneficiary sex (unknown, male, female) 
 BENE_RACE_CD Beneficiary race (seven categories) 
 COUNTY_CD Beneficiary county code base on mailing 
address 
 STATE_CD Beneficiary state code based on mailing address 
 ZIP_CD Beneficiary zip code based on mailing address 
   
Insurance plan  BENE_HMO_CVRAGE_TOT_MONS Number of months beneficiary received their 
benefits through an MA plan 
 PTC_CNTRCT_ID_01 Beneficiary’s MA plan identification number in 
January 
 PTC_CNTRCT_ID_12 Beneficiary’s MA plan identification number in 
December 
   
 
 
 Summary file. Among the data received for our study is a file named “Master 
Beneficiary Summary File Cost & Use Segment” (MBSF). For each Traditional Medicare 
beneficiary, this dataset contains annual summaries of patient care activity and associated 
costs for each of several care categories. These data summarize many of the provider 
payment elements of the study and are useful for validating the summation of specific 
line item values contained within other data sets. The variables examined from this file 
appear in Table 14. The MBSF Cost &Use segment contains very limited and incomplete 
cost-of-service information for Medicare Advantage beneficiaries, and that data is not 
useful for this study. 
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Table 14 Cost and Use Segment File: Variables for Traditional Medicare Beneficiaries 
Cost and Use Segment File: Variables for Traditional Medicare Beneficiaries 
 
Group SAS Variable Long Name Description 
   
Acute Inpatient  ACUTE_STAYS Number of acute inpatient stays 
 ACUTE_COV_DAYS Number of acute inpatient days 
 ACUTE_MDCR_PMT Acute inpatient payments from Medicare 
 ACUTE_PERDIEM_PMT Acute inpatient per diem payments from Medicare 
 ACUTE_PRMRY_PMT Acute inpatient payments from non-Medicare 
sources 
 READMISSIONS Number of readmissions to Missouri hospitals within 
30 days of a previous stay 
   
Other Inpatient OIP_STAYS Other (non-acute) inpatient stays 
 OIP_COV_DAYS Number of other (non-acute) inpatient days 
 OIP_MDCR_PMT Other (non-acute) inpatient payments from Medicare 
 OPI_PERDIEM_PMT Other (non-acute) inpatient per diem payments from 
Medicare 
 OIP_PRMRY_PMT Other (non-acute) inpatient payments from non-
Medicare sources 
   
Skilled Nursing SNF_STAYS Number of skilled nursing stays 
 SNF_COV_DAYS Number of skilled nursing days 
 SNF_MDCR_PMT Skilled nursing payments from Medicare 
 SNF_PRMRY_PMT Skilled nursing payment from non-Medicare sources 
 SNF_BENE_PMT Skilled nursing payment co-insurance and deductible 
payment amounts 
   
Hospital Outpatient HOP_VISITS Hospital outpatient visits 
 HOP_MDCR_PMT Hospital outpatient payments from Medicare 
 HOP_PRMRY_PMT Hospital outpatient payments from non-Medicare 
sources 
 HOP_BENE_PMT Hospital outpatient co-insurance and deductible 
payment amounts 
   
   
Home Health HH_VISITS Home health visits 
 HH_MDCR_PMT Home health payments from Medicare 
 HH_PRMRY_PMT Home health payment from non-Medicare sources 
   
   
   
 Inpatient file. Inpatient care occurs in a Medicare-certified facility where a 
patient incurs an overnight stay that generally includes two or more midnights. (Some 
single night stays are classified as observation-only stays and do not meet the inpatient 
admission criteria.) Using each beneficiary's unique identifier, we extract from the 
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merged inpatient file the specific variables to construct each beneficiary’s inpatient 
facilities record. The complete listing of inpatient variable names and descriptors appear 
in Appendix B, but generally are described as 
 pseudo-identifier; 
 discharge dates; 
 facility identifiers; 
 ICD diagnosis codes. 
Also, the diagnosis codes (ICD-9/10) recorded in any inpatient admission are placed into 
their appropriate group as defined previously. 
 Skilled Nursing Facility (SNF) file. A beneficiary may receive skilled nursing 
care provided for a limited time (on a short-term basis) if all of these conditions are met:  
 the beneficiary has Medicare Part A (hospital coverage) and a balance of days left 
in their benefit period; 
 the beneficiary is discharged from a qualifying hospital stay; 
 the beneficiary’s doctor has decided that daily skilled care is required and that 
care must be given by, or under the supervision of, a skilled nursing or therapy 
staff; 
 the skilled services occur in a Medicare-certified SNF; and the skilled services are 
required for a medical condition that’s either (a) a hospital-related medical 
condition treated during a qualifying 3-day inpatient hospital stay, even if it was 
not the reason for the hospital admission, or (b) a condition that started while 
receiving care in the SNF for a hospital-related medical condition (for example, 
an infection that requires IV antibiotics while receiving SNF care). 
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Using each beneficiary's unique identifier, we extract from the merged SNF file the 
specific variables to construct each beneficiary’s skilled nursing activity record. 
Appendix C displays the names and descriptors, but they generally can be described as 
follows: 
 pseudo-identifier; 
 facility identifiers; 
 discharge dates; 
 ICD codes. 
Also, the ICD codes recorded in any SNF admission are assigned to their appropriate 
group.  
 Hospital-based outpatient services file. Outpatient services are generally received 
in places other than an inpatient hospital or medical practice setting. They can be located 
on a hospital campus or off a hospital campus. The hospital’s organizational structure, 
including its arrangements for reimbursement from CMS, determines if an off-campus 
service is a hospital-based service. Examples of hospital outpatient services include but 
are not limited to, imaging, laboratory, therapies, endoscopic procedures, emergency 
department visits, urgent care, and ambulatory surgeries. Using each beneficiary's unique 
identifier, we extract from the merged outpatient file the specific variables to construct 
each beneficiary’s outpatient services record. The variable names and descriptors appear 
in Appendix D but generally are described as follows: 
 pseudo-identifier; 
 facility identifiers; 
 encounter dates; 
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 HCPCS codes; 
 ICD codes. 
Also, the HCPCS and ICD codes recorded from any outpatient event are assigned to their 
appropriate groups. 
 Home health care. Traditional Medicare beneficiaries with either or both 
Medicare Part A and Part B coverage and who meet all of these conditions are eligible to 
receive home health care services (Health Services Coverage, 
https://www.medicare.gov/coverage/home-health-services): 
 the beneficiary is under the care of a doctor and is receiving services under 
a plan of care created and reviewed regularly by a doctor; 
 a  doctor has certified that one or more of the following is needed:  
 intermittent skilled nursing care (other than drawing blood); 
 physical therapy, speech-language pathology, or continued 
occupational therapy services (note: these services are covered 
only when the services are a specific, safe and effective treatment 
for the condition being treated); 
 the amount, frequency, and time period of the services needs to be 
reasonable, and they need to be complex or such that only qualified 
therapists can do them safely and effectively; 
 either (1) beneficiary’s condition must be expected to improve in a 
reasonable and generally predictable period of time, or (2) a skilled 
therapist is needed to safely and effectively create a maintenance 
program for the condition being treated, or (3) a skilled therapist is 
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needed to safely and effectively do maintenance therapy for a 
condition. 
 the home health agency is certified by Medicare; 
 the beneficiary is homebound, as certified by a doctor; and 
 the beneficiary does not need more than part-time or "intermittent" skilled 
nursing care.  
MAOs generally impose similar requirements on their members, but the MAOs are 
allowed to expand these benefits as long as the Traditional Medicare benefits are 
included in their plans. 
 Using each beneficiary's unique identifier, we extract from the merged home 
health files the specific variables to construct each beneficiary’s home health care record. 
The variable names and descriptors appear in Appendix E, but generally can be described 
as follows: 
 pseudo-identifier; 
 provider identifiers; 
 encounter dates; 
 HCPCS codes; 
 ICD codes 
Also, the HCPCS and ICD codes recorded with any outpatient event are placed into their 
appropriate groups. 
 Carrier file. This care category includes services performed by physicians, nurse 
practitioners, therapists, and other licensed practitioners. It also may include certain 
institutional providers such as clinical laboratories, urgent care centers, free-
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standing/walk-in clinics, ambulance services, suppliers, and stand-alone ambulatory 
surgical centers. Using each beneficiary's unique identifier, we extract from the merged 
carrier file the specific variables to construct each beneficiary’s carrier records. The 
variable names and descriptors for this file appear in Appendix F, but generally can be 
described as follows: 
 pseudo-identifier; 
 encounter dates; 
 provider identifiers (NPI) codes; 
 provider taxonomy (specialty) codes; 
 HCPCS codes; 
 ICD codes. 
Also, the HCPCS and ICD codes recorded from any carrier event are placed into their 
appropriate groups. 
4.4 CCMI score 
 The CCMI score is a predictor of a beneficiary’s survival rate during the next 
year. A CCMI score is calculated for each service category for each beneficiary using 
weighted values applied to specific ICD-10 codes reported by their providers. The ICD-
10 coding algorithm (see Exhibit 13) used in our study was proposed by Quan et al. 
(2005). If any of the eligible ICD-10 codes appear one or more times in a beneficiary’s 
aggregated record, the score for that code enters the CCMI calculation. The sum of the 
values represents the CCMI score placed into each beneficiary’s aggregated record. The 
score can range from 0 (no serious diseases) to 32 (multiple co-morbidities). Lower 
CCMI scores predict higher survival rates, and higher scores predict lower survival rates. 
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In this study, our application of a CCMI score is its use as an explanatory variable 
relating to a beneficiary’s plan choice and service utilization in each care setting. 





 We also investigate if a beneficiary’s access to medical care affects service 
utilization. We define “access” four ways: physician access, hospital access, financial 
resources, and level of education. We developed these access scores using the CMS files 
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and third-party sources, including the Missouri Division of Professional Registration, the 
Essence 2016 Provider Directory, the Missouri Office of Primary Care Health and Rural 
Health, the Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services, and the U.S. Census 
Bureau. 
 4.5.1 Physician access score. Using data from the Missouri Division of 
Professional Registration, we identified all physicians, both allopathic and osteopathic, 
having a primary business address in a Missouri county. We totaled the number of 
physicians in each county who were not under disciplinary action and had an active 
license since 2015. Physician count by county is an explanatory variable. The resulting 
directory is displayed in Appendix H.  
 4.5.2 RB PCP roster. We wish to note that we have been unable to locate a data 
set that identifies the individual PCPs who participate in Medicare Advantage RB 
arrangements. Consequently, we do not know how many PCPs have experience with 
these types of agreements, and it is likely we could find them only with an extensive and 
expensive search. Moreover, if such a search and identification process were feasible, it 
presumes that PCPs are willing to cooperate and reveal the contract terms and other 
arrangements with their MAOs. Furthermore, our conversations with PCPs and MAOs, as 
well as a review of their contracts, indicate the contract information may be limited or 
unavailable. There are at least three reasons: (a) various confidentiality provisions exist in 
the MAO/PCPs contracts, (b) various disclosure prohibitions exist in the provider 
group/provider contracts (e.g., Harmony IPA and its participating providers), and (c) 
proprietary, closely guarded information is held by the MAOs. Collectively, these 
constraints significantly hinder one’s ability to create an extensive directory of RB PCPs, 
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including descriptions of critical financial elements contained in their contracts with 
MAOs. 
 Fortunately, our familiarity with Harmony and two of its MAO presented the 
opportunity to understand the RB arrangements with this group of PCPs. We learned 
from our conversations with the MAOs that there are similarly structured contracts with 
many PCPs in their plan networks. For example, we learned that Harmony is engaged in 
an RB arrangement with an MAO called “Essence.” Three sources within Essence 
confirmed that Harmony’s RB contract is structured similarly to those involving 200 
PCPs in Essence’s St. Louis-area network. Accordingly, when examining characteristics 
of the plans in which Harmony participates, we also can assess the presence of RB PCPs 
(including Harmony PCPs) and evaluate whether their collective presence affects 
healthcare service utilization.  
 4.5.3 Gatekeeping. The RB PCP typically is a medical “gatekeeper” who 
determines how, when, and where a patient will receive services. The RB PCP may 
choose to refer a patient for a service rendered at a hospital-based clinic, a specialty 
medical practice, or other clinics (any of which likely requires an external referral for an 
appointment on a future date). Alternatively, the RB PCP may render that same service 
on the same day the patient visits the PCP’s medical practice. By rendering same day 
service in the PCP’s office, the patient experiences greater convenience and possibly 
avoids a co-pay or other costs associated with a visit to the external provider. If a referral 
is warranted, then the PCP may choose to direct or refer patients to facilities, providers, 
and services having competitive prices. These gatekeeping functions enable the PCP to 
engage in medical care and cost management oversight that may not be done by non-
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gatekeepers. Accordingly, our study examines if the Essence beneficiaries use services 
differently than beneficiaries in the other Traditional Medicare and Medicare Advantage 
plans. 
 4.5.4 Hospital proximity. We use the Missouri Office of Primary Care and Rural 
Health’s (MOPCRH) bi-annual 2018 report to quantify hospital access for each Missouri 
county. We verified that the hospitals listed in the report were operational in 2016. We 
also asked a MOPCRH representative to describe the method by which hospital distances 
from each non-hospital county were determined, as stated in the report. The 
representative indicated that the hospital distances were calculated by traveling the most 
direct, primary roadways from the county seat to the nearest hospital. When we asked for 
the definition of a county seat, the representative told us that information was not 
available because the staff and consultants engaged in the study were no longer with the 
office. Using Google maps, we tested the distances by conducting a visual inspection of 
the roadways nearest the approximate geographical center of each of five no-hospital 
counties (from differing areas of the state) to the nearest hospitals in their regions. Using 
the Google maps driving distance results, we found that the tested distances were within 
the parameters defined in the report. Therefore, we accepted the report’s travel distance 
assumptions. We then assigned three groupings: (a) counties containing at least one 
general access hospital, (b) counties without a hospital but having one within a distance 
of 27 miles or less, and (c) counties with no general access hospitals within 28 miles of 
the county seat. Each group was assigned a code of 1, 2, or 3. The hospital access results 
are displayed in Appendix I. 
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 4.5.5 Missouri census data. One objective of our study is to consider explanatory 
variables that are not contained within the CMS datasets. We specifically include 
surrogate variables that predict each beneficiary’s financial resource and level of 
education based on individuals who live in the beneficiary’s residential neighborhood. To 
create these variables, we obtained data for geographic regions from the Missouri Census 
Data Center (MCDC). The MCDC participates in a cooperative program with the U.S. 
Bureau of the Census (Bureau). An innovation introduced by the Bureau as part of the 
2000 U.S. census effort was creating Zip Code Tabulations Areas (ZCTAs) as an 
alternative to using zip codes for constructing data analyses. From the Bureau’s 
perspective, zip codes represent mail delivery locations that may not always represent 
logical, spatial areas defined by geographical boundaries. Also, there are some zip codes 
with little to no residential populations, such as those representing a specific location for 
a group of post office boxes or a very sparsely populated rural area. To overcome these 
deficiencies, the Bureau invoked the ZCTA methodology, based on census blocks (which 
include the residence zip codes) rather than the zip codes themselves, to represent 
geographically definable areas meeting minimum population thresholds (census.gov, 
n.d.). 
 Also under the purview of the Bureau is the American Community Survey (ACS). 
The ACS is an ongoing, long-form survey taken both during the decennial censuses and 
in each interim year. The ACS seeks to capture various characteristics of the U.S. 
population-based on survey answers supplied from approximately 3.5 million households 
(census.gov, n.d.). The survey tabulations generate statistically relevant summaries of 
demographical data applied to a geographic region such as a nation, state, county, or 
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ZCTA. With the annual updates, longitudinal data can be structured to create more 
accurate estimates, thereby improving the accuracy of estimates drawn from a single 
point in time (such as the decennial census year). For our study, we access the MCDC-
supplied dataset containing demographical estimates for financial resources and levels of 
education assigned to the Missouri ZCTAs based on a five-year average (2014-2018) of 
ASC survey responses. We incorporate the census data by matching our beneficiaries’ 
residence zip codes to their respective ZCTAs.   
 Financial resource. Whether in Traditional Medicare or Medicare Advantage 
plans, beneficiaries may incur a personal cost for access to and use of medical services. 
The amount of personal cost is, in part, determined by plan selection and the associated 
schedule of benefits. Personal costs can include insurance premium payments, co-
payments, and deductibles. Sometimes, the aggregate costs of co-payments and 
deductibles are limited to an annual maximum “out-of-pocket” expense. A beneficiary’s 
affluence or ability to afford these costs could influence both plan selection and service 
utilization. To allow for the effects of a beneficiary’s ability to afford the costs of 
insurance premiums, co-payments, deductibles, and other costs of the selected plan, from 
the MCDC-supplied dataset, we use the predicted “median household income” or the 
predicted “median home value” of residents in the beneficiary’s ZCTA as the surrogate 
for the beneficiary’s financial resources. 
 Level of Education. The selection of a Medicare plan can be a daunting task. 
Beneficiaries have numerous choices for their coverage. Those choices include Medicare 
with no secondary coverage, Medicare with Medicaid as secondary coverage, Medicare 
with commercial insurance for secondary coverage, Medicare Advantage PPOs, and 
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Medicare Advantage HMOs. Retirees may have additional choices arranged by their 
former employers. There can be numerous insurer and plan selections within these 
choices, and varying costs and benefits schedules can create additional complexities. 
Much of this information exists on CMS’ and MAOs’ websites. Other means of 
information distribution to inform or entice enrollees include elaborate marketing 
campaigns and mailings of informational packets containing dozens of pages. 
  Further, there is a cadre of independent brokers and insurance agents willing to 
meet one-on-one with potential enrollees to provide additional information and education 
about insurance offerings and to sell the health insurance policies. Consequently, we 
consider one’s level of education as a beneficiary attribute that may be a factor in plan 
choice and service utilization. To allow for the effects of a beneficiary’s ability to 
navigate the complexities of plan choice and utilization, from the MCDC-supplied 
dataset, we select the predicted “percent of households having a bachelor’s degree or 
more” in the beneficiary’s ZCTA as the surrogate for the beneficiary’s level of education. 
4.6 Data sufficiency 
 Differences in data collection techniques for Traditional Medicare and Medicare 
Advantage beneficiaries pose certain challenges for researchers. One notable concern is 
dealing with multiple claims or accountings for a single medical event as a result of 
various issues involving claims processing and MAO data reporting. While there are 
potential remedies to refine the data and eliminate duplicative records, it can be a 
daunting and imperfect task. To avoid the possibility of duplicative counting of any 
service event, we consolidate records of all services in a category (inpatient, SNF, 
outpatient, home health, and carrier) with the same date when counting the number of 
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services for individual beneficiaries. This is one method recommended by ResDAC as 
discussed in their workshops and contained in several of their training materials. For 
inpatient and skilled nursing, we count the number of distinctive discharge dates. For the 
outpatient, home health, and carrier categories, we count the dates when a patient 
receives a service. If multiple service records occur on the same date within the same 
category, the count is “one.”  
 4.6.1 Data Correlation Test. Service count summaries for FFS beneficiaries are 
in the Master Beneficiary Summary File (MBSF), but comparable count summaries for 
HMO beneficiaries are not. Therefore, to test our counting method, we subjected the FFS 
results to a correlation test. We compared the summary counts that we tallied from each 
of the FFS categories to their counterparts found in the MBSF. The results (see Appendix 
J) gave us confidence in our counting methodology as demonstrated by the very high 
correlation for each service category (inpatient r = 0.996, p-value < .001; skilled nursing 
r = 0.999, p-value =<0.001; outpatient r = 0.993, p-value < 0.001; home health r = 0.979; 
p-value < 0.001; and carrier r = 0.933, p-value < 0.001). Given the acceptable 
correlations from the FFS service count summaries, we applied the same counting 
methodology to the HMO service events.  
 4.6.2 MAO Data Collection Processes. In our conversations with the Essence 
representatives, we inquired about their confidence in their encounter data reporting to 
CMS. They told us that significant investments are made in their data collection and 
reporting processes, and they have high confidence in the accuracy of their data. We 
received similar comments from the UHC representatives. While this is encouraging, we 
judge that further triangulation is required to verify the consistency between FFS and 
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HMO data. For example, primary data collection studies could be conducted to 
investigate how data are collected and reported by all MAOs. This would include 
examinations and tests of the processes and systems that exist between providers and 
MAOs, and MAOs and CMS, as well as confirmation of their data accuracy. Second, data 
accuracy should be verified by third party sources such as Medicare cost reports or 
reviews of financial and medical records by independent auditors. We are aware that 
CMS is engaged in some of these activities, and we are encouraged by reports that data 
accuracy continues to improve. 
4.7 Statistical Analysis 
 We employ various analyses, including summary statistics, tests of differences in 
means, CHAID decision trees, and Poisson regressions to examine the data and test our 
hypotheses. 
 4.7.1 Units of Analysis. The units of analysis are (a) for total system utilization: 
per capita utilization for various medical services by type of coverage, and (b) for 
individual beneficiaries (patients), annual summaries of their utilization of medical 
services (inpatient, outpatient, carrier, home-health assistance, skilled nursing facility) 
counted by the number of dates with records related to a service or diagnosis rendered in 
the service category. 
 4.7.2 CHAID Decision Trees. Chi-square automatic interaction detection 
(CHAID) decision trees are useful in uncovering relationships between variables. For this 
portion of the study, we imported a SAS dataset into the IBM SPSS Statistics Version 26. 
The dataset contained values for each of 143 variables representing services utilization 
data derived from the CMS merged datasets for our study’s normalized population. To 
MEDICARE PLAN ATTRIBUTES  88 
 
examine their effect on the Medicare plan choice target variable, we selected various 
explanatory variables to represent the beneficiaries’ characteristics (see Exhibit 14). The 
CHAID parameters were set for a minimum of 2,000 cases per node, significance levels 
of 0.01, utilization of the Pearson chi-square statistic, a maximum of 100 model 
iterations, and a tree depth of three. The purpose of the CHAID analysis is to cluster 
individuals with similar values of “target” or “independent” variables with consideration 
of possible nonlinear relationships and interactions between explanatory factors 
(independent variables). The clusters reveal predicted values (e.g., plan choice, services 
utilization) for beneficiary groups based on specific attributes such as age, race, or health 
status. Statistically significant differences in the predicted values for the explanatory 
variables will lend support to our hypotheses. 
 
Exhibit 14. CHAID Tree Variables Used for Medicare Plan Choice Analysis 
Explanatory (independent) variables 
 Age – defined as the beneficiary’s age at the end of the year 
 Gender – male, female, other 
 Race – White, Black, Hispanic, North American Native, Other 
 Health status – represented by the Charlson Co-morbidity Index from inpatient ICD codes 
 Access to doctors – number of doctors in the beneficiary’s residence county 
 Access to hospitals – value of 1, 2, or 3 to define the proximity of hospitals to the 
beneficiary’s residence county 
 Median home value – for the beneficiary’s ZCAT 
 Education – American Community Survey estimate of the % of bachelor degree or more 
households within the beneficiary’s residence ZCAT 
 
Target (dependent) variables 
 Medicare Plan Choice 
 
Results of this clustering of beneficiaries according to choice of Medicare plans are 
presented in Section 5.1 
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 4.7.3 Tests of Difference in Means. Our interviews and field observations 
involving PCPs and MAOs inform us that many essential performance measures in the 
Medicare industry involve calculating utilization ratios to determine the mean service 
count per beneficiary for each service category. We use tests of differences in 
independent means (e.g., mean number of inpatient admissions per beneficiary) to assess 
the magnitudes and statistical significance of the variances in service utilization among 
the plan beneficiaries. Specifically, we compare the service rates per beneficiary for each 
of the five service categories (inpatient, skilled nursing, outpatient, home health, and 
carrier) for beneficiaries enrolled in Medicare Advantage (HMO) plans with those 
enrolled in Traditional Medicare (FFS) plans. We also examine differences between 
utilization rates by enrollees in four Medicare Advantage market leaders versus enrollees 
in FFS plans.  These results are reported in Section 5.2. 
  4.7.4 Poisson Regression. Poisson regression is useful when analyzing the 
effects of multiple variables on a target variable expressed as a count. This method is 
helpful when predicting utilization rates (and estimated costs) attributable to a panel of 
beneficiaries assigned to a specific plan, hospital system, medical group, or individual 
practitioner. It also enables analysts to predict utilization changes driven by changing 
attributes (such as aging or health status) of the individuals in the group being evaluated. 
These types of analyses are critical in determining whether plans or providers should 
enter into or continue with risk-bearing contracts. Plans and providers presumably would 
prefer to forgo any situation where projected utilization (and costs) would outstrip the 
associated revenues. Also, for budgeting and legislative purposes, policymakers may 
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wish to know the projected utilization and costs of services authorized under the 
Medicare program and its various plans. 
 Using SAS, we introduce 22 explanatory variables into our regression model and 
determine the statistical relevance of each variable for each of the five service categories 
(inpatient, skilled nursing, outpatient, home health, and carrier). The 22 variables and 
their origins are shown in Exhibit 15. We examine the resulting “full” models that 
contain all 22 variables and then employ backwards elimination to reduce each regression 
model to exclude any variable that does not show statistical significance on the margin 
(eliminating, at each stage,  the variable with largest  p-value > 0.01). Results of this 
analysis are presented in Section 5.3. 
Exhibit 15. Poisson Regression Variables 
 
Exhibit 15. Count variables such as discharges or service events represent annual amounts for an 
aggregated beneficiary record.  
Variable Description
numipadmits Inpatient admissions based on discharge dates
numOPsrvcevents Outpatient service events
numOPsrvcrecs Outpatient service records
numcarsrvcrecs Carrier services
numCARdiagevents\ Carrier events with recorded diagnoses
numhhasrvcrecs Home health service records
numsnfdiagevents Skilled nursing events based on dates with recorded diagnoses
maxchscoreallser Highest charlson score of all service categories
female Gender selection from male, female, and other
HMOplan Enrolled in HMO rather than FFS plan
yrendage Beneficiary aged at year end
Black Race variable sub-category
Hispanic Race variable sub-category
Asian Race variable sub-category
Other non-white Race variable sub-category representing all races other than Black, Hispanic, and Asian
medianhouseeval Zip code median house value expressed in $100,000 increments
zpctbachelorsormore Zip code average percent households with bachelors degree or more
zpctmanprofoccs Zip code average percent of households with managerial or professional employment
hospitalaccess1 Missouri counties having one or more hospitals
hospitalaccess2 Missouri counties without a hospital but having one ≤ 27 miles of county seat
hospitalaccess3 Counties without a hospital and with the nearest hospital being >27 miles from county seat
physiciansper1000 Average number of physicians per 1,000 beneficiaries in a county
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 Data Summary. In Exhibit 16, we provide a diagram showing all of the sources 
of uses of data contained within this study. 
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Chapter 5: Statistical Results 
 
 In this chapter, we discuss the effects of beneficiary characteristics on Medicare 
plan choice and service utilization. First, using CHAID decision trees, we construct 
clusters of individuals with the same propensity to choose one health plan versus another 
and examine the characteristics of individuals with which choice of plan is related. 
Second, we employ tests of differences in means to compare service utilization of 
beneficiaries enrolled in various Medicare Advantage (HMO) plans with those enrolled 
in the traditional Medicare (FFS) plan. Lastly, using Poisson regression, we study, for the 
different insurance plans, how the number of service encounters of each type depends 
upon beneficiary characteristics and other factors. 
5.1 Plan Choice 
 To analyze Medicare plan choice, we present the results of several CHAID 
decision trees. We introduce into the models various beneficiary demographical attributes 
to determine their relationships to the beneficiary’s Medicare Plan choice. 
 5.1.1 Beneficiary Characteristics. H1 states that the choice of Medicare 
insurance plan depends on the characteristics of beneficiaries, their access to doctors and 
hospitals, and their wealth and education. Our CHAID tree analyses support the 
hypothesis. In Exhibits 18 to 27, we present a series of CHAID decision trees with 
descriptions of the findings. The plan choice labels displayed in the output diagrams are 
a) the Traditional Medicare plan [indicated as “None,” meaning not a Medicare 
Advantage plan], b) each of the four Medicare Advantage market share leaders based on 
their beneficiary enrollments [rankings are Essence #1, UHC #2, Humana #3, and Aetna 
#4], and c) the collection of all other Medicare Advantage plans [indicated as “Other”]. 
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 Age and Plan Choice. In Exhibit 17 and Table 15, we demonstrate the impact of 
a beneficiary’s age on Medicare plans selection. This CHAID tree reveals five age 
clusters having differing plan selection results, and those results are highly statistically 
significant (p-value < 0.001, Χ2 = 1373.295, df = 20). The youngest age cluster (Node 1, 
<=68.0, 69.3%) and the oldest age cluster (Node 5, >82.0, 69.6%) have a projected 
Traditional Medicare enrollment of approximately the same rate, which is greater than 
the other three age clusters. While the analysis does not explain why these results occur, 
we speculate that beneficiaries in the youngest age cluster have not yet decided to move 
from Traditional Medicare into an HMO plan. Further, we suspect that beneficiaries in 
the oldest age cluster may have less experience with HMOs than the other beneficiary 
groups, and, therefore, are likely to prefer the FFS plan option. 
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Exhibit 17. Age and Plan Choice 
 
 
Table 15 Percentage of Plan Members by Age Groups  
Percentage of Plan Members by Age Groups 
 
 
Note: FFS plus ALL HMOS may not total to 100.0 due to rounding. 
 
Plan Type 65-68 68-72 72-76 76-82 >82
FFS 69.3 65.7 64.4 65.9 69.6
All HMOs 30.6 34.3 35.7 33.9 30.4
Essence HMO 5.0 5.5 5.4 5.2 4.7
UHC HMO 4.7 4.9 4.5 4.7 5.0
Humana HMO 4.1 4.5 4.9 4.3 3.7
Aetna HMO 3.7 3.6 3.9 3.9 3.9
Other HMOs 13.1 15.8 17.0 15.8 13.1
Age Clusters
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 The distribution of choices among the top four HMO plans are consistent with 
published statistics in secondary sources; however, their market shares vary from cluster 
to cluster (see Exhibit 18).  Further investigation of factors affecting choices of Medicare 
plans is left for future research, perhaps with nationwide scope. 
 




 Gender and Plan Choice. In Exhibit 19, the CHAID tree reveals that the two 
gender clusters (male, female) have differing plan selection results, and those results are 
statistically significant (p-value < 0.001, Ꭓ 2 = 69.033, df = 5). However, the projected 
percentage of each gender’s selection of the Traditional Medicare plan selection is only 
nominally different (male = 67.1%, female = 66.9%). We also note that the probable 
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Exhibit 19. Gender and Plan Choice 
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 Race and Plan Choice. The CHAID tree in Exhibit 20 reveals five clusters based 
on the beneficiary’s ethnicity (or race), and differences in choice of plan are highly 
statistically significant (p-value < 0.001, Ꭓ 2 = 5727.150, df = 20). The “Black” race 
cluster shows a much lower probability of enrollment (51.8%) in the Traditional 
Medicare plan than the other race clusters. The other race clusters predict enrollment in 
Traditional Medicare from a low of 63.4% (Node 5, “Other”) to a high of 73.4% (Node 4, 
“Unknown”). Nodes 1 and 2 represent 98% of the total population, and both nodes reflect 
a Medicare Advantage plan choice that is consistent with each plan’s market share 
rankings. One area of future research is to understand why Black race beneficiaries are 
much more likely to enroll in HMOs than are other beneficiaries (see Exhibit 21). We 
also note the significantly higher percentage of Blacks’ enrollment into Essence as 
compared to the other HMO plans. Are the Essence plan benefits as compared to other 
plans more appealing to Blacks? Compared to other plans, does Essence focus its 
marketing efforts more intentionally toward the Black population? Does Essence offer its 
plans in regions with higher than average Black populations? These and other questions 
could be explored with further research.  
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Exhibit 20. Race and Plan Choice 
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 Charlson Score and Plan Choice. In this analysis, the maximum Charlson score 
from all services categories was selected as the explanatory variable. In Exhibit 22, the 
CHAID tree contains six Charlson-score clusters. The difference in predicted plan 
selection for these clusters is highly statistically significant (p-value < 0.001, Ꭓ 2 = 
3968.490, df = 25). The beneficiaries with the greatest predicted enrollment in Traditional 
Medicare are those with Charlson scores = 0 (Node 1, 69.9%). We note that a Charlson 
score = 0 indicates those beneficiaries who either did not have any recorded diagnosis 
codes in any service category during the year or their diagnosis codes not were severe 
enough to be included in the Charlson scoring algorithm. Those with Charlson scores > 5 
show the lowest predicted Traditional Medicare enrollment. (Node 6, 59.7%). The tree 
suggests that higher Charlson scores associate with lesser Traditional Medicare 
enrollment, although the difference in Traditional Medicare enrollment between each 
score cluster is not dramatically different. We note that third place market leader Humana 
is predicted to have the highest enrollment of beneficiaries with Charlson scores = 0 
(4.1%) while market leader Essence is predicted to have the highest enrollment of 
beneficiaries with Charlson scores > 5 (7.8%). Essence and UHC are predicted to extend 
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Exhibit 22. Maximum Charlson Score and Plan Choice 
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  Physician Count and Plan Choice. The CHAID tree in Exhibit 23 reveals five 
physician count clusters having differing plan selection results, and those results are 
highly statistically significant (p-value < 0.001, Ꭓ 2 = 80890.750, df = 20). Beneficiaries 
residing counties with 18 or fewer physicians (Node 1) have the highest probability of the 
FFS plan selection (78.2%). Because CMS has standards to assure adequate provider 
coverage, we suspect this result shows that beneficiaries in many counties have little to 
no access to HMO alternatives due to an insufficiency of physician coverage. In contrast, 
beneficiaries in counties with more than 2,465 physicians (Node 5) are the least likely to 
select Traditional Medicare (57.5%), and therefore most likely to select a Medicare 
Advantage plan. We also note that specific Medicare Advantage plan choices within each 
cluster are somewhat inconsistent compared to the individual plans’ market share 
rankings. 
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The graph displayed in Exhibit 24 shows the variances in beneficiary enrollment, by plan, 
relative to the midpoint of the number of physicians in the counties where those 
beneficiaries reside. Here we wonder what factors might be contributing to these 
variances. For example, does a plan with greater physician presence than others within 
the same county make that plan more attractive to beneficiaries? Do some plans have 
more effective marketing and recruitment campaigns in some counties than the other 
plans, resulting in higher enrollment numbers? Do some plans choose not to have a 
presence in some counties? These questions offer opportunities for additional research. 
Clearly, the degree of physician presence in a county impacts beneficiary plan choice. 
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 Hospital Access and Plan Choice. The CHAID tree in Exhibit 25 reveals all three 
hospital access code clusters, and the results are highly statistically significant (p-value < 
0.001, Ꭓ 2 = 5360.428, df = 20). Beneficiaries residing in counties most distant from a 
hospital (Node 3) show the highest probability of Traditional Medicare plan selection 
(74.2%). Because CMS has standards to assure that plans have adequate hospital 
coverage, we suspect this result is due to beneficiaries in many counties having little to 
no access to Medicare Advantage alternatives because of an insufficient hospital 
presence. In contrast, beneficiaries in counties with one or more hospitals (Node 1) are 
the least likely to select Traditional Medicare (66.0%), and, therefore, the most likely to 
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 Median Home Value and Choice. In Exhibit 26, the CHAID tree reveals five 
child node median home value clusters of comparable populations having differing plan 
selection results, and those results are highly statistically significant (p-value < 0.001, Ꭓ 2 
= 67,055.308, df = 20). Beneficiaries in regions with the projected lowest value homes 
(Node, 1, ≤ $96,800, 80.2%) are more likely to select the Traditional Medicare plan as 
compared to beneficiaries residing in regions having higher median home values. 
Beneficiaries in the regions with the projected highest median home values (Node 5, 
>$161,000, 59.2%) are less likely to select the Traditional Medicare plan as compared to 
other beneficiaries. Overall, the groupings indicate that Traditional Medicare plan 
selection is higher in areas with lower median home values. Also, the Medicare 
Advantage plan choices in each income cluster generally do not reflect the plans’ market 
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share rankings (see Exhibit 27). Future research could investigate this result to determine 
what factors are driving these variances. For example, if median home values are greater 
in urban and suburban areas as compared to rural areas, then it is likely that urban and 
suburban beneficiaries have more Medicare Advantage alternatives that offer greater 
attraction than Traditional Medicare. 
 
Exhibit 27. Median Home Value and Plan Choice 
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Exhibit 28. Plan Choice of Top HMOs by Median Home Value Cluster Midpoint 
 
  
 All Variables and Plan Choice. Lastly, we consider the implications of entering 
all eight variables into the CHAID tree model. The resulting tree contains three levels 
with 25 mutually exclusive clusters, making it unrealistic to display in this paper. 
Alternatively, in Appendix M, we offer the tree results in a tabular form. Here we 
summarize the results. 
 Five physician count clusters (number of physicians in a county) emerge as the 
level one child nodes and they are highly statistically significant (p-value < 0.001, Ꭓ 2 = 
80560.808, df = 20). Beneficiaries in the counties with the fewest physicians (Node 1, 
physician count ≤ 18) are most likely to enroll in the Traditional Medicare plan (78.1%). 
Beneficiaries in the counties with the most physicians (Node 5, physician count > 2,465) 
are least likely to enroll in the Traditional Medicare plan (57.5%). Nodes 2, 3, and 4 show 
a similarly consistent pattern. We conclude that beneficiaries residing in counties with 
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fewer doctors have a higher probability of the Traditional Medicare plan selection, 
possibly due to the lesser availability of HMO plans. 
 At Level Two (where statistically significant variables attach to Level One 
nodes), hospital access emerges as a significant variable (Nodes 6 – 8) for counties where 
physician count is low (physician count  ≤ 18). Median home value becomes statistically 
relevant, occupying four nodes (Nodes 12 -15) and representing beneficiaries residing in 
counties having a broad range of physician counts (Count = 18 to 2465). Maximium 
Charlson score occupies the final Level 2 clusters (Nodes 16 – 18) with significance for 
beneficiaries residing in high physician count counties (Count > 2465). 
 At Level Three (where statistically significant variables attach to Level Two 
nodes), education  level (i.e., households with bachelors degree or more) is statistically 
relevant for several nodes  (Nodes 19, 20, 23, 24, 25, and 26). Across the entire tree, the 
highest probability of Traditional Medicare plan choice (Node 11, 85.7%) resides with 
beneficiaries in counties having median home values ≤ $146,800 and a moderate 
presence of  physicians (109 - 540). The lowest probability of Traditional Medicare plan 
choice (Node 12, 48.2%) resides with beneficiaries of residing in counties with median 
home values ranging from $146,800 to $161,000 and with a moderate presence of 
physicians (109 – 540). We find these results to be curious in that the highest and lowest 
likelihood of Traditional Medicare enrollment is distinguished only by the median home 
values in counties with the same physician presence (109 – 540). This is an opportunity 
for future research. 
 From this collection of CHAID trees, we conclude that Medicare plan choice is, 
indeed, related to the beneficiaries’ demographical attributes and those attributes are 
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statistically significant. For example, the findings imply that HMOs are less prevalent in 
rural communities (i.e., low physician count and low hospital access) and more prevalent 
in metropolitan areas (i.e., high physician count and high hospital access). This is likely 
due to CMS’ mandated provider thresholds. Those who are in the youngest and oldest 
age clusters tend to enroll in the FFS plan more so than beneficiaries in the central 
clusters. Perhaps the youngest and the oldest beneficiaries have less familiarity with their 
Medicare HMO alternatives. Blacks are more likely to enroll in HMOs than are other 
races. Perhaps a higher percentage of Blacks (compared to non-Blacks) live in 
metropolitan areas where HMO plans are more plentiful than other areas. We also find 
that when all eight variables enter the model, only “gender” shows no statistical 
relationship to plan choice. Why isn't’ there a difference? Why do median home values 
show some curious effects on plan choice? The data do not tell us “why” these results are 
predicted, but they do leave open the door for more research. Nevertheless, we can 
conclude that these variables, both singularly and combined, have differing effects on the 
beneficiaries’ specific Medicare plan selections. These findings support our H1 that 
beneficiaries’ attributes, proximity to hospitals and doctors, and levels of education and 
wealth are statistically associated with Medicare plan choices.  
5.2 Service Utilization: Tests of Differences in Means 
 In this section, we present averages and percentiles for measures of service 
delivery derived from all 2016 transactional records for the study's population (see Table 
10). Both H2 and H3 propose that plan choice impacts service utilization. To test H2, we 
look at service utilization for the FFS plan, all HMO plans combined, and for each of the 
four market leader HMOs. We find that beneficiaries in the HMO plans, including the top 
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four market share plans, use fewer services in all service categories. Summary statistics 
are displayed in Table 16, followed by the detailed SAS outputs and summaries for each 
scenario, as shown in Exhibits 29 through 33.  
  
Table 16 % Difference in Mean Utilization Per Beneficiary as Compared to FFS Plan 
% Difference in Mean Utilization Per Beneficiary as Compared to FFS Plan 
 
 
   
 5.2.1 Overall differences for the study population.  For the study’s normalized 
sample population (n = 646,230), in every service category, the mean service utilization 
per HMO beneficiary is less than the mean service utilization per FFS beneficiary, and 
the differences are statistically significant.  These results are displayed in Exhibit 29. 
Service All HMO Essence UHC Humana Aetna
Inpatient -22% -38% -23% -18% -27%
Outpatient -46% -59% -50% -46% -44%
Carrier -8% -11% -5% -16% -12%
Home Health -47% -77% -66% -13% -39%
Skilled Nursing -29% -47% -23% -25% -26%
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Exhibit 29. Differences in FFS and HMO Events per Beneficiary 
 
The service category counts appear in lines 1, 2, 4, 6, and 9. 
  
 Inpatient. Inpatient discharges are lower for the HMO beneficiaries by 62 per 
1,000 enrollees (22% lower), and the difference is highly statistically significant (t-test = 
-33.5, p- value < 0.001).  
 Outpatient. Outpatient services are lower for the HMO beneficiaries by 3,813 per 
1,000 enrollees (46% lower) and the difference is highly statistically significant (t-test = -
150.9, p-value < 0.001).  
 Carrier. Carrier services are lower for HMO beneficiaries by 3,654 per 1,000 
enrollees (8% lower), and the difference is highly statistically significant (t-test = -31.0, 
p-value < 0.001). 
 Home health. Home health services are lower for HMO beneficiaries by 709 per 
1,000 (47% lower) and the difference is highly statistically significant (t-test = -45.9, p-
value < 0.001). 
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 SNF. SNF discharges are lower for HMO beneficiaries by 21 per 1,000 enrollees 
(29% lower), and the difference is statistically significant (t-test = -24.4, p-value < 
0.001). 
 5.2.2 MAO Variances. We also produced comparative statistics for each of the 
top four MAOs (by market share) based on each MAO’s total beneficiary count. 
Collectively, they account for 54.7% of the Medicare Advantage study population. In 
every service category, the mean service utilization per HMO beneficiary derived from 
transactional data is less than the mean service utilization per FFS beneficiary. The 
differences are statistically significant.   
 Essence. Based on its beneficiary count (n = 33,472) within the study’s Medicare 
Advantage population, this MAO holds the lead market position with a 15.7% share. The 
Essence results are displayed in Exhibit 30. 
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Exhibit 30. Differences in FFS and Essence Events per Beneficiary 
 
 
The service category counts are shown in lines 1, 2, 4, 6, and 9. 
 
 
 Inpatient. Inpatient discharges are fewer for the Essence beneficiaries by 107 per 
1,000 enrollees (38% lower), and the difference is highly statistically significant (t-test = 
-33.3, p-value < 0.001).  
 Outpatient. Outpatient services are fewer for the Essence beneficiaries by 4,910 
per 1,000 enrollees (59% lower) and the difference is highly statistically significant (t-test 
=  -127.1, p-value < 0.001).  
 Carrier. Carrier services are fewer for HMO beneficiaries by 4,992 per 1,000 
enrollees (11% lower), and the difference is highly statistically significant (t-test = -22.8, 
p value < 0.001). 
 Home health. Home health services are fewer for Essence beneficiaries by 1,169 
per 1,000 (77% lower) and the difference is highly statistically significant (t-test = -66.4, 
p-value < 0.001). 
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 SNF. SNF discharges are fewer for Essence beneficiaries by 35 per 1,000 
enrollees (47% lower) and the difference is statistically significant (t-test = -24.0, p-value 
< 0.001). 
 United Healthcare (UHC). Based on its beneficiary count (n = 30,764) within 
the study’s Medicare Advantage population, this MAO holds the second place market 
position with a 14.4% share. UHC results are displayed in Exhibit 31. 
 
Exhibit 31. Differences in FFS and UHC Events per Beneficiary 
 
The service category counts appear in lines 1, 2, 4, 6, and 9. 
 
 
 Inpatient. Inpatient discharges are fewer for the UHC beneficiaries by 64 per 
1,000 enrollees (23% lower), and the difference is highly statistically significant (t-test = 
-16.8, p-value < 0.001).  
 Outpatient. Outpatient services are fewer for the UHC beneficiaries by 4,165per 
1,000 enrollees (50% lower) and the difference is highly statistically significant (t-test =  
-116.2, p- value < 0.001).  
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 Carrier. Carrier services are fewer for UHC beneficiaries by 2,297 per 1,000 
enrollees (5% lower), and the difference is statistically significant (t-test = -8.6, p-value < 
0.001). 
 Home health. Home health services are fewer for UHC beneficiaries by 996 per 
1,000 (66% lower) and the difference is highly statistically significant (t-test = -54.4, p-
value < 0.001). 
 SNF. SNF services are fewer for UHC beneficiaries by 17 per 1,000 enrollees 
(23.3% lower) and the difference is statistically significant (t-test = -9.3, p-value < 
0.001). 
 Humana. Based on its beneficiary count (n = 27,930) within the study’s 
Medicare Advantage population, this MAO holds the third-place market position with a 
13.1% share. Humana results are displayed in Exhibit 32. 
 
Exhibit 32. Differences in Number of FFS and Humana Events per Beneficiary 
 
The service category counts appear in lines 1, 2, 4, 6, and 9. 
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 Inpatient. Inpatient discharges are fewer for the Humana beneficiaries by 50 per 
1,000 enrollees (18% lower), and the difference is statistically significant (t-test = -12.1, 
p-value < 0.001).  
 Outpatient. Outpatient services are fewer for the Humana beneficiaries by 3,829 
per 1,000 enrollees (46% lower) and the difference is highly statistically significant (t-test 
=  -71.9, p-value < 0.001).  
 Carrier. Carrier services are fewer for Humana beneficiaries by 7,354 per 1,000 
enrollees (16% lower), and the difference is statistically significant (t-test = -31.2,  p-
value < 0.001). 
 Home health. Home health services are fewer for Humana beneficiaries by 200 
per 1,000 (13% lower) and the difference is statistically significant (t-test = -4.9, p-value 
< 0.001). 
 SNF. SNF services are fewer for Humana beneficiaries by 19 per 1,000 enrollees 
(25% lower) and the difference is statistically significant (t-test = -9.9, p-value < 0.001). 
 Aetna. Based on its beneficiary count (n = 24,538) within the eligible population, 
this MAO holds the #4 MA market position with an 11.5% share of the sample 
population. Aetna results are displayed in Exhibit 33. 
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Exhibit 33. Differences in Number of FFS and Aetna Events per Beneficiary 
 
The service category counts appear in lines 1, 2, 4, 6, and 9. 
 
 
 Inpatient. Inpatient discharges are fewer for the Aetna beneficiaries by 75 per 
1,000 enrollees (27% lower), and the difference is statistically significant (t-test = -16.8, 
p-value < 0.001).  
 Outpatient. Outpatient services are fewer for the Aetna beneficiaries by 3,648 per 
1,000 enrollees (44% lower) and the difference is highly statistically significant (t-test = -
66.2, p-value < 0.001).  
 Carrier. Carrier services are fewer for Aetna beneficiaries by 5,732 per 1,000 
enrollees (12% lower), and the difference is highly statistically significant (t-test = -22.0, 
p value < 0.001). 
 Home health. Home health services are fewer for Aetna beneficiaries by 596 per 
1,000 (39% lower) and the difference is highly statistically significant (t-test = -17.0, p-
value < 0.001). 
 SNF. SNF services are fewer for Aetna beneficiaries by 19 per 1,000 enrollees 
(26% lower) and the difference is statistically significant (t-test = -8.2, p-value < 0.001). 
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 5.2.3. Other comments. Under CMS requirements, the HMOs are required to 
offer benefits that are the same as or comparable to Traditional Medicare; however, with 
CMS approval, the HMOs may also enhance those benefits. For example, many HMOs 
offer the “Silver Sneakers” program that allows beneficiaries to obtain memberships at 
fitness clubs at little to no cost. Some HMOs enhance their prescription drug benefits by 
lowering co-payments, placing higher cost drugs into lower co-payment tiers, and 
including drugs that are not part of the Traditional Medicare authorized formulary. 
HMOs plans vary in their annual maximum out-of-pocket costs, deductibles, and co-
payments. Furthermore, HMOs plans are not all available in all areas (i.e., counties), nor 
do they all have the same networks of providers. All of these and other factors could 
potentially affect the amount and mix of services received by the beneficiaries. It is 
possible to gather data from third party sources to complement the CMS data and make 
comparisons of the plans’ structures and operations. Accordingly, there are several 
opportunities to initiate research that makes a deeper dive into the effects of plan 
differences on services utilization, mix, and costs. 
 5.2.4 Comparative totals. One potential and significant plan difference is the 
presence and proliferation of RB PCPs. To test H3, we compare Essence HMO (the plan 
with known RB PCPs) results with all other plans. In Table 17, we present the side-by-
side comparisons of summary statistics expressed in service counts per thousand 
beneficiaries for each of the plans.  
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Table 17 Service Counts per Thousand Beneficiaries in Sample Population 




 We note that market leader Essence has the smallest service count per thousand 
beneficiaries of every plan in every category excepting Carrier services. This finding 
suggests that the presence of RB PCPs serving as medical gatekeepers may be a 
statistically relevant factor in interpreting the utilization variances of beneficiaries from 
differing plans.  
 Lastly, in Exhibit 34, we show per-beneficiary service usage for the top four 
HMOs relative to FFS beneficiaries. Again, we note that beneficiaries in all four HMO 
plans utilize fewer services than their FFS counterparts, and Essence ranks lowest in all 







(MA) Essence UHC Humana Aetna
Inpatient discharges 279           217           172           215           229           204           
Outpatient service dates 8,364        4,551        3,454        4,199        4,535        4,716        
Carrier service dates 46,435     42,781     41,443     44,138     39,081     40,703     
Home health service dates 1,512        803           343           516           1,312        916           
Skilled nursing discharges 73              52              38              56              54              54              
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Exhibit 34. Relative Service Utilization for Top 4 HMOs vs. FFS 
 
Exhibit 34. For relative comparisons, FFS = 1. 
 
 We do not know the extent to which HMO plans other than Essence engage RB 
PCPs. Consequently, while this evidence offers support of H3, ultimately, it is 
inconclusive. In future research, there is an opportunity to explore in greater detail the 
utilization patterns of beneficiaries assigned to the specific PCPs in the Essence plan.  
Comparing those results to similar beneficiary populations in the FFS plan and other 
HMO plans may reveal relevant variances that lend more support to H3. 
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5.3 Service Utilization: CHAID Decision Trees 
 The tests of differences in means are useful in examining summary statistics, but 
they do not consider the effects of multiple variables. To initiate our investigation of 
these effects, we constructed two CHAID decision trees to determine if any of the eight 
explanatory variables have an effect on inpatient utilization or outpatient utilization. The 
eight variables are shown in Exhibit 35. 
 




 Age at year-end 
 Charlson scores 
 
Beneficiary Access to Providers 
 Proximity to hospitals based on county of residence 
 Count of physicians in county of residence 
 
Other  
 Median home value in residence ZCAT 
 % of households with a bachelors degree or more in residence ZCAT 
 Beneficiary’s Medicare plan choice 
 
 
The inclusion of all eight variables results in a very large CHAID tree with numerous 
clusters, thus making interpretation difficult. Also, some clusters represent very small 
populations that contribute little to the analysis. Therefore, to reduce the number of 
clusters in our model, we adjusted the CHAID parameter to require a minimum of 20,000 
records per cluster. 
 In our first tree (see Exhibit 36), we select the number of inpatient admissions as 
the target variable. We find that three explanatory variables (inpatient Charlson score, 
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plan choice, and gender) have a strong relationship with inpatient utilization. At level 
one, the model reveals that the inpatient Charlson score is a strong predictor of inpatient 
utilization (p-value < 0.001, F value = 632,697.028, df1 = 1, df2 = 484,434). Plan choice 
emerges at level two, and gender at level three. Predicted inpatient utilization is lowest 
(27 admissions per 1,000, Node 4) for beneficiaries with Charlson scores = 0 and enrolled 
in the UHC HMO. Highest utilization (1,653 admissions per 1,000, Node 2) is 
experienced by beneficiaries with Charlson scores > 0. This is nearly six times greater 
than the FFS mean. No child nodes appear under Node 4. From this tree, we conclude 
that a beneficiary’s health status, as defined by their inpatient Charlson score, is the 
primary driver of utilization. For those with a score equal to zero, plan choice is 
statistically related to FFS beneficiaries experiencing higher utilization than HMO 
beneficiaries. Also, there is a significant utilization variance between FFS males (41 per 
1,000) and FFS females (53 per 1,000). The primary observation is that the group of 
beneficiaries with Charleson scores > 0 predicts an admission rate 38 times greater than 
those with scores = 0. 
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Exhibit 36. Multivariate CHAID Tree for Inpatient Services 
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 In our second tree (see Exhibit 37), we examine outpatient activity. The model 
reveals that three outpatient Charlson score clusters emerging at level one are significant 
(p-value < 0.001, F value = 46,145.999, df1 = 1, df2 = 484,433). The first cluster (Node 
1) represents beneficiaries with outpatient Charlson scores = 0, and they experience the 
lowest utilization among the three clusters (3,312 outpatient service dates per 1,000). The 
second cluster (Node 2) represents beneficiaries with outpatient Charlson scores greater 
than zero and up to a value of 1. Their utilization (8,294 outpatient service dates per 
1,000) is greater than those in Node 1. The third cluster (Node 3) represents beneficiaries 
with outpatient Charlson scores > 1 and having the highest utilization of the Charlson 
score clusters (14,019 outpatient service dates per 1,000). At level two, plan choice 
clusters attach to each Charlson score node. Gender, age, and home values are relevant at 
level three. The highest outpatient utilization is by FFS beneficiaries with Charlson 
scores > 1 living in zip codes with home values ≤ $121,000 (16,942 service events per 
1,000, Node 17). The lowest outpatient utilization is by beneficiaries with Charlson 
scores = 0 who enroll in either Essence or Humana HMO (1,819 outpatient service dates 
per 1,000, Node 6). We draw three conclusions from this tree: a) higher outpatient 
Charlson scores are associated with greater outpatient service utilization, b) beneficiaries 
enrolled in the FFS plan, especially those likely to be living in lower-income areas, use 
more outpatient services than those enrolled in the HMO plans, and c) utilization 
variances exist among the HMO plans. 
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Exhibit 37. Multivariate CHAID Tree for Outpatient  Services 
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  From these two CHAID trees, we demonstrate that variables have interactive and 
predictive implications for services utilization. For more detailed analyses, we construct 
Poisson regression models to account for the effects of several explanatory variables on 
services utilization. 
 
5.4 Service Utilization: Poisson Regression 
 For the Poisson regressions, we randomly selected 75% of the included sample 
population (resulting in n = 484,436) for model fitting, reserving the remaining 25% (n = 
161,764) for future testing of our models on an independent sample. For each plan and 
service category, we extended our analysis from the previous 8 variables to 22 variables 
(see Exhibit 38) in the regressions. With each regression model, any variable failing our 
p-value test (marginal p-value > 0.01) was removed from the model by the backwards 
elimination process. The full Poisson regression tables (i.e., before removal of variables) 
are displayed in Appendix N. The reduced Poisson regression models (i.e., after removal 
of variables that did not contribute statistically significant information on the margin) are 
discussed in this section. 
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Exhibit 38. Poisson Regression Variables  
 
  
 The Poisson regression models are presented in a series of exhibits that indicate 
the formula for the logarithm of the mean number of events for a patient over an entire 
year, depending on the values of the explanatory (independent) variables. Coefficients of 
the linear function for the mean (expected value) of the number of events and the 
standard deviations of the coefficient estimates are followed by the “incidence impacts” 
for each independent variable. The “incidence impacts” (exp[beta]) are the factors by 
which the estimated incidence rate (the mean) will change with one-unit increases in the 
values of individual independent variables if all the other independent variables are held 
constant. The Z-values reveal the relative impact (worsening of fit) that would occur if 
the respective variables alone should be removed from the model.  The statistical 
significance of each parameter is computed as a two-tail test using the Z-value. In the 
Variable Description
numipadmits Inpatient admissions based on discharge dates
numOPsrvcevents Number of Outpatient service date
numCARdiagevents Nubmer of Carrier events with recorded diagnoses
numhhasrvcrecs Number of Home health service events
numsnfdiagevents Skilled nursing events based on discharge dates with recorded diagnoses
maxchscoreallser Highest charlson score of all service categories
female Gender selection from male, female, and other
HMOplan Enrolled in HMO rather than FFS plan
yrendage Beneficiary age at year end
Black Race variable sub-category
Hispanic Race variable sub-category
Asian Race variable sub-category
Other non-white Race variable sub-category representing all races other than Black, Hispanic, and Asian
medianhouseeval Zip code median house value expressed in $100,000 increments
zpctbachelorsormore Zip code average percent households with bachelors degree or more
zpctmanprofoccs Zip code average percent of households with managerial or professional employment
hospitalaccess1 Missouri counties having one or more hospitals
hospitalaccess2 Missouri counties without a hospital but having one < 28 miles from county seat
hospitalaccess3 Counties without a hospital and with the nearest hospital being >27 miles from county seat
physiciansper1000 Average number of physicians per 1,000 beneficiaries in a county
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following sections, we identify the type and size of the population studied, display the 
SAS output tables for each Poisson regression model, identify a few of the most 
significant variables appearing in each model, and summarize our findings.  
5.5 All Plans (n = 484,436) 
 In Exhibit 39, we present the regression results for inpatient service utilization by 
beneficiaries in all plans. The target variable (dependent variable) is the number of 
hospital discharges (inpatient admissions) over the year for an individual beneficiary. For 
this model, the greatest explanatory power (on the margin) is provided by the maximum 
Charlson co-morbidity score computed from diagnostics recorded in delivery of any 
medical service over the year, followed by whether the beneficiary’s plan is categorized 
as FFS versus HMO, and the beneficiaries’ age at year-end. After fixing the values of the 
other seven variables, each unit increase in the maximum Charlson score would increase 
the expected number of inpatient admissions by 29%.  Ceteris paribus, enrollees in HMO 
plans are expected to have 30% fewer inpatient admissions than enrollees in FFS plans.  
Each additional year of age results in an approximate 2% increase in the number of 
inpatient admissions per beneficiary. 
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 In Exhibit 40, we present the regression results for outpatient service utilization 
by beneficiaries in all plans. The target variable (dependent variable) is the number of 
outpatient service dates (outpatient services) over the year for an individual beneficiary. 
For this model, the greatest explanatory power (on the margin) is provided by the 
maximum Charlson co-morbidity score computed from diagnostics recorded in delivery 
of any medical service over the year, followed by whether the beneficiary’s plan is 
categorized as FFS versus HMO, and the beneficiaries’ gender. After fixing the values of 
the other 13 variables, each unit increase in the maximum Charlson score would increase 
the expected number of outpatient services by 18%.  Ceteris paribus, enrollees in HMO 
plans are expected to have 46% fewer outpatient services than enrollees in FFS plans.  
Females would utilize 24% more outpatient services than males.  
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 In Exhibit 41, we present the regression results for carrier services utilization by 
beneficiaries in all plans. The target variable (dependent variable) is the number of carrier 
service dates (carrier services) over the year for an individual beneficiary. For this model, 
the greatest explanatory power (on the margin) is provided by the maximum Charlson co-
morbidity score computed from diagnostics recorded in delivery of any medical service 
over the year, followed by whether the beneficiary’s plan is categorized as FFS versus 
HMO, and the beneficiaries’ age at year-end. After fixing the values of the other 13 
variables, each unit increase in the maximum Charlson score would increase the expected 
number of carrier services by 15%.  Ceteris paribus, enrollees in HMO plans are 
expected to have 18% fewer carrier services than enrollees in FFS plans.  Females are 
expected to utilize 14% more carrier services than males. 
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 In Exhibit 42, we present the regression results for home health services 
utilization by beneficiaries in all plans. The target variable (dependent variable) is the 
number of home health service events (home health services) over the year for an 
individual beneficiary. For this model, the greatest explanatory power (on the margin) is 
provided by the maximum Charlson co-morbidity score computed from diagnostics 
recorded in delivery of any medical service over the year, followed by the beneficiaries’ 
year-end age and whether the beneficiary’s plan is categorized as FFS versus HMO. After 
fixing the values of 11 other variables, each unit increase in the maximum Charlson score 
would increase the expected number of home health services by 27%.  Ceteris paribus, 
each additional year of age results in a 6% increase in the number of home health services 
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per beneficiary. Enrollees in HMO plans are expected to receive 53% fewer home health 
services than enrollees in FFS plans.   
 




 In Exhibit 43, we present the regression results for skilled nursing facility 
utilization by beneficiaries in all plans. The target variable (dependent variable) is the 
number of skilled nursing discharges (skilled nursing services) over the year for an 
individual beneficiary. For this model, the greatest explanatory power (on the margin) is 
provided by the maximum Charlson co-morbidity score computed from diagnostics 
recorded in delivery of any medical service over the year, followed by the beneficiaries’ 
year-end age and whether the beneficiary’s plan is categorized as FFS versus HMO. After 
fixing the values of 10 other variables, each unit increase in the maximum Charlson score 
would increase the expected number of skilled nursing services by 30%.  Ceteris paribus, 
each additional year of age results in an 8% increase in the number of skilled nursing 
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services per beneficiary. Enrollees in HMO plans are expected to receive 59% fewer 
skilled nursing services than enrollees in FFS plans.   
 




5.6  Fee for Service Plans (n = 324,339) 
 In Exhibit 44, we present the regression results for inpatient utilization by 
beneficiaries in the FFS plans. The target variable (dependent variable) is the number of 
hospital discharges (inpatient admissions) over the year for an individual beneficiary. For 
this model, the greatest explanatory power (on the margin) is provided by the maximum 
Charlson co-morbidity score computed from diagnostics recorded in delivery of any 
medical service over the year, followed by the beneficiary’s year-end age and whether the 
projected median household value (in hundred thousand dollars) in the zip code where 
the beneficiary resides. After fixing the values of 7 other variables, each unit increase in 
the maximum Charlson score would increase the expected number of inpatient 
admissions by 29%.  Ceteris paribus, each additional year of age results in a 2% increase 
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in the number of inpatient admissions per beneficiary. Females would experience about 
8% more admissions than males.  
 
 




 In Exhibit 45, we present the regression results for outpatient service utilization 
by beneficiaries in FFS plans. The target variable (dependent variable) is the number of 
outpatient service dates (outpatient services) over the year for an individual beneficiary. 
For this model, the greatest explanatory power (on the margin) is provided by the 
maximum Charlson co-morbidity score computed from diagnostics recorded in delivery 
of any medical service over the year, the beneficiary’s year-end age, and female gender. 
After fixing the values of the other eight variables, each unit increase in the maximum 
Charlson score would increase the expected number of outpatient services by 18%.  
Ceteris paribus, each additional year of age results in a 1% increase in the number of 
outpatient services per beneficiary. Females would experience about 25% more 
outpatient services than males. 
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 In Exhibit 46, we present the regression results for carrier services utilization by 
beneficiaries in FFS plans. The target variable (dependent variable) is the number of 
carrier service dates (carrier services) over the year for an individual beneficiary. For this 
model, the most significant explanatory power (on the margin) is provided by the 
maximum Charlson co-morbidity score computed from diagnostics recorded in delivery 
of any medical service over the year, followed by the beneficiary’s year-end age, race, 
and gender. After fixing the values of the other 12 variables, each unit increase in the 
maximum Charlson score would increase the expected number of carrier services by 
15%.  Ceteris paribus, each additional year of age results in a 0.5% increase in the 
number of outpatient services per beneficiary. Blacks would experience about 17% fewer 
outpatient services than Whites. Females would experience about 15% more carrier 
services than males. We also note that all other non-White races are predicted to receive 
fewer carrier services than Whites, as do beneficiaries in counties with no close hospital 
proximity. 
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Exhibit 46. Effects on Carrier Services for FFS Plans 
  
 
 In Exhibit 47, we present the regression results for home health services 
utilization by beneficiaries in FFS plans. The target variable (dependent variable) is the 
number of home health service events (home health services) over the year for an 
individual beneficiary. For this model, the greatest explanatory power (on the margin) is 
provided by the maximum Charlson co-morbidity score computed from diagnostics 
recorded in delivery of any medical service over the year, followed by the beneficiary’s 
year-end age and gender. After fixing the values of the other ten variables, each unit 
increase in the maximum Charlson score would increase the expected number of home 
health services by 28%. Ceteris paribus, each additional year of age results in a 6% 
increase in the number of home health services per beneficiary. Females would 
experience 37% more services than males.  
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 In Exhibit 48, we present the regression results for skilled nursing facility 
utilization by beneficiaries in FFS plans. The target variable (dependent variable) is the 
number of skilled nursing discharges (skilled nursing services) over the year for an 
individual beneficiary. For this model, the greatest explanatory power (on the margin) is 
provided by the maximum Charlson co-morbidity score computed from diagnostics 
recorded in delivery of any medical service over the year, followed by the beneficiaries’ 
year-end age and female gender. After fixing the values of 10 other variables, each unit 
increase in the maximum Charlson score would increase the expected number of skilled 
nursing services by 30%.  Ceteris paribus, each additional year of age results in an 8% 
increase in the number of skilled nursing services per beneficiary. Females are expected 
to receive 58% more skilled nursing services than males.   
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5.7 HMO Plans (n = 160,097) 
 In Exhibit 49, we present the regression results for inpatient utilization by 
beneficiaries in the HMO plans. The target variable (dependent variable) is the number of 
hospital discharges (inpatient admissions) over the year for an individual beneficiary. For 
this model, the greatest explanatory power (on the margin) is provided by the maximum 
Charlson co-morbidity score computed from diagnostics recorded in delivery of any 
medical service over the year, followed by the beneficiary’s year-end age and gender. 
After fixing the values of seven other variables, each unit increase in the maximum 
Charlson score would increase the expected number of inpatient admissions by 29%.  
Ceteris paribus, each additional year of age results in about a 2% increase in the number 
of inpatient admissions per beneficiary. Females would experience about 12% more 
admissions than males.  
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 In Exhibit 50, we present the regression results for outpatient service utilization 
by beneficiaries in HMO plans. The target variable (dependent variable) is the number of 
outpatient service dates (outpatient services) over the year for an individual beneficiary. 
For this model, the greatest explanatory power (on the margin) is provided by the 
maximum Charlson co-morbidity score computed from diagnostics recorded in delivery 
of any medical service over the year, followed by median home value and female gender. 
After fixing the values of the other eight variables, each unit increase in the maximum 
Charlson score would increase the expected number of outpatient services by about 18%.  
Ceteris paribus, females would experience about 18% more outpatient services than 
males. Each $100,000 increase in median home value predicts about a 27% reduction in 
the number of outpatient services per beneficiary.  
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 In Exhibit 51, we present the regression results for carrier services utilization by 
beneficiaries in HMO plans. The target variable (dependent variable) is the number of 
carrier service dates (carrier services) over the year for an individual beneficiary. For this 
model, the greatest explanatory power (on the margin) is provided by the maximum 
Charlson co-morbidity score computed from diagnostics recorded in delivery of any 
medical service over the year, followed by the female gender and Black race. After fixing 
the values of the other 12 variables, each unit increase in the maximum Charlson score 
would increase the expected number of carrier services by about 14%. Ceteris paribus, 
females would experience about 12% more carrier services than males, and Blacks would 
utilize about 12% fewer carrier services than other races.  
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 In Exhibit 52, we present the regression results for home health services 
utilization by beneficiaries in HMO plans. The target variable (dependent variable) is the 
number of home health service events (home health services) over the year for an 
individual beneficiary. For this model, the greatest explanatory power (on the margin) is 
provided by the maximum Charlson co-morbidity score computed from diagnostics 
recorded in delivery of any medical service over the year, followed by the beneficiary’s 
year-end age, and female gender. After fixing the values of the other 11 variables, each 
unit increase in the maximum Charlson score would increase the expected number of 
home health services by about 26%. Ceteris paribus, each additional year of age results 
in an approximate 6% increase in the number of outpatient services per beneficiary. 
Females would experience about 37% more services than males. 
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 In Exhibit 53, we present the regression results for skilled nursing facility 
utilization by beneficiaries in FFS plans. The target variable (dependent variable) is the 
number of skilled nursing discharges (skilled nursing services) over the year for an 
individual beneficiary. For this model, the greatest explanatory power (on the margin) is 
provided by the maximum Charlson co-morbidity score computed from diagnostics 
recorded in delivery of any medical service over the year, followed by the beneficiaries’ 
year-end age and gender. After fixing the values of 7 other variables, each unit increase 
in the maximum Charlson score would increase the expected number of skilled nursing 
services by about 30%.  Ceteris paribus, each additional year of age results in an 
approximate 7% increase in the number of skilled nursing services per beneficiary. 
Females are expected to receive about 52% more skilled nursing services than males.   
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Exhibit 53. Effects on Skilled Nursing Services for HMO Plans 
 
5.8 Essence HMO (n = 24,114) 
 In this section, we examine the results specifically for Essence HMO, the plan 
with known RB-PCPs, so that comparisons are made to the previously presented plan 
segments. In Exhibit 54, we present the regression results for inpatient utilization by 
beneficiaries in the Essence HMO plan. The target variable (dependent variable) is the 
number of hospital discharges (inpatient admissions) over the year for an individual 
beneficiary. For this model, the greatest explanatory power (on the margin) is provided 
by the maximum Charlson co-morbidity score computed from diagnostics recorded in 
delivery of any medical service over the year, followed by the beneficiary’s year-end age 
and female gender. After fixing the values of 10 other variables, each unit increase in the 
maximum Charlson score would increase the expected number of inpatient admissions by 
26%.  Ceteris paribus, each additional year of age results in an approximate 1% increase 
in the number of inpatient admissions per beneficiary. Females would experience about 
12% more inpatient admissions than males. 
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Exhibit 54. Effects on Inpatient Services for Essence HMO 
  
 
 In Exhibit 55, we present the regression results for outpatient service utilization 
by beneficiaries in HMO plans. The target variable (dependent variable) is the number of 
outpatient service dates (outpatient services) over the year for an individual beneficiary. 
For this model, the greatest explanatory power (on the margin) is provided by the 
maximum Charlson score computed from diagnostics recorded in delivery of any medical 
service over the year, followed by median home value and female gender. After fixing 
the values of the other eight variables, each unit increase in the maximum Charlson score 
would increase the expected number of outpatient services by about 17%.  Ceteris 
paribus, each $100,000 increase in median home value predicts an approximate 46% 
reduction in the number of outpatient services per beneficiary. Females would experience 
about 26% more outpatient services than males.  
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Exhibit 55. Effects on Outpatient Services for Essence HMO 
  
  
 In Exhibit 56, we present the regression results for carrier services utilization by 
beneficiaries in Essence HMO. The target variable (dependent variable) is the number of 
carrier service dates (carrier services) over the year for an individual beneficiary. For this 
model, the greatest explanatory power (on the margin) is provided by the maximum 
Charlson co-morbidity score computed from diagnostics recorded in delivery of any 
medical service over the year, followed by the Black race and female gender. After fixing 
the values of the other 12 variables, each unit increase in the maximum Charlson score 
would increase the expected number of carrier services by about 13%. Ceteris paribus, 
blacks would utilize approximately 15% fewer carrier services than other races, and 
females would experience about 11% more carrier services than males.  
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 In Exhibit 57, we present the regression results for home health services 
utilization by beneficiaries in HMO plans. The target variable (dependent variable) is the 
number of home health service events (home health services) over the year for an 
individual beneficiary. For this model, the greatest explanatory power (on the margin) is 
provided by the maximum Charlson co-morbidity score computed from diagnostics 
recorded in delivery of any medical service over the year, followed by the beneficiary’s 
year-end age and female gender. After fixing the values of the other eight variables, each 
unit increase in the maximum Charlson score would increase the expected number of 
home health services by about 21%. Ceteris paribus, each additional year of age results 
in an approximate 5% increase in the number of outpatient services per beneficiary. Each 
$100,000 increase in median home value predicts about a 74% decrease in home health 
services per beneficiary. Why is this? Perhaps those with greater wealth have other 
alternatives such as the employment of an in-home caregiver or the ability to afford more 
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frequent visits with physicians or other providers. This is another area for further 
exploration. 
 





 In Exhibit 58, we present the regression results for skilled nursing facility 
utilization by beneficiaries in FFS plans. The target variable (dependent variable) is the 
number of skilled nursing discharges (skilled nursing services) over the year for an 
individual beneficiary. For this model, the greatest explanatory power (on the margin) is 
provided by the maximum Charlson co-morbidity score computed from diagnostics 
recorded in delivery of any medical service over the year, followed by the beneficiaries’ 
year-end age and gender. After fixing the values of 3 other variables, each unit increase 
in the maximum Charlson score would increase the expected number of skilled nursing 
services by about 29%.  Ceteris paribus, each additional year of age results in an 
approximate 7% increase in the number of skilled nursing services per beneficiary. 
Females are expected to receive about 50% more skilled nursing services than males.   
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Exhibit 58. Effects on Skilled Nursing Services for Essence HMO 
   
 
 
5.9 Poisson Regressions Summary 
 In Table 18, we display the three variables showing the most significant impact 
for each service for each plan. The Charlson score consistently presents as one of the top 
three factors of most significant impact in every service for every plan. We also note that 
the selection of an HMO plan predicts a substantial decline in service utilization of all 
types. Compared to males, females are predicted to use more services of all types. Blacks 
are predicted to use fewer carrier services than other races. Interestingly, increases in 
median home value are associated with decreased outpatient service usage for 
beneficiaries in HMO plans. Age sometimes has an effect, most notably for home health 
and skilled nursing services.  
 For Essence, the “Median Home Value” variable is prominent in both outpatient 
and home health services and that variable has a sizable, negative impact on utilization 
for those services. Perhaps Essence has an operational strategy to constrain those 
services. Perhaps there are less costly alternatives available from its schedule of benefits. 
Perhaps aggressive care management by RB PCPs results in demand reduction for those 
services. Perhaps the beneficiaries in the other plan categories are experiencing over-
utilization for some reason. Whatever the cause, this is a curiosity for further exploration. 
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 From the Poisson regressions, we conclude that beneficiary traits and plan 
selection have a statistically significant effect on service utilization. These results support 
our H2.  
  
Table 18 Summary of Poisson Regressions: Effects of Top 3 Variables for Each Service 
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5.10 Services Mix 
 One additional analysis drawn from this research is an examination of the mix of 
services by plan. In Table 19, for each service category, we show the service counts as  
percentages of total services for FFS, all HMOs, and Essence plans. The table reveals 
significant differences in the services mix experienced by beneficiaries in each plan 
category, and an interesting pattern emerges. Compared to the FFS beneficiaries, the 
HMO beneficiaries have a lesser proportion of services attributable to inpatient, 
outpatient, home health, and skilled nursing services and a greater proportion attributable 
to carrier services. These differences are even more pronounced when comparing FFS 
and Essence results. 
  Carrier services include entities such as physician medical practices and non-
hospital-based services such as ambulatory surgery centers, free-standing imaging 
centers, and retail laboratories. We learned from our field research that these carrier 
services generally represent less costly alternatives to hospital-based services (both 
inpatient and outpatient) and, therefore, MAOs and risk-bearing PCP groups prefer them. 
This suggests that the use of more carrier services results in a reduction of all other 
services. Further research is needed to demonstrate the legitimacy of this claim and to 
determine if there are cost implications. Nevertheless, we can conclude that the mix of 
services is predicted to differ between FFS and HMO plans. The Essence results also 
suggest that the presence of RB PCPs also may materially impact services utilization. 
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Table 19 Service Mix by Plan Type 
 
Service Mix by Plan Type (Using Counts per 1,000 Beneficiaries) 
     
 
 
5.11 Hypotheses Summary 
 Hypothesis 1. Using CHAID decision trees, we tested eight predictor 
(explanatory) variables against the target variable of the Medicare plan choice. The 
results demonstrate that Medicare plan choice is statistically related to specific 
beneficiary characteristics (age, gender, race, health status), the medical services 
available in the beneficiary’s county of residence (i.e., physician count, hospital 
proximity), and the demographic characteristics of individuals who reside in the same 
Postal Zip code (education level and median household income). As a group, seven of the 
eight predictor variables showed statistical relationships to Medicare plan choice. 
Hypothesis 1 is supported.  
 Hypothesis 2. Again, using CHAID decision trees, we examined the relationships 
of nine variables (age, gender, race, health status, physician count, hospital proximity, 
education level, household income, and plan choice) to each of the five service 
categories. The results show that the medical services received by Medicare beneficiaries 
vary according to beneficiary characteristics (age, gender, race, health status), insurance 
plan choice (Traditional Medicare, Medicare Advantage), medical services available in 
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the beneficiary’s county of residence (physician count, hospital proximity), and the 
demographic characteristics of individuals who reside in the same Postal Zip code 
(education level and median household income). We also produced a series of Poisson 
regression models to investigate the impact of 22 variables on each of the service 
categories in each plan. Again, we demonstrated that variables such as health status (i.e., 
Charlson score), gender, race, median home value, and the choice of an HMO plan 
impact service utilization. Collectively, these findings support H2. 
 Hypothesis 3. We note that our study does not explicitly include an analysis of 
service utilization by beneficiaries receiving care from specifically identified RB PCPs. 
However, our field research confirms that Essence HMOs engage RB PCPs to serve as 
medical gatekeepers, and each Essence beneficiary is assigned to one of the RB PCP. 
Accordingly, we offer the Essence plan as a proxy for a network of RB PCPs. We 
conducted tests of differences in means of the five service categories for each of six plan 
types (Traditional Medicare, All Medicare Advantage Plans, Essence, UHC, Humana, 
and Aetna).  The results show that the mean utilization statistic for each service category, 
except carrier services, is lowest for Essence beneficiaries. We also examined the mix of 
services and found that Essence beneficiaries experience a mix that differs from both FFS 
and other HMO beneficiaries, including proportionately lesser use of inpatient, skilled 
nursing, outpatient, and home health services. These finding support our hypothesis that 
beneficiaries of medical groups with risk-sharing reimbursement schemes will have lower 
utilization of medical services than do patients of physicians who practice under FFS 
arrangements. However, because this research was not conducted at the physician level 
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(rather than through the use of a proxy such as Essence), we can only state that support of 
H3 is suggested and that further examination is required. 
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Chapter 6: Discussion 
 
 We developed a comprehensive method for analyzing healthcare services 
utilization using data from several hundred thousand Missouri beneficiaries. Furthermore, 
the method is valid for studying medical services usage by any patient population for 
which detailed records of medical treatments and diagnoses are available.  
We demonstrate that beneficiary traits and access to providers are associated with 
Medicare plan choice, and all of those (traits, access, and plan choice) are statistically 
related to utilization of services. Also, we provide some evidence that the presence of RB 
PCPs in HMO plans results in less utilization of non-carrier services as compared to other 
plans, especially the FFS plan.  
We lay the groundwork for further investigation of factors affecting mix of 
services received by patients and services rendered by medical practices under different 
insurance coverages for patients and reimbursement practices for practitioners. In the 
following sections, we present the implications of our research, opportunities for future 
research, and concluding comments. 
6.1 Implications 
 Operationally and clinically, the U.S. healthcare industry is complex, and the 
associated data are massive. The industry needs skilled, knowledgeable researchers to 
address industry challenges. For example, a significant component of the Medicare 
program, specifically Medicare Part A (inpatient care benefits), is headed toward a 
solvency problem (kff.org, 2019) in the year 2026. This is the estimated timeframe when 
the Part A Trust Fund will encounter two problems: a) incoming revenues will be less 
than benefits spending, and b) the fund’s assets will be depleted.  Without sufficient 
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changes, Medicare will not be able to pay for all of the costs of the current Part A 
benefits commitment.  
 Solutions are needed to contain or reduce services utilization and associated costs. 
Researchers and practitioners have the opportunity to offer solutions to policymakers. By 
documenting the strengths and weaknesses of current plan offerings, researchers might 
uncover more and better opportunities that lead to improved plan design at lower costs 
for better care. Furthermore, with data already available from CMS, advanced data 
analytics can be used for health policy and insurance plan refinements that better serve 
the healthcare needs of specific beneficiaries based on their attributes, access to care, plan 
choice tendencies, and provider compensation arrangements 
 Stakeholders want strategies to contain Medicare costs. By understanding the role 
of each stakeholder as described in our Cascading Agency Theory model, one might 
better understand how to generate cost containment strategies for both the Medicare and 
Medicare Advantage enterprises. As one strategy, CMS has been transitioning Traditional 
Medicare enrollment to Medicare Advantage enrollment. This transition is done, in part, 
by encouraging private entities to become MAOs and to accept the administrative 
responsibilities, financial risks, and financial rewards associated with member 
recruitment into their Medicare Advantage plans, thereby increasing beneficiary access to 
the Medicare Advantage alternative. Approximately one-third of Medicare beneficiaries 
are now Medicare Advantage enrollees, and Medicare Advantage enrollment has been 
growing at an annual rate of about 7% (kff.org, 2019). Supplementing existing research 
with additional information that reveals the effects of beneficiary traits on plan choice 
offers a greater understanding of why beneficiaries increasingly select the Medicare 
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Advantage alternative. When they do, those traits and plan choices will help predict 
services utilization, thereby offering an improved capability for predicting costs.  Using 
statistical models of the type demonstrated in this dissertation, stakeholders in healthcare 
delivery can compare services received or delivered against norms that adjust for patient 
characteristics and practice setting. 
 Our research also suggests that successful MAOs might benefit from engaging 
RB entities with experienced PCPs who will render clinically sound and financially 
prudent medical care and care management services to the Medicare Advantage 
beneficiaries assigned to them. We learned from our discussions with Harmony PCPs and 
their MAOs, that cooperation and shared data enable both groups to succeed financially. 
Also important for this success is peer-to-peer discussion, education, and review among 
the PCPs. We also learn from their joint operating reports that over 90% of the 
beneficiaries extend their enrollment in the same plan year after year. By understanding 
the problems predicted by agency theory, such as information asymmetry, the moral 
hazard of agent self-interest, and agent’s risk-aversion, the MAOs have an opportunity to 
mitigate those problems through the development of mutually beneficial contracts with 
RB entities that wish to engage as willing partners.   
 In Appendix A of our study, we offer several conceptual examples of RB contract 
components that have been in place for several years. Given the longevity of these types 
of contract terms, we conclude that the MAOs and RB PCPs find these types of terms to 
be agreeable. Our research also suggests that patients of RB PCPs receiving adequate 
financial incentives (and timely information) will utilize fewer services than their FFS 
counterparts, thus delighting their MAOs. This outcome reinforces the MAOs’ decisions 
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to enter into and sustain their CMS contracts and grow their memberships, thereby 
helping CMS achieve its stated strategy of shifting beneficiaries from Traditional 
Medicare to Medicare Advantage.  
6.2 Limitations 
 6.2.1 Data. Our study is subject to some important limitations. The study is 
conducted from Missouri-only data, so the results may not be generalizable to the entire 
Medicare beneficiary population. However, in many categories such as population, 
geographical size, and household income, Missouri ranks near the average of all states 
and, therefore, one might expect Missouri to be representative of a significant portion of 
the Medicare population. Each state, however, has its own regulatory regimes for medical 
insurance and medical practices and varies in concentration of medical facilities and 
practicing professionals. Further, each state has differing histories with Medicare 
Advantage plans; thus, patient care utilization management may be more advanced in 
some regions. 
 The Traditional Medicare (FFS) claims data used in this research are dependent 
upon claims filings. Claims are processed by third parties known as Medicare 
Administrative Contractors (MAC). Among other duties, the MACs are responsible for 
the processing and payment of claims from providers and reporting a vast amount of data 
to CMS. Consequently, the accuracy, thoroughness, and timeliness of claims data may be 
subject to errors and omissions by providers, MACs, and CMS. To mitigate these 
concerns, CMS and its contractors undertake a regular and rigorous review of claims data 
(https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Monitoring-




 Similarly, the Medicare Advantage (HMO) encounter data used in this research 
are dependent upon MAOs’ efforts to collect and report data that are accurate, thorough, 
and timely. According to MedPAC, in recent years, data collection efforts have improved 
with the advent of more performance-driven payments to providers.  MedPAC states that 
researchers must be cautious in their use of these data as the data continue to evolve in 
accuracy. In its March 2020 report to Congress, MedPAC reported that the data were 
improved from prior years, but that further work is required to assure greater data 
accuracy. Because of need for complete and accurate data, and with MedPAC’s 
recommendation, CMS continues its efforts to improve data reporting by plans and 
providers by establishing better audits and higher standards for reporting (MedPAC, 
2020). 
 6.2.2 Gauging health status. Another limitation is our selection of the Charlson 
Co-morbidity Index scoring tool to measure health status. This tool is only one of several 
available. Researchers may prefer to adopt or modify the CCMI algorithm used in this 
study or utilize other methods such as the Elixhauser Index, Chronic Disease Score, or 
Health-related Quality of Life Comorbidity Index. The predictive validity of these 
various methods is dependent upon the characteristics of the patients being observed, the 
purpose of the study, and the sources of data used to construct the indicator (Ou, 
Mukherjee, Erickson, Piette, Bagozzi, & Balkrishnan, 2012). CMS continues to refine its 
metrics to determine a beneficiary’s health status, in part, to determine capitation 
amounts to pay to MAOs. Nevertheless, the beneficiaries’ “official” risk scores are 
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available to researchers only for the calendar year 2014. At this time, we do not know 
when risk scores for other years will be released. Hence, we do not know if our 
calculations will materially yield the same results produced by CMS for the not-yet-
published 2016 scores.  With diagnostic data in the individual encounter records, 
however, it is possible to produce alternative indicators of patients’ health status which 
may be more sensitive than co-morbidity indicators for predicting needs for specific 
medical services. 
 6.2.3 Beneficiary traits. The Medicare files do not contain any variables for 
“level of education” or “household wealth.” Our surrogate variables are obtained from 
U.S. Census-related data as organized by zip code tabulation areas (ZCAT), based on 
results from the American Household Survey. In this study, for these two attributes, we 
use averages based on individuals residing within the same ZCAT. 
 6.2.4 Quality considerations. This study does not address the quality of care 
rendered by clinicians or the clinical outcomes experienced by beneficiaries. It is our 
experience that conversations involving healthcare quantity inevitably lead to corollary 
discussions regarding healthcare quality. Some may contend that quantity reduction can 
lead to quality reduction. Search engines produce thousands of articles, editorials, 
research papers, public policy statements, and other published subject matter on the topic, 
and the topic is broad. We find that attempts to define healthcare quality can be very 
narrow, such as for specific surgical procedures (Yuan & Chung, 2016), or more 
comprehensive, such as for an industry-wide standard (AHRQ, 2020). Busse, Panteli, and 
Quinten (2019) write: “despite the vast literature base and its universal acknowledgment 
of its importance in health systems, there is no common understanding of the term 
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‘quality of care,’ and there is disagreement about what it encompasses.” In proposing a 
framework for defining quality, one research team acknowledges “the fact that patients, 
clinicians, leaders, and other stakeholders might have different perspectives on health-
care quality makes it even harder to standardize and harmonize different conceptual 
models of quality” (Nylenna, Bjertnaes, Saunes, and Lindahl, 2015). Others propose that 
the absence of a standard characterization of healthcare quality, and the tensions created, 
may be valuable. For example, Mitchell, Cribb, & Entwistle (2019) argue that efforts to 
generalize or coordinate industry-wide definitions of quality could squash local and 
legitimate quality initiatives, thereby limiting pathways to further quality improvements. 
Consequently, in this study, we do not attempt to define or report quality and leave that to 
future research. With an additional year of data, however, it would be possible to use the 
detailed diagnostic information to examine how health status in the succeeding year is 
affected by health status and services received in the previous year. This presents an 
opportunity to introduce some type of quality component into the study. 
 Our agency structure is but one set of forces that might influence the quantity and 
quality of care received by patients.  In discussions with medical practitioners, the author 
has found that physicians inherently seek to provide high quality care and are motivated 
by factors such as: 
 The “Calling” to be a doctor; 
 The Hippocratic oath; 
 Personal and professional pride; 
 Preserving one’s community reputation; 
 Achieving patient and family satisfaction with services rendered; 
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 Peer review by professional colleagues of one’s clinical activity; 
 Peer review by MAOs of one’s clinical and patient satisfaction outcomes; 
 Rewards and penalties based on patient satisfaction and clinical outcome metrics; 
 The threat of malpractice lawsuits; 
 State sanctions, including loss of professional license; and 
 The threat of federal penalties due to improper medical care. 
It may be possible to develop indicators of some of these forces and consider them 
additionally when comparing services rendered in different environments. In this study, 
however, there is no intention to measure quality as it relates to services utilization, 
appropriateness or outcomes. For some, that may represent an important limitation. 
Accordingly, we leave open the discussion of quality for future research. 
 6.2.5 Additional Comments.  Despite the need for further investigation of the 
accuracy and uniformity of data furnished to CMS by MAOs , the quantitative methods 
presented herein collectively lay a foundation for productive  multi-year studies of CMS 
data  as further evolution occurs in medical insurance programs for individuals and 
reimbursement arrangements for service delivery. 
6.3 Future Research 
 At this time, the Medicare Advantage encounter data were available only for 
calendar years 2015 (released by CMS in 2018) and 2016 (released in 2019). (Data for 
2017 were subsequently released in 2020). This study uses the data for the most recent 
year available (2016), a year for which master beneficiary information also was 
comparatively complete for enrollees in HMO plans. In 2015, the healthcare industry 
underwent a significant transition from ICD-9 to ICD-10 diagnosis coding, and we are 
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aware of concerns about coding accuracy in that year. This reinforces our decision to use 
only 2016 data. 
 Should researchers be granted permission to review contract terms between 
MAOs and providers (perhaps CMS should mandate such disclosure), their analyses 
could expand to include the effects those terms have on many elements such as 
beneficiary plan choice, enrollment trends, and services utilization. It is possible, perhaps 
likely, that specific contract terms drive long-term principal-agent relationships, 
accelerate enrollment of MAO beneficiaries, and contribute to optimal service utilization 
patterns. 
 The granularity of the Traditional Medicare and Medicare Advantage datasets 
offers a treasure trove of research opportunities, and we envision several additional 
opportunities for ongoing research. Healthcare utilization can be analyzed by procedure, 
diagnosis, patient, provider, plan, MAO, and demographical traits. Accordingly, we 
suggest several future research topics to advance the Medicare body of knowledge. 
 Refinement of the Poisson regression models.  When the Poisson regression 
models were applied to individual cases and the cases were sorted according to the 
estimated number of encounters for each type of service, it was apparent that predictions 
could be refined to accommodate nonlinear impacts of Charlson scores and age of patient 
on the log (expected encounters).  Such refinements did not affect the statistical 
significance of the factors included in the models presented in this dissertation or 
materially affect the total number of services of a particular type that were predicted to be 
delivered under the different insurance plans. They did, however, result in more accurate 
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estimates for population subgroups. Results of experiments with alternative methods of 
incorporating these effects will be reported in future work.   
 Other regions. Results using this (or similar) methodology with data from other 
locales, states, and regions will help determine if the results from this study are 
generalizable to the entire Medicare population.  
 Plan choice.  In our research, we presented evidence that a beneficiary’s 
demographical characteristics and access to care may affect their Medicare plan choice 
and service utilization.  Policymakers and MAOs alike may be interested in further 
investigation into this line of research for tactical development of plans and benefits 
schedules best suited for the beneficiaries they seek to accommodate. For example, would 
CMS’ cost to incentivize MAOs and their healthcare providers to increase their presence 
in an underserved community be less than the long-term cost attributable to a presumably 
less healthy population? Or, could plan benefit structures somehow better incentivize 
beneficiaries in underserved areas to be more proactive in seeking preventative care in 
neighboring counties? These types of analyses are compelling opportunities to expand 
research in these areas. 
 Effect of service prices on referrals. The Traditional Medicare (FFS) data 
contain payment information for each healthcare service received, including the service 
location and rendering provider. For each service event, there is a record of the specific 
amounts paid by the Medicare program, secondary and supplemental insurers, and 
beneficiaries. The sum of those payments is the total cost of the service. Researchers 
could determine if the total cost of a specific service (or service provider) has a 
relationship to the RB PCPs’ patient referral patterns. If so, this suggests that RB PCPs 
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are price sensitive and may actively seek out low-cost providers as one strategy to 
minimize expense payments from their medical risk pools. 
 PCP practice-based services. Researchers could examine the medical practice-
based procedure codes and volumes reported by both RB PCPs and FFS PCPs to 
determine if one cohort offers a broader selection of services as compared to the other. 
The RB PCPs whom we interviewed believe they offer a comprehensive array of medical 
practice-based services as another strategy to minimize both their referrals and the 
associated deductions from their medical risk pools. We are not aware of any research 
that supports their viewpoint, but the Medicare claims data are available to conduct such 
research. 
 Medical practice modeling. Medical service providers, such as PCPs wishing to 
enter into risk-bearing contracts, could utilize the tools contained in this research to 
construct various models to predict the results given various assumptions about patient 
attributes, services utilization, and compensation schemes (such as capitation and risk 
pools). They could enter the profiles of their existing Medicare patients and the profiles 
of incremental patients they anticipate receiving from participation in new agreements 
with MAO. These analyses could be very instructive to providers when deciding to 
accept or reject participation agreements from MAOs or negotiating better terms for 
agreements that interest them. 
 Specialist referrals. Our research only examines the total volumes of general 
category services used by beneficiaries of RB PCPs and FFS PCPs. Researchers could 
utilize the provider identifiers, taxonomy codes, service centers, and associated volumes 
to determine if there is a significant difference in the mix and quantity of services within 
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each category used by beneficiaries of RB PCPs and FFS PCPs. Those results, compared 
with results found in the PCP practice-based services research, might uncover meaningful 
correlations between PCP practices and specialist referrals. 
 Service mix by plan. Researchers could examine the mix of services used by 
beneficiaries for each unique plan and benefits structure. Among other potential findings, 
researchers may discover that some MAO plans offer a broader selection of lower-cost 
services while other plans offer a narrower selection of higher-cost services. Included in 
this type of research would be the amount of the patient’s deductible and co-payment 
responsibilities as potential explanatory variables in plan and benefit selections. 
 Clinical outcomes. Our brief discussion of quality, including clinical outcomes, 
highlights a concern that the industry struggles with this element of patient care 
evaluation. Researchers could assess the ongoing debate about clinical outcomes and 
quality metrics, devise appropriate variables, extract the corresponding values from the 
Medicare files, and utilize the methods shown in this study to determine what 
relationships exist among those variables. Death rates, readmission rates, and alternative 
measures for changes in health status can be examined with information in the CMS 
datasets.  Associations between patient characteristics, plan choice, provider access, 
physician compensation structures and clinical outcomes would provide useful 
perspective as participating parties collaborate in efforts to improve healthcare delivery. 
 Health status. Researchers could replace the CCMI score with an alternative 
variable to determine if health status defined differently has a different relationship to 
services utilization than shown in our research. 
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 Access to care. There may be alternative proxies for access to hospitals and 
doctors. Refinements could be made by examining the effects of the availability of 
specific physician specialties, clinics, and hospital types. Also, consideration could be 
given to service availability in neighboring counties or regions. Transportation modes 
(e.g., auto, public transportation, taxi) may affect access to health care service locations. 
More recently, because of the Covid-19 pandemic, CMS has lifted several restrictions on 
the use of telemedicine. The removal of physical barriers made possible by digital 
transmission of conversations and images could have an effect on service utilization; 
however, some beneficiaries may not have access to the necessary technology to access 
those services. Consequently, future research could investigate these and other potential 
barriers that beneficiaries encounter when trying to access the health services that they 
require. 
 Longitudinal studies. As data integrity improves, and CMS releases more years 
of data, researchers could identify longer-term patterns and trends of healthcare services 
used by Medicare beneficiaries. Beneficiaries could be grouped into various subsets to 
examine the effects of physician and plan choices over time. Policymakers could better 
evaluate their strategy to steer Medicare beneficiaries into Medicare Advantage plans. 
Also, by examining clinical outcomes derived from the data, more careful analyses could 
be conducted to determine if there are differences in the long-term clinical outcomes of 
Traditional Medicare and MA beneficiaries. Researchers could also look for evolution in 
plan choices as driven by beneficiary attributes or industry changes. 
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6.5 Conclusion 
 Our study found that personal traits, access to providers, and levels of wealth and 
education, exhibit statistically significant relationships with a beneficiary’s choice of 
Medicare plans. Using statistical methods such as CHAID decision trees and Poisson 
regression, we show how those attributes (personal traits, access, wealth, education, and 
plan choice) also predict service utilization in each of five general categories: inpatient 
admissions, skilled nursing admissions, outpatient services, home health services, and 
carrier services.  
 We identified major stakeholders in the Medicare system, demonstrated how they 
preside as both principal and agent, and discussed their operational problems predicted by 
agency theory. By conducting fieldwork that included discussions with PCPs and MAOs 
and reviews of their participation agreements, we were able to identify the elements of 
purportedly successful contract terms that serve to mitigate the problems posed by agency 
theory. A review of results stemming from one such contract suggests that beneficiaries 
of MAOs engaged with RB PCPs will utilize fewer healthcare resources than 
beneficiaries in FFS plans and, possibly, those in other HMO plans. This is an area for 
further exploration. Overall, our findings suggest that the features of health insurance 
plans and compensation mechanisms for healthcare providers significantly affect the 
services received by individual patients. Quantifying the impact of these effects with the 
methods used in this dissertation can provide vital information to governmental officials, 
health insurers, healthcare organizations and individual practitioners. 
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Appendix A: Risk-bearing Contracts for Primary Care Physicians 
 
Typically, Managed Care Organizations (MAOs) receive a monthly payment, sometimes 
referred to as capitation, from CMS for each insured member in the MAO’s Medicare 
Advantage plan(s) assigned to a physician or physician group. The capitation payment 
emanates from a complex formula that includes, but is not limited to, such variables as 
the MAO’s bid amount sent to CMS; the insured patient’s age, sex, geographic location, 
place of residence and other demographics; risk adjustments for health conditions; prior 
year adjustments that are posted in the current year; and incentive payments based on the 
plan’s performance as indicated by the plan’s prior-year “Star” rating. Due to these 
variables, monthly capitation payments will differ from patient to patient. The 
complexities of this risk-adjusted payment structure are not addressed in this paper, but 
they can be reviewed in detail at CMS’ website at www.cms.gov. For our purposes, we 
shall refer to the CMS payment as the average risk-adjusted capitation payment received 
for each insured member. We label this monthly capitation payment as “C.” 
 The MAO generally retains a portion of the C to fund its internal resources such 
as general management, provider contracting and relations, marketing, sales, advertising, 
information technology, other administrative functions, and potential profits. The 
retention typically is a percentage of C. We label the retention percentage as “r.” The 
difference between C and (C * r) is the pool of dollars available to pay all medical and 
medically related expenses for the care of the insured member (patient). We label this 
pool as “P.” 
[C – (C * r)] = P 
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Medical and medically related expenses include payments to hospitals, doctors, ancillary 
service providers, laboratories, pharmacies, outpatient surgery centers, home health 
companies, member/patient health club memberships, stop-loss reinsurance companies, 
and other costs of care and services. We label the average expenses per patient as “E.” If 
P > E, then there is a surplus in the pool. If P < E, there is a deficit. If P = E, the pool 
has a zero balance. During contract negotiations, the PCP Organization (PCP) and MAO 
negotiate each party's respective share of the surplus or deficit, and the terms of those 
negotiations are written into the contract between the parties. If there is a surplus, the 
contract requires the MAO to pay the PCPs’ share of the surplus to the PCPs within a 
specified period. If there is a deficit, the contract requires the PCPs to pay their share of 
the deficit to the MAO within a specified period. Alternatively, the PCPs and the MAO 
may agree to provisions whereby current deficit payments due from the PCPs are 
deducted from PCPs’ future surpluses, thus reducing those future payments, but easing 
the PCPs’ near-term cash flow burden. 
 There also can be variations in this payment methodology. In recent years, it is 
our observation that agreements between MAOs and PCPs have become increasingly 
complex, especially regarding the calculations for both surplus/deficit sharing and 
supplemental incentives such as the outcomes measures. For example, the contract 
between the PCPs and a MAO might state that the ratio value of E to P (E/P) must be less 
than a specific threshold to qualify for financial incentives. Alternatively, if E/P equals or 
exceeds the threshold, then the PCPs may incur financial penalties. In this type of 
arrangement, the MAO expects the overall cost of care to be such that E/P is less than a 
predefined ratio, denoted by "X”. Thus, we can write: 
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If E/P < X, then then PCPs receive a share of the surplus 
If E/P > X, then the PCPs’ share of the surplus is voided and penalties are incurred 
 
Our experience suggests that the PCPs’ share of surpluses (and deficits) ranges from 60% 
to 80% in these types of risk-bearing arrangements. We label the PCPs’ percentage share 
as “S”; therefore, we can write: 
 
[C – (C * r)] = P  
If E/P < X, then the PCP share of surplus = [(P * X) – E] * S  
If E/P ≥ X, then the PCP repayment to MAO = [(P * X) – E] * S 
 
The X may or may not be negotiable, and may reflect past precedent or the parties’ goals 
for the upcoming contract year(s), or both. 
 In addition to financial incentives, contracts between MAOs and PCPs also may 
contain outcomes incentives. Our experience with and review of Medicare Advantage 
contracts between MAOs and PCPs suggests that outcomes incentives are calculated 
differently in each contract based on the MAO’s objectives. Generally, it appears that 
outcomes incentives are directly related to the MAO’s effort to maximize its Star rating. 
Outcomes metrics contained in the Star rating program for MAOs, and the outcomes 
incentives for PCPs, are derived, in part, from a listing of measures included in the 
Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set (HEDIS), one of the most widely 
used sets of health care performance measures in the United States (NCQA, 2018).  This 
information is collected, compiled, and published by the non-profit organization, 
National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA). Background information about 
NCQA and HEDIS is available at www.ncqa.org.  
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 Based on our conversations with MAOs and Harmony PCPs, we believe that 
outcomes metrics achievement or non-achievement are introduced into the payment 
model for at least four reasons: a) to create a critical check and balance offering 
deterrence, in the form of opportunity costs, for underutilization of resources, resulting in 
lower E, that potentially would harm members/patients, b) to help the MAO maximize its 
CMS Star rating, c) to provide guidance and structure that assist PCPs in efforts to 
improve clinical outcomes, and d) to reward PCPs for improving outcomes.  Our review 
of MAOs’ contracts with PCPs indicates that achievement of specified benchmarks, 
either individually or collectively, is rewarded as dollar payments that supplement the 
PCPs’ surplus share, or as additional percentages added to S, with either method resulting 
in a potentially higher rate of compensation than offered by a financial incentive alone. 
 The outcomes incentives may be expressed as a pre-defined dollar value per 
outcome attained, or a pre-defined percentage value that supplements S. We let 𝑖𝑗 be the 
predefined dollar incentive for outcome 𝑗, 𝑖′𝑗 be the predefined percentage incentive for 
outcome 𝑗, and 𝛼𝑗 = 1 if outcome 𝑗 is attained, and 0 otherwise. We illustrate the effects 
outcomes incentives have on payment models with three hypothetical risk-bearing 
contracts, as follows: 
Scenario 1. Assumptions: E/P ratio is favorable (i.e., less than X), and 𝑛 dollar incentive 
measures are available to supplement the surplus share. 
Given [C – (C * r)] = P, and E/P < X, 
Therefore, PCP Earnings = {[(P * X) – E] * S} + ∑ 𝛼𝑗 ∗ 𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1   
 
Scenario 2. Assumptions: E/P ratio is unfavorable (i.e., E/P ≥ X), but 𝑛 dollar incentive 
measures are available to help offset the penalty for not achieving the ratio X. 
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Given [C – (C * r)] = P, and E/P ≥ X, 
Therefore, PCP Earnings = {[(P * X) – E] * S} + ∑ 𝛼𝑗 ∗ 𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1    (a potential deficit) 
 
Scenario 3. Assumptions: The contract terms do not include a threshold (X), but 
𝑛 percentage incentive measures are available to supplement S. 
Given [C – (C * r)] = P and P > E 
Therefore, PCP Earnings = (P – E) * (S + ∑ 𝛼𝑗 ∗ 𝑖′𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1  ) 
 
We note that these payment formulas generally are not calculated for each patient. 
Instead, it is typically the summation of payments, expenses, and incentives for the entire 
patient panel assigned to each PCP or the entire PCP group. 
 The MAO typically makes these calculations and reports them to the PCPs on a 
monthly, quarterly, and annual basis. Cumulative calculations sometimes are titled 
“reconciliations” and typically occur on quarterly and yearly bases several weeks after 
the close of those respective periods. This delayed reporting allows for “incurred but not 
reported claims” (IBNR) to make their way into the MAO’s payment system before the 
reconciliations. 
 The previously displayed Exhibit 7 illustrates the flow of funds for the various 
components of a generic Medicare Advantage risk-bearing contract between an MAO 
and PCP group organized to enter into such agreements. Our discussions with Harmony 
physicians and reviews of their risk-bearing contracts inform us that Harmony PCPs may 
generate revenue from any or all of five different sources: 1) advance from the MAO, 2) 
FFS reimbursement for medical services rendered, 3) the share of the medical expense 
pool surplus, 4) outcomes incentives earned, and 5) patient co-payments and unmet 
deductibles (see Exhibit A1). 
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Exhibit A1. MA-HMO Funds Flow 
 
 
It is the summation of these five revenue sources that PCPs compare and contrast to 
Traditional Medicare fee-for-service arrangements to determine if the financial reward 
from MA-HMO participation justifies the risks incurred. 
 For illustrative and simplicity purposes, we shall examine the hypothetical results 
for a single patient/member for one month, using the three scenarios described 
previously. We use the following common data for all scenarios: 
C (Monthly Capitation Payment) = $1,000 
r (MAO Retention) = 10% 
𝑖1 (Dollar outcomes metric) = $1.00 
𝑖2 (Dollar outcomes metric) = $1.50 
𝑖3 (Dollar outcomes metric) = $1.50 
𝑖4 (Dollar outcomes metric) = $2.00 
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𝑖5 (Dollar outcomes metric) = $2.00 
𝑖6 (Dollar outcomes metric) = $2.50 
𝑖′1 (Percentage outcomes metric) = 1.0% 
𝑖′2 (Percentage outcomes metric) = 1.5% 
𝑖′3 (Percentage outcomes metric) = 1.5% 
𝑖′4 (Percentage outcomes metric) = 2.0% 
𝑖′5 (Percentage outcomes metric) = 2.0% 
𝑖′6 (Percentage outcomes metric) = 3.0% 
In each scenario, the calculated pool P = [1,000 – (1,000 * 0.1)] = $900 
 
Scenario 1. Assumptions: E/P ratio is favorable (i.e., less than X), and all six dollar 
amount outcomes incentive measures are achieved. Let: 
E (Medical Expense) = $700 
X (Expense Threshold) = 85% 
S (PCP Share) = 75% 
Then: 
 
PCP Earnings = {[(900 * 0.85) – 700)] * 0.75} + {1.00 + 1.50 + 1.50 + 2.00 +2.00 + 
2.50} 
  = {48.75} + {10.50} 
  = 59.25, or $59.25 payment for one patient, for one month 
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If one were to assume that a PCP has a panel of 150 patients of comparable demographics 
and health, and the results were the same each month of the year for each patient, then the 
PCP’s earnings would be as follows: 
 
$59.25/month/patient * 150 patients * 12 months/year = $106,650 annually 
 
Scenario 2. Assumptions: E/P ratio is unfavorable (i.e., E/P ≥ X), but all six dollar 
outcomes incentive measures are achieved to offset the penalty for the E/P ratio not 
exceeding X.  
Let:  
E (Medical Expense) = $800 
X (Expense Threshold) = 85% 
S (PCP Share) = 75% 
Then: 
PCP Earnings = {[(900 * 0.85) – 800)] * 0.75} + {1.00 + 1.50 + 1.50 + 2.00 +2.00 + 
2.50} 
  = {-26.25} + {10.50} 
  = -15.75, or -$15.75 for one patient, for one month (to be repaid to the 
MAO) 
 
If one were to assume that a PCP has a panel of 150 patients of comparable demographics 
and health (i.e., comparable risk factors), and the results were the same each month of the 
year for each patient, then the PCP’s earnings would be as follows: 
 
-$15.75/month/patient * 150 patients * 12 months/year = -$28,350 annually (payable to 
MAO) 
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In this scenario, the PCP provided services to a patient panel for one year but had to 
reimburse the MAO for the shortfall. Further analysis would be needed to determine if 
the PCP incurred an overall net loss because other payment sources such as patient co-
pays and services paid on a fee-for-service basis could potentially offset some or all of 
the loss, and possibly return the PCP to a net positive result. 
Scenario 3. Assumptions: The contract does not contain a threshold (X), and the PCP 
surplus share percentage S is increased due to the achievement of all six percentage 
outcomes measures  to supplements S. 
Let: 
E (Medical Expense) = $750 
S (PCP Share) = 60% 
Then:  
PCP Earnings = (900 – 750) * (0.60 + 0.01 + 0.015 + 0.015 + 0.02 + 0.02 +0.025) 
  = (150) * (0.705) 
  = 105.75, or $105.75 payment for one patient, for one month 
 
If one were to assume that a PCP has a panel of 150 patients each having comparable risk 
factors, and the results were the same each month of the year for each patient, then the 
PCP’s earnings would be as follows: 
 
$105.75/month/patient * 150 patients * 12 months/year = $190,350 annually 
  
Of course, these illustrations overly simplify the actual contract terms and conditions, as 
well as the amount of data generated and resultant calculations, attributable to the 150 
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patients of varying demographics and illnesses contained in an actual reconciliation 
process.  
In addition to financial and outcomes measures, we observe other types of 
incentives incorporated into these risk-bearing contracts. Examples include cash rewards 
for patient satisfaction survey results (MAOs desire high ratings) and utilization metrics 
(MAOs want reduced utilization) such as hospital inpatient days per thousand patients 
and hospital emergency department visits per thousand patients. Further complexity 
occurs when some contracts prescribe an advance payment to the PCPs as interim cash 
flow support before reconciliation payments. These advance payments pose an additional 
risk component because some or the entire advance would have to be repaid to the MAO 
should the PCPs find themselves in a deficit position at reconciliation. Advance payment 
also creates a cash management dilemma: should the advance be recognized as spendable 
income, or should it be reserved for losses?  The Harmony PCPs told us they install a 
measure of both by using an internal risk share methodology that establishes an internal 
reserve that offsets future deficits. If the reserve is not used by year-end, the proceeds are 
distributed to the PCPs per a pre-defined formula. 
 These scenarios demonstrate the tremendous importance of PCPs familiarizing 
themselves, and acting on, the information supplied by the MAO, but also received from 
multiple sources: CMS, NCQA, contract terms and conditions, provider claims and 
payment data, historical records, outcomes data, and other informational sources. When 
Harmony PCPs discuss their risks inherent in these types of risk bearing (RB) 
arrangements, they frequently mention that their total compensation as Medicare 
Advantage HMO participating physicians is heavily dependent on several factors, some 
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controllable, some not. From our field observations, we note that the Harmony PCPs 
place substantial reliance on the MAOs to supply timely and useful information to help 
the PCPs perform well. To get more contemporary and customized data, some PCP 
groups invest in specialized technology and services to supplement the MAOs’ 
information. 
 Collectively, many elements comprise the payment scheme that attempts to 
incentivize and compensate PCPs for the care of Medicare Advantage beneficiaries 
assigned to them. Our interaction with the Harmony PCPs left us quite impressed with 
their ability to analyze data and understand the extent to which various elements pose a 
financial risk and therefore impact their payments from MAOs. However, the complexity 
of these arrangements also makes one mindful of the significant body of knowledge a 
fee-for-service-oriented PCP, or PCP group should possess before committing to a 
Medicare Advantage risk-bearing contract. Additionally, the PCPs should ensure their 
contract negotiator has experience with such contract complexities. 
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Appendix B: Master Beneficiary Summary File Variables and Names 
 
 
SAS Name Label Type Length 
Base Claim File:        
BENE_ID Encrypted CCW Beneficiary ID CHAR 15 
BENE_ENROLLMT_REF_YR Reference Year NUM 4 
ENRL_SRC Source of enrollment data CHAR 3 
SAMPLE_GROUP 
Medicare 1, 5, or 20% strict sample group 
indicator 
CHAR 2 
ENHANCED_FIVE_PERCENT_FLAG Enhanced Medicare 5% Sample Indicator CHAR 1 
CRNT_BIC_CD Current Beneficiary Identification Code CHAR 2 
STATE_CODE State code for beneficiary (SSA code) CHAR 2 
COUNTY_CD County code for beneficiary (SSA code) CHAR 3 
ZIP_CD 5-digit ZIP code for beneficiary CHAR 5 
STATE_CNTY_FIPS_CD_01 State and county FIPS code - January CHAR 5 
STATE_CNTY_FIPS_CD_02 State and county FIPS code - February CHAR 5 
STATE_CNTY_FIPS_CD_03 State and county FIPS code - March CHAR 5 
STATE_CNTY_FIPS_CD_04 State and county FIPS code - April CHAR 5 
STATE_CNTY_FIPS_CD_05 State and county FIPS code - May CHAR 5 
STATE_CNTY_FIPS_CD_06 State and county FIPS code - June CHAR 5 
STATE_CNTY_FIPS_CD_07 State and county FIPS code - July CHAR 5 
STATE_CNTY_FIPS_CD_08 State and county FIPS code - August CHAR 5 
STATE_CNTY_FIPS_CD_09 State and county FIPS code - September CHAR 5 
STATE_CNTY_FIPS_CD_10 State and county FIPS code - October CHAR 5 
STATE_CNTY_FIPS_CD_11 State and county FIPS code - November CHAR 5 
STATE_CNTY_FIPS_CD_12 State and county FIPS code - December CHAR 5 
AGE_AT_END_REF_YR Age of beneficiary at end of year NUM 3 
BENE_BIRTH_DT Beneficiary date of birth DATE 8 
VALID_DEATH_DT_SW Valid Date of Death Switch CHAR 1 
BENE_DEATH_DT Date of Death DATE 8 
SEX_IDENT_CD Sex CHAR 1 
BENE_RACE_CD Beneficiary Race Code CHAR 1 
RTI_RACE_CD 
Research Triangle Institute (RTI) Race 
Code 
CHAR 1 
COVSTART Medicare Coverage Start Date DATE 8 
ENTLMT_RSN_ORIG Original Reason for Entitlement Code CHAR 1 
ENTLMT_RSN_CURR Current Reason for Entitlement Code CHAR 1 
ESRD_IND End-stage Renal Disease (ESRD) Indicator CHAR 1 
MDCR_STATUS_CODE_01 Medicare Status Code - January CHAR 2 
MDCR_STATUS_CODE_02 Medicare Status Code - February CHAR 2 
MDCR_STATUS_CODE_03 Medicare Status Code - March CHAR 2 
MDCR_STATUS_CODE_04 Medicare Status Code - April CHAR 2 
MDCR_STATUS_CODE_05 Medicare Status Code - May CHAR 2 
MDCR_STATUS_CODE_06 Medicare Status Code - June CHAR 2 
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MDCR_STATUS_CODE_07 Medicare Status Code - July CHAR 2 
MDCR_STATUS_CODE_08 Medicare Status Code - August CHAR 2 
MDCR_STATUS_CODE_09 Medicare Status Code - September CHAR 2 
MDCR_STATUS_CODE_10 Medicare Status Code - October CHAR 2 
MDCR_STATUS_CODE_11 Medicare Status Code - November CHAR 2 
MDCR_STATUS_CODE_12 Medicare Status Code - December CHAR 2 
BENE_PTA_TRMNTN_CD Part A Termination Code CHAR 1 
BENE_PTB_TRMNTN_CD Part B Termination Code CHAR 1 
BENE_HI_CVRAGE_TOT_MONS Part A Months Count NUM 3 
BENE_SMI_CVRAGE_TOT_MONS Part B Months Count NUM 3 
BENE_STATE_BUYIN_TOT_MONS State Buy-In Coverage Count NUM 3 
BENE_HMO_CVRAGE_TOT_MONS HMO Coverage Count NUM 3 
PTD_PLAN_CVRG_MONS Months of Part D Coverage NUM 3 
RDS_CVRG_MONS Months of Retiree Drug Subsidy Coverage NUM 3 
DUAL_ELGBL_MONS Months of Dual Eligibility NUM 3 
MDCR_ENTLMT_BUYIN_IND_01 












































Medicare  Entitlement/Buy-In Indicator - 
December 
CHAR 1 
HMO_IND_01 HMO Indicator - January  CHAR 1 
HMO_IND_02 HMO Indicator - February CHAR 1 
HMO_IND_03 HMO Indicator - March CHAR 1 
HMO_IND_04 HMO Indicator - April CHAR 1 
HMO_IND_05 HMO Indicator - May CHAR 1 
HMO_IND_06 HMO Indicator - June CHAR 1 
HMO_IND_07 HMO Indicator - July CHAR 1 
HMO_IND_08 HMO Indicator - August CHAR 1 
HMO_IND_09 HMO Indicator - September CHAR 1 
HMO_IND_10 HMO Indicator - October CHAR 1 
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HMO_IND_11 HMO Indicator - November CHAR 1 
HMO_IND_12 HMO Indicator - December CHAR 1 
PTC_CNTRCT_ID_01 Part C Contract Number - January CHAR 5 
PTC_CNTRCT_ID_02 Part C Contract Number - February CHAR 5 
PTC_CNTRCT_ID_03 Part C Contract Number - March CHAR 5 
PTC_CNTRCT_ID_04 Part C Contract Number - April CHAR 5 
PTC_CNTRCT_ID_05 Part C Contract Number - May CHAR 5 
PTC_CNTRCT_ID_06 Part C Contract Number - June CHAR 5 
PTC_CNTRCT_ID_07 Part C Contract Number - July CHAR 5 
PTC_CNTRCT_ID_08 Part C Contract Number - August CHAR 5 
PTC_CNTRCT_ID_09 Part C Contract Number - September CHAR 5 
PTC_CNTRCT_ID_10 Part C Contract Number - October CHAR 5 
PTC_CNTRCT_ID_11 Part C Contract Number - November CHAR 5 
PTC_CNTRCT_ID_12 Part C Contract Number - December CHAR 5 
PTC_PBP_ID_01 Part C PBP Number - January CHAR 3 
PTC_PBP_ID_02 Part C PBP Number - February CHAR 3 
PTC_PBP_ID_03 Part C PBP Number - March CHAR 3 
PTC_PBP_ID_04 Part C PBP Number - April CHAR 3 
PTC_PBP_ID_05 Part C PBP Number - May CHAR 3 
PTC_PBP_ID_06 Part C PBP Number - June CHAR 3 
PTC_PBP_ID_07 Part C PBP Number - July CHAR 3 
PTC_PBP_ID_08 Part C PBP Number - August CHAR 3 
PTC_PBP_ID_09 Part C PBP Number - September CHAR 3 
PTC_PBP_ID_10 Part C PBP Number - October CHAR 3 
PTC_PBP_ID_11 Part C PBP Number - November CHAR 3 
PTC_PBP_ID_12 Part C PBP Number - December CHAR 3 
PTC_PLAN_TYPE_CD_01 Part C Plan Type Code - January CHAR 3 
PTC_PLAN_TYPE_CD_02 Part C Plan Type Code - February CHAR 3 
PTC_PLAN_TYPE_CD_03 Part C Plan Type Code - March CHAR 3 
PTC_PLAN_TYPE_CD_04 Part C Plan Type Code - April CHAR 3 
PTC_PLAN_TYPE_CD_05 Part C Plan Type Code - May CHAR 3 
PTC_PLAN_TYPE_CD_06 Part C Plan Type Code - June CHAR 3 
PTC_PLAN_TYPE_CD_07 Part C Plan Type Code - July CHAR 3 
PTC_PLAN_TYPE_CD_08 Part C Plan Type Code - August CHAR 3 
PTC_PLAN_TYPE_CD_09 Part C Plan Type Code - September CHAR 3 
PTC_PLAN_TYPE_CD_10 Part C Plan Type Code - October CHAR 3 
PTC_PLAN_TYPE_CD_11 Part C Plan Type Code - November CHAR 3 
PTC_PLAN_TYPE_CD_12 Part C Plan Type Code - December CHAR 3 
PTD_CNTRCT_ID_01 Part D Contract Number - January CHAR 5 
PTD_CNTRCT_ID_02 Part D Contract Number - February CHAR 5 
PTD_CNTRCT_ID_03 Part D Contract Number - March CHAR 5 
PTD_CNTRCT_ID_04 Part D Contract Number - April CHAR 5 
PTD_CNTRCT_ID_05 Part D Contract Number - May CHAR 5 
PTD_CNTRCT_ID_06 Part D Contract Number - June CHAR 5 
PTD_CNTRCT_ID_07 Part D Contract Number - July CHAR 5 
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PTD_CNTRCT_ID_08 Part D Contract Number - August CHAR 5 
PTD_CNTRCT_ID_09 Part D Contract Number - September CHAR 5 
PTD_CNTRCT_ID_10 Part D Contract Number - October CHAR 5 
PTD_CNTRCT_ID_11 Part D Contract Number - November CHAR 5 
PTD_CNTRCT_ID_12 Part D Contract Number - December CHAR 5 
PTD_PBP_ID_01 Part D PBP Number - January CHAR 3 
PTD_PBP_ID_02 Part D PBP Number - February CHAR 3 
PTD_PBP_ID_03 Part D PBP Number - March CHAR 3 
PTD_PBP_ID_04 Part D PBP Number - April CHAR 3 
PTD_PBP_ID_05 Part D PBP Number - May CHAR 3 
PTD_PBP_ID_06 Part D PBP Number - June CHAR 3 
PTD_PBP_ID_07 Part D PBP Number - July CHAR 3 
PTD_PBP_ID_08 Part D PBP Number - August CHAR 3 
PTD_PBP_ID_09 Part D PBP Number - September CHAR 3 
PTD_PBP_ID_10 Part D PBP Number - October CHAR 3 
PTD_PBP_ID_11 Part D PBP Number - November CHAR 3 
PTD_PBP_ID_12 Part D PBP Number - December CHAR 3 
PTD_SGMT_ID_01 Part D Segment Number - January CHAR 3 
PTD_SGMT_ID_02 Part D Segment Number - February CHAR 3 
PTD_SGMT_ID_03 Part D Segment Number - March CHAR 3 
PTD_SGMT_ID_04 Part D Segment Number - April CHAR 3 
PTD_SGMT_ID_05 Part D Segment Number - May CHAR 3 
PTD_SGMT_ID_06 Part D Segment Number - June CHAR 3 
PTD_SGMT_ID_07 Part D Segment Number - July CHAR 3 
PTD_SGMT_ID_08 Part D Segment Number - August CHAR 3 
PTD_SGMT_ID_09 Part D Segment Number - September CHAR 3 
PTD_SGMT_ID_10 Part D Segment Number - October CHAR 3 
PTD_SGMT_ID_11 Part D Segment Number - November CHAR 3 
PTD_SGMT_ID_12 Part D Segment Number - December CHAR 3 
RDS_IND_01 




































Part D Retiree Drug Subsidy Indicator - 
October 
CHAR 1 
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RDS_IND_11 
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Appendix C: Inpatient and Skilled Nursing Variables and Names 
 
 
SAS Name Label Type Length 2015 
Base Claim File         
BENE_ID Encrypted CCW Beneficiary ID Char 15 1 
SAMPLE_GROUP 
CCW  Beneficiary Random Sample 
Group  
Char 2 2 
ENC_JOIN_KEY Unique Encounter Join Key Char 15 3 
CLM_TYPE_CD Claim Type Code Char 4 4 
CLM_FROM_DT Claim From Date Date 8 5 
CLM_THRU_DT Claim Through Date Date 8 6 
SRVC_MONTH Service Month Date 6 7 
CLM_CHRT_RVW_SW Claim Chart Review Switch Char 1 8 
CLM_CNTL_NUM Claim Control Number Char 23 9 
CLM_ORIG_CNTL_NUM Claim Original Control Number Char 23 10 
CLM_FINL_ACTN_IND Claim Final Action Indicator Char 1 11 
CLM_LTST_CLM_IND Latest Claim Indicator Char 1 12 
EDPS_CREATE_DT 
Encounter Data Processing System 
(EDPS) Create Date 
Date 8 13 
CLM_RCPT_DT Claim Receipt Date Date 8 14 
CLM_FAC_TYPE_CD Claim Facility Type Code Char 1 15 
CLM_SRVC_CLSFCTN_TYPE_CD Claim Service classification Type Code Char 1 16 
CLM_FREQ_CD Claim Frequency Code Char 1 17 
CNTRCT_NUM Medicare Part C Contract Number Char 5 18 
CNTRCT_PBP_NUM 
Medicare Part C Plan Benefit Package 
(PBP) Number 
Char 3 19 
CLM_MDCL_REC Claim Medical Record Number Char 1 20 
ORG_NPI Organization NPI Number Char 10 21 
ORG_TXNMY_CD Organization Taxonomy Code Char 10 22 
RNDRNG_PHYSN_NPI Claim Rendering Physician NPI Number  Char 10 23 
AT_PHYSN_NPI Claim Attending Physician NPI Number Char 10 24 
AT_PHYSN_TXNMY_CD 
Claim Attending Physician Taxonomy 
Code 
Char 10 25 
OP_PHYSN_NPI Claim Operating Physician NPI Number Char 10 26 
OT_PHYSN_NPI Claim Other Physician NPI Number Char 10 27 
CLM_ADMSN_DT Claim Admission Date Date 8 28 
CLM_IP_ADMSN_TYPE_CD Claim Inpatient Admission Type Code Char 1 29 
CLM_SRC_IP_ADMSN_CD Claim Source Inpatient Admission Code Char 1 30 
PTNT_DSCHRG_STUS_CD Patient Discharge Status Code Char 2 31 
CLM_DAY_CNT Day Count (Length of Stay) Num 4 32 
BENE_DSCHRG_DT Beneficiary Discharge Date Date 8 33 
CLM_DRG_CD 
Claim MS-Diagnosis Related Group Code 
(MS-DRG) 
Char 3 34 
DRVD_DRG_CD 
Derived MS-Diagnosis Related Group 
Code (MS-DRG) 
Char 4 35 
ADMTG_DGNS_CD Claim Admitting Diagnosis Code Char 7 36 
PRNCPAL_DGNS_CD Claim Principal Diagnosis Code Char 7 37 
ICD_DGNS_CD1 Claim Diagnosis Code 1 Char 7 38 
ICD_DGNS_CD2 Claim Diagnosis Code 2 Char 7 39 
ICD_DGNS_CD3 Claim Diagnosis Code 3 Char 7 40 
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ICD_DGNS_CD4 Claim Diagnosis Code 4 Char 7 41 
ICD_DGNS_CD5 Claim Diagnosis Code 5 Char 7 42 
ICD_DGNS_CD6 Claim Diagnosis Code 6 Char 7 43 
ICD_DGNS_CD7 Claim Diagnosis Code 7 Char 7 44 
ICD_DGNS_CD8 Claim Diagnosis Code 8 Char 7 45 
ICD_DGNS_CD9 Claim Diagnosis Code 9 Char 7 46 
ICD_DGNS_CD10 Claim Diagnosis Code 10 Char 7 47 
ICD_DGNS_CD11 Claim Diagnosis Code 11 Char 7 48 
ICD_DGNS_CD12 Claim Diagnosis Code 12 Char 7 49 
ICD_DGNS_CD13 Claim Diagnosis Code 13 Char 7 50 
ICD_DGNS_CD14 Claim Diagnosis Code 14 Char 7 51 
ICD_DGNS_CD15 Claim Diagnosis Code 15 Char 7 52 
ICD_DGNS_CD16 Claim Diagnosis Code 16 Char 7 53 
ICD_DGNS_CD17 Claim Diagnosis Code 17 Char 7 54 
ICD_DGNS_CD18 Claim Diagnosis Code 18 Char 7 55 
ICD_DGNS_CD19 Claim Diagnosis Code 19 Char 7 56 
ICD_DGNS_CD20 Claim Diagnosis Code 20 Char 7 57 
ICD_DGNS_CD21 Claim Diagnosis Code 21 Char 7 58 
ICD_DGNS_CD22 Claim Diagnosis Code 22 Char 7 59 
ICD_DGNS_CD23 Claim Diagnosis Code 23 Char 7 60 
ICD_DGNS_CD24 Claim Diagnosis Code 24 Char 7 61 
ICD_DGNS_CD25 Claim Diagnosis Code 25 Char 7 62 
CLM_POA_IND_SW1 
Claim Diagnosis Code 1 Diagnosis 
Present on Admission (POA) Indicator 
Code 
Char 1 63 
CLM_POA_IND_SW2 
Claim Diagnosis Code 2 Diagnosis 
Present on Admission (POA) Indicator 
Code 
Char 1 64 
CLM_POA_IND_SW3 
Claim Diagnosis Code 3 Diagnosis 
Present on Admission (POA) Indicator 
Code 
Char 1 65 
CLM_POA_IND_SW4 
Claim Diagnosis Code 4 Diagnosis 
Present on Admission (POA) Indicator 
Code 
Char 1 66 
CLM_POA_IND_SW5 
Claim Diagnosis Code 5 Diagnosis 
Present on Admission (POA) Indicator 
Code 
Char 1 67 
CLM_POA_IND_SW6 
Claim Diagnosis Code 6 Diagnosis 
Present on Admission (POA) Indicator 
Code 
Char 1 68 
CLM_POA_IND_SW7 
Claim Diagnosis Code 7 Diagnosis 
Present on Admission (POA) Indicator 
Code 
Char 1 69 
CLM_POA_IND_SW8 
Claim Diagnosis Code 8 Diagnosis 
Present on Admission (POA) Indicator 
Code 
Char 1 70 
CLM_POA_IND_SW9 
Claim Diagnosis Code 9 Diagnosis 
Present on Admission (POA) Indicator 
Code 
Char 1 71 
CLM_POA_IND_SW10 
Claim Diagnosis Code 10 Diagnosis 
Present on Admission (POA) Indicator 
Code 
Char 1 72 
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CLM_POA_IND_SW11 
Claim Diagnosis Code 11 Diagnosis 
Present on Admission (POA) Indicator 
Code 
Char 1 73 
CLM_POA_IND_SW12 
Claim Diagnosis Code 12 Diagnosis 
Present on Admission (POA) Indicator 
Code 
Char 1 74 
CLM_POA_IND_SW13 
Claim Diagnosis Code 13 Diagnosis 
Present on Admission (POA) Indicator 
Code 
Char 1 75 
CLM_POA_IND_SW14 
Claim Diagnosis Code 14 Diagnosis 
Present on Admission (POA) Indicator 
Code 
Char 1 76 
CLM_POA_IND_SW15 
Claim Diagnosis Code 15 Diagnosis 
Present on Admission (POA) Indicator 
Code 
Char 1 77 
CLM_POA_IND_SW16 
Claim Diagnosis Code 16 Diagnosis 
Present on Admission (POA) Indicator 
Code 
Char 1 78 
CLM_POA_IND_SW17 
Claim Diagnosis Code 17 Diagnosis 
Present on Admission (POA) Indicator 
Code 
Char 1 79 
CLM_POA_IND_SW18 
Claim Diagnosis Code 18 Diagnosis 
Present on Admission (POA) Indicator 
Code 
Char 1 80 
CLM_POA_IND_SW19 
Claim Diagnosis Code 19 Diagnosis 
Present on Admission (POA) Indicator 
Code 
Char 1 81 
CLM_POA_IND_SW20 
Claim Diagnosis Code 20 Diagnosis 
Present on Admission (POA) Indicator 
Code 
Char 1 82 
CLM_POA_IND_SW21 
Claim Diagnosis Code 21 Diagnosis 
Present on Admission (POA) Indicator 
Code 
Char 1 83 
CLM_POA_IND_SW22 
Claim Diagnosis Code 22 Diagnosis 
Present on Admission (POA) Indicator 
Code 
Char 1 84 
CLM_POA_IND_SW23 
Claim Diagnosis Code 23 Diagnosis 
Present on Admission (POA) Indicator 
Code 
Char 1 85 
CLM_POA_IND_SW24 
Claim Diagnosis Code 24 Diagnosis 
Present on Admission (POA) Indicator 
Code 
Char 1 86 
CLM_POA_IND_SW25 
Claim Diagnosis Code 25 Diagnosis 
Present on Admission (POA) Indicator 
Code 
Char 1 87 
CLM_1ST_DGNS_E_CD First Claim Diagnosis E Code Char 7 88 
ICD_DGNS_E_CD1 Claim Diagnosis E Code 1 Char 7 89 
ICD_DGNS_E_CD2 Claim Diagnosis E Code 2 Char 7 90 
ICD_DGNS_E_CD3 Claim Diagnosis E Code 3 Char 7 91 
ICD_DGNS_E_CD4 Claim Diagnosis E Code 4 Char 7 92 
ICD_DGNS_E_CD5 Claim Diagnosis E Code 5 Char 7 93 
ICD_DGNS_E_CD6 Claim Diagnosis E Code 6 Char 7 94 
ICD_DGNS_E_CD7 Claim Diagnosis E Code 7 Char 7 95 
ICD_DGNS_E_CD8 Claim Diagnosis E Code 8 Char 7 96 
ICD_DGNS_E_CD9 Claim Diagnosis E Code 9 Char 7 97 
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ICD_DGNS_E_CD10 Claim Diagnosis E Code 10 Char 7 98 
CLM_E_POA_IND_SW1 
Claim Diagnosis E Code 1 Diagnosis 
Present on Admission Indicator Code 
Char 1 99 
CLM_E_POA_IND_SW2 
Claim Diagnosis E Code 2 Diagnosis 
Present on Admission Indicator Code 
Char 1 100 
CLM_E_POA_IND_SW3 
Claim Diagnosis E Code 3 Diagnosis 
Present on Admission Indicator Code 
Char 1 101 
CLM_E_POA_IND_SW4 
Claim Diagnosis E Code 4 Diagnosis 
Present on Admission Indicator Code 
Char 1 102 
CLM_E_POA_IND_SW5 
Claim Diagnosis E Code 5 Diagnosis 
Present on Admission Indicator Code 
Char 1 103 
CLM_E_POA_IND_SW6 
Claim Diagnosis E Code 6 Diagnosis 
Present on Admission Indicator Code 
Char 1 104 
CLM_E_POA_IND_SW7 
Claim Diagnosis E Code 7 Diagnosis 
Present on Admission Indicator Code 
Char 1 105 
CLM_E_POA_IND_SW8 
Claim Diagnosis E Code 8 Diagnosis 
Present on Admission Indicator Code 
Char 1 106 
CLM_E_POA_IND_SW9 
Claim Diagnosis E Code 9 Diagnosis 
Present on Admission Indicator Code 
Char 1 107 
CLM_E_POA_IND_SW10 
Claim Diagnosis E Code 10 Diagnosis 
Present on Admission Indicator Code 
Char 1 108 
ICD_PRCDR_CD1 Claim Procedure Code 1 Char 7 109 
ICD_PRCDR_CD2 Claim Procedure Code 2 Char 7 110 
ICD_PRCDR_CD3 Claim Procedure Code 3 Char 7 111 
ICD_PRCDR_CD4 Claim Procedure Code 4 Char 7 112 
ICD_PRCDR_CD5 Claim Procedure Code 5 Char 7 113 
ICD_PRCDR_CD6 Claim Procedure Code 6 Char 7 114 
ICD_PRCDR_CD7 Claim Procedure Code 7 Char 7 115 
ICD_PRCDR_CD8 Claim Procedure Code 8 Char 7 116 
ICD_PRCDR_CD9 Claim Procedure Code 9 Char 7 117 
ICD_PRCDR_CD10 Claim Procedure Code 10 Char 7 118 
ICD_PRCDR_CD11 Claim Procedure Code 11 Char 7 119 
ICD_PRCDR_CD12 Claim Procedure Code 12 Char 7 120 
ICD_PRCDR_CD13 Claim Procedure Code 13 Char 7 121 
PRCDR_DT1 Claim Procedure Code 1 Date Date 8 122 
PRCDR_DT2 Claim Procedure Code 2 Date Date 8 123 
PRCDR_DT3 Claim Procedure Code 3 Date Date 8 124 
PRCDR_DT4 Claim Procedure Code 4 Date Date 8 125 
PRCDR_DT5 Claim Procedure Code 5 Date Date 8 126 
PRCDR_DT6 Claim Procedure Code 6 Date Date 8 127 
PRCDR_DT7 Claim Procedure Code 7 Date Date 8 128 
PRCDR_DT8 Claim Procedure Code 8 Date Date 8 129 
PRCDR_DT9 Claim Procedure Code 9 Date Date 8 130 
PRCDR_DT10 Claim Procedure Code 10 Date Date 8 131 
PRCDR_DT11 Claim Procedure Code 11 Date Date 8 132 
PRCDR_DT12 Claim Procedure Code 12 Date Date 8 133 
PRCDR_DT13 Claim Procedure Code 13 Date Date 8 134 
CLM_OBSLT_DT Claim Obsolete Date Date 8 135 
CLM_BPRVDR_CITY_NAME Billing Provider Address - City Char 30 136 
CLM_BPRVDR_USPS_STATE_CD Billing Provider Address - USPS State Char 2 137 
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Code 
CLM_BPRVDR_ADR_ZIP_CD Billing Provider Address - ZIP Code Char 9 138 
CLM_SUBSCR_CITY_NAME Medicare Subscriber Address - City Char 30 139 
CLM_SUBSCR_USPS_STATE_CD 
Medicare Subscriber Address - USPS 
State Code 
Char 2 140 
CLM_SUBSCR_ADR_ZIP_CD Medicare Subscriber Address - ZIP Code Char 9 141 
BENE_CNTY_CD 
Beneficiary County Code from Claim 
(SSA) 
Char 3 142 
BENE_STATE_CD Beneficiary Residence (SSA) State Code Char 2 143 
BENE_MLG_CNTCT_ZIP_CD Beneficiary ZIP Code of Residence  Char 9 144 
GNDR_CD Gender Code  Char 1 145 
BENE_RACE_CD Race Code Char 1 146 
DOB_DT Date of Birth Date 8 147 
BENE_MDCR_STUS_CD Beneficiary Medicare Status Code Char 2 148 
TAX_NUM Provider Tax Number Char 10 149 
BENE_STATE Beneficiary State Postal Code Char 2 150 
 
Revenue Center File 
BENE_ID  Encrypted CCW Beneficiary ID Char 15 1 
ENC_JOIN_KEY Unique Encounter Join Key Char 15 2 
CLM_TYPE_CD Claim Type Code Char 4 3 
CLM_LINE_NUM Claim Line Number Num 13 4 
LINE_NUM_ORIG  Original Claim Line Number Num 13 19 
CLM_THRU_DT Claim Through Date Date 8 5 
REV_CNTR Revenue Center Code Char 4 6 
REV_CNTR_FROM_DT Revenue Center From Date Date 8 7 
REV_CNTR_THRU_DT Revenue Center Thru Date Date 8 8 
REV_CNTR_UNIT_CNT Revenue Center Unit Count Num 8 9 
HCPCS_CD 
HCFA Common Procedure Coding 
System (HCPCS) Code 
Char 5 10 
HCPCS_1ST_MDFR_CD HCPCS Initial Modifier Code Char 2 11 
HCPCS_2ND_MDFR_CD HCPCS Second Modifier Code Char 2 12 
HCPCS_3RD_MDFR_CD HCPCS Third Modifier Code  Char 2 13 
REV_CNTR_IDE_NDC_UPC_NUM 
Revenue Center IDE, NDC, or UPC 
Number 
Char 24 14 
REV_CNTR_NDC_QTY 
Revenue Center National Drug Code 
(NDC) Quantity 
Num 10 15 
REV_CNTR_NDC_QTY_QLFR_CD 
Revenue Center NDC Quantity Qualifier 
Code 
Char 2 16 
REV_CNTR_RNDRNG_PHYSN_NPI Revenue Center Rendering Physician NPI Char 10 17 
LINE_LTST_CLM_IND Line Latest Claim Indicator Char 1 18 
 
Condition Code File 
BENE_ID  Encrypted CCW Beneficiary ID Char 15 1 
ENC_JOIN_KEY Unique Encounter Join Key Char 15 2 
CLM_TYPE_CD Claim Type Code Char 4 3 
RLT_COND_CD_SEQ Claim Related Condition Code Sequence Char 2 4 
CLM_RLT_COND_CD Claim Related Condition Code Char 2 5 
 
Occurrence Code File 
BENE_ID  Encrypted CCW Beneficiary ID Char 15 1 
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ENC_JOIN_KEY Unique Encounter Join Key Char 15 2 
CLM_TYPE_CD Claim Type Code Char 4 3 
RLT_OCRNC_CD_SEQ 
Claim Related Occurrence Code 
Sequence 
Char 2 4 
CLM_RLT_OCRNC_CD Claim Related Occurrence Code Char 2 5 
CLM_RLT_OCRNC_DT Claim Related Occurrence Date Date 8 6 
 
Span Code File 
BENE_ID  Encrypted CCW Beneficiary ID Char 15 1 
ENC_JOIN_KEY Unique Encounter Join Key Char 15 2 
CLM_TYPE_CD Claim Type Code Char 4 3 
RLT_SPAN_CD_SEQ Claim Related Span Code Sequence Char 2 4 
CLM_SPAN_CD Claim Occurrence Span Code Char 2 5 
CLM_SPAN_FROM_DT Claim Occurrence Span From Date Date 8 6 
CLM_SPAN_THRU_DT Claim Occurrence Span Through Date Date 8 7 
 
Value Code File 
BENE_ID  Encrypted CCW Beneficiary ID Char 15 1 
ENC_JOIN_KEY Unique Encounter Join Key Char 15 2 
CLM_TYPE_CD Claim Type Code Char 4 3 
RLT_VAL_CD_SEQ Claim Related Value Code Sequence Char 2 4 
CLM_VAL_CD Claim Value Code Char 2 5 
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Appendix D: Hospital Outpatient Services Variables and Names 
 




Base Claim File         
BENE_ID Encrypted CCW Beneficiary ID Char 15 1 
SAMPLE_GROUP CCW  Beneficiary Random Sample Group  Char 2 2 
ENC_JOIN_KEY Unique Encounter Join Key Char 15 3 
CLM_TYPE_CD Claim Type Code Char 4 4 
CLM_FROM_DT Claim From Date Date 8 5 
CLM_THRU_DT Claim Through Date Date 8 6 
SRVC_MONTH Service Month Date 6 7 
CLM_CHRT_RVW_SW Claim Chart Review Switch Char 1 8 
CLM_CNTL_NUM Claim Control Number Char 23 9 
CLM_ORIG_CNTL_NUM Claim Original Control Number Char 23 10 
•CLM_FINL_ACTN_IND Claim Final Action Indicator Char 1 11 
•CLM_LTST_CLM_IND Latest Claim Indicator Char 1 12 
EDPS_CREATE_DT 
Encounter Data Processing System (EDPS) 
Create Date 
Date 8 13 
CLM_RCPT_DT Claim Receipt Date Date 8 14 
CLM_FAC_TYPE_CD Claim Facility Type Code Char 1 15 
CLM_SRVC_CLSFCTN_TYPE_C
D 
Claim Service classification Type Code Char 1 16 
CLM_FREQ_CD Claim Frequency Code Char 1 17 
CNTRCT_NUM Medicare Part C Contract Number Char 5 18 
CNTRCT_PBP_NUM 
Medicare Part C Plan Benefit Package (PBP) 
Number 
Char 3 19 
CLM_MDCL_REC Claim Medical Record Number Char 1 20 
ORG_NPI Organization NPI Number Char 10 21 
ORG_TXNMY_CD Organization Taxonomy Code Char 10 22 
RNDRNG_PHYSN_NPI Claim Rendering Physician NPI Number  Char 10 23 
RFRG_PHYSN_NPI Claim Referring Physician NPI Number Char 10 24 
AT_PHYSN_NPI Claim Attending Physician NPI Number Char 10 25 
AT_PHSYN_TXNMY_CD Claim Attending Physician Taxonomy Code Char 10 26 
OP_PHYSN_NPI Claim Operating Physician NPI Number Char 10 27 
OT_PHYSN_NPI Claim Other Physician NPI Number Char 10 28 
PTNT_DSCHRG_STUS_CD Patient Discharge Status Code Char 2 29 
PRNCPAL_DGNS_CD Claim Principal Diagnosis Code Char 7 30 
ICD_DGNS_CD1 Claim Diagnosis Code 1 Char 7 31 
ICD_DGNS_CD2 Claim Diagnosis Code 2 Char 7 32 
ICD_DGNS_CD3 Claim Diagnosis Code 3 Char 7 33 
ICD_DGNS_CD4 Claim Diagnosis Code 4 Char 7 34 
ICD_DGNS_CD5 Claim Diagnosis Code 5 Char 7 35 
ICD_DGNS_CD6 Claim Diagnosis Code 6 Char 7 36 
ICD_DGNS_CD7 Claim Diagnosis Code 7 Char 7 37 
ICD_DGNS_CD8 Claim Diagnosis Code 8 Char 7 38 
ICD_DGNS_CD9 Claim Diagnosis Code 9 Char 7 39 
ICD_DGNS_CD10 Claim Diagnosis Code 10 Char 7 40 
ICD_DGNS_CD11 Claim Diagnosis Code 11 Char 7 41 
ICD_DGNS_CD12 Claim Diagnosis Code 12 Char 7 42 
MEDICARE PLAN ATTRIBUTES  201 
 
ICD_DGNS_CD13 Claim Diagnosis Code 13 Char 7 43 
ICD_DGNS_CD14 Claim Diagnosis Code 14 Char 7 44 
ICD_DGNS_CD15 Claim Diagnosis Code 15 Char 7 45 
ICD_DGNS_CD16 Claim Diagnosis Code 16 Char 7 46 
ICD_DGNS_CD17 Claim Diagnosis Code 17 Char 7 47 
ICD_DGNS_CD18 Claim Diagnosis Code 18 Char 7 48 
ICD_DGNS_CD19 Claim Diagnosis Code 19 Char 7 49 
ICD_DGNS_CD20 Claim Diagnosis Code 20 Char 7 50 
ICD_DGNS_CD21 Claim Diagnosis Code 21 Char 7 51 
ICD_DGNS_CD22 Claim Diagnosis Code 22 Char 7 52 
ICD_DGNS_CD23 Claim Diagnosis Code 23 Char 7 53 
ICD_DGNS_CD24 Claim Diagnosis Code 24 Char 7 54 
ICD_DGNS_CD25 Claim Diagnosis Code 25 Char 7 55 
CLM_1ST_DGNS_E_CD First Claim Diagnosis E Code Char 7 56 
ICD_DGNS_E_CD1 Claim Diagnosis E Code 1 Char 7 57 
ICD_DGNS_E_CD2 Claim Diagnosis E Code 2 Char 7 58 
ICD_DGNS_E_CD3 Claim Diagnosis E Code 3 Char 7 59 
ICD_DGNS_E_CD4 Claim Diagnosis E Code 4 Char 7 60 
ICD_DGNS_E_CD5 Claim Diagnosis E Code 5 Char 7 61 
ICD_DGNS_E_CD6 Claim Diagnosis E Code 6 Char 7 62 
ICD_DGNS_E_CD7 Claim Diagnosis E Code 7 Char 7 63 
ICD_DGNS_E_CD8 Claim Diagnosis E Code 8 Char 7 64 
ICD_DGNS_E_CD9 Claim Diagnosis E Code 9 Char 7 65 
ICD_DGNS_E_CD10 Claim Diagnosis E Code 10 Char 7 66 
RSN_VISIT_CD1 Reason for Visit Diagnosis Code 1 Char 7 67 
RSN_VISIT_CD2 Reason for Visit Diagnosis Code 2 Char 7 68 
RSN_VISIT_CD3 Reason for Visit Diagnosis Code 3 Char 7 69 
ICD_PRCDR_CD1 Claim Procedure Code 1 Char 7 70 
ICD_PRCDR_CD2 Claim Procedure Code 2 Char 7 71 
ICD_PRCDR_CD3 Claim Procedure Code 3 Char 7 72 
ICD_PRCDR_CD4 Claim Procedure Code 4 Char 7 73 
ICD_PRCDR_CD5 Claim Procedure Code 5 Char 7 74 
ICD_PRCDR_CD6 Claim Procedure Code 6 Char 7 75 
ICD_PRCDR_CD7 Claim Procedure Code 7 Char 7 76 
ICD_PRCDR_CD8 Claim Procedure Code 8 Char 7 77 
ICD_PRCDR_CD9 Claim Procedure Code 9 Char 7 78 
ICD_PRCDR_CD10 Claim Procedure Code 10 Char 7 79 
ICD_PRCDR_CD11 Claim Procedure Code 11 Char 7 80 
ICD_PRCDR_CD12 Claim Procedure Code 12 Char 7 81 
ICD_PRCDR_CD13 Claim Procedure Code 13 Char 7 82 
PRCDR_DT1  Claim Procedure Code 1 Date Date 8 83 
PRCDR_DT2 Claim Procedure Code 2 Date Date 8 84 
PRCDR_DT3 Claim Procedure Code 3 Date Date 8 85 
PRCDR_DT4 Claim Procedure Code 4 Date Date 8 86 
PRCDR_DT5 Claim Procedure Code 5 Date Date 8 87 
PRCDR_DT6 Claim Procedure Code 6 Date Date 8 88 
PRCDR_DT7 Claim Procedure Code 7 Date Date 8 89 
PRCDR_DT8 Claim Procedure Code 8 Date Date 8 90 
PRCDR_DT9 Claim Procedure Code 9 Date Date 8 91 
PRCDR_DT10 Claim Procedure Code 10 Date Date 8 92 
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PRCDR_DT11 Claim Procedure Code 11 Date Date 8 93 
PRCDR_DT12 Claim Procedure Code 12 Date Date 8 94 
PRCDR_DT13 Claim Procedure Code 13 Date Date 8 95 
CLM_OBSLT_DT Claim Obsolete Date Date 8 96 
CLM_BPRVDR_CITY_NAME Billing Provider Address - City Char 30 97 
CLM_BPRVDR_USPS_STATE_C
D 
Billing Provider Address - USPS State Code Char 2 98 
CLM_BPRVDR_ADR_ZIP_CD Billing Provider Address - ZIP Code Char 9 99 
CLM_SUBSCR_CITY_NAME Medicare Subscriber Address - City Char 30 100 
CLM_SUBSCR_USPS_STATE_C
D 
Medicare Subscriber Address - USPS State 
Code 
Char 2 101 
CLM_SUBSCR_ADR_ZIP_CD Medicare Subscriber Address - ZIP Code Char 9 102 
BENE_CNTY_CD Beneficiary County Code from Claim (SSA) Char 3 103 
BENE_STATE_CD Beneficiary Residence (SSA) State Code Char 2 104 
BENE_MLG_CNTCT_ZIP_CD Beneficiary ZIP Code of Residence  Char 9 105 
GNDR_CD Gender Code  Char 1 106 
BENE_RACE_CD Race Code Char 1 107 
DOB_DT Date of Birth Date 8 108 
BENE_MDCR_STUS_CD Beneficiary Medicare Status Code Char 2 109 
TAX_NUM Provider Tax Number Char 10 110 
BENE_STATE Beneficiary State Postal Code Char 2 111 
 
Revenue Center File 
BENE_ID Encrypted CCW Beneficiary ID Char 15 1 
ENC_JOIN_KEY Unique Encounter Join Key Char 15 2 
CLM_TYPE_CD Claim Type Code Char 4 3 
CLM_LINE_NUM Claim Line Number Num 13 4 
LINE_NUM_ORIG  Original Claim Line Number Num 13 20 
CLM_THRU_DT Claim Through Date Date 8 5 
REV_CNTR Revenue Center Code Char 4 6 
REV_CNTR_FROM_DT Revenue Center From Date Date 8 7 
REV_CNTR_THRU_DT Revenue Center Thru Date Date 8 8 
REV_CNTR_UNIT_CNT Revenue Center Unit Count Num 8 9 
HCPCS_CD 
HCFA Common Procedure Coding System 
(HCPCS) Code 
Char 5 10 
HCPCS_1ST_MDFR_CD HCPCS Initial Modifier Code Char 2 11 
HCPCS_2ND_MDFR_CD HCPCS Second Modifier Code Char 2 12 
HCPCS_3RD_MDFR_CD HCPCS Third Modifier Code  Char 2 13 
HCPCS_4TH_MDFR_CD HCPCS Fourth Modifier Code  Char 2 14 
REV_CNTR_IDE_NDC_UPC_NU
M 
Revenue Center IDE, NDC, or UPC Number Char 24 15 
REV_CNTR_NDC_QTY 
Revenue Center National Drug Code (NDC) 
Quantity 
Num 10 16 
REV_CNTR_NDC_QTY_QLFR_
CD 
Revenue Center NDC Quantity Qualifier 
Code 
Char 2 17 
REV_CNTR_RNDRNG_PHYSN_
NPI 
Revenue Center Rendering Physician NPI Char 10 18 
LINE_LTST_CLM_IND Line Latest Claim Indicator Char 1 19 
 
Condition Code File 
BENE_ID  Encrypted CCW Beneficiary ID Char 15 1 
ENC_JOIN_KEY Unique Encounter Join Key Char 15 2 
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CLM_TYPE_CD Claim Type Code Char 4 3 
RLT_COND_CD_SEQ Claim Related Condition Code Sequence Char 2 4 
CLM_RLT_COND_CD Claim Related Condition Code Char 2 5 
 
Occurrence Code File 
BENE_ID  Encrypted CCW Beneficiary ID Char 15 1 
ENC_JOIN_KEY Unique Encounter Join Key Char 15 2 
CLM_TYPE_CD Claim Type Code Char 4 3 
RLT_OCRNC_CD_SEQ Claim Related Occurrence Code Sequence Char 2 4 
CLM_RLT_OCRNC_CD Claim Related Occurrence Code Char 2 5 
CLM_RLT_OCRNC_DT Claim Related Occurrence Date Date 8 6 
 
Span Code File 
BENE_ID  Encrypted CCW Beneficiary ID Char 15 1 
ENC_JOIN_KEY Unique Encounter Join Key Char 15 2 
CLM_TYPE_CD Claim Type Code Char 4 3 
RLT_SPAN_CD_SEQ Claim Related Span Code Sequence Char 2 4 
CLM_SPAN_CD Claim Occurrence Span Code Char 2 5 
CLM_SPAN_FROM_DT Claim Occurrence Span From Date Date 8 6 
CLM_SPAN_THRU_DT Claim Occurrence Span Through Date Date 8 7 
 
Value Code File 
BENE_ID  Encrypted CCW Beneficiary ID Char 15 1 
ENC_JOIN_KEY Unique Encounter Join Key Char 15 2 
CLM_TYPE_CD Claim Type Code Char 4 3 
RLT_VAL_CD_SEQ Claim Related Value Code Sequence Char 2 4 
CLM_VAL_CD Claim Value Code Char 2 5 
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Appendix E: Home Health Variables and Names 
 




Base Claim File         
BENE_ID Encrypted CCW Beneficiary ID Char 15 1 
SAMPLE_GROUP 
CCW  Beneficiary Random Sample 
Group  
Char 2 2 
ENC_JOIN_KEY Unique Encounter Join Key Char 15 3 
CLM_TYPE_CD Claim Type Code Char 4 4 
CLM_FROM_DT Claim From Date Date 8 5 
CLM_THRU_DT Claim Through Date Date 8 6 
SRVC_MONTH Service Month Date 6 7 
CLM_CHRT_RVW_SW Claim Chart Review Switch Char 1 8 
CLM_CNTL_NUM Claim Control Number Char 23 9 
CLM_ORIG_CNTL_NUM Claim Original Control Number Char 23 10 
CLM_FINL_ACTN_IND Claim Final Action Indicator Char 1 11 
CLM_LTST_CLM_IND Latest Claim Indicator Char 1 12 
EDPS_CREATE_DT 
Encounter Data Processing System 
(EDPS) Create Date 
Date 8 13 
CLM_RCPT_DT Claim Receipt Date Date 8 14 
CLM_FAC_TYPE_CD Claim Facility Type Code Char 1 15 
CLM_SRVC_CLSFCTN_TYPE_CD Claim Service classification Type Code Char 1 16 
CLM_FREQ_CD Claim Frequency Code Char 1 17 
CNTRCT_NUM Medicare Part C Contract Number Char 5 18 
CNTRCT_PBP_NUM 
Medicare Part C Plan Benefit Package 
(PBP) Number 
Char 3 19 
CLM_MDCL_REC Claim Medical Record Number Char 1 20 
ORG_NPI Organization NPI Number Char 10 21 
ORG_TXNMY_CD Organization Taxonomy Code Char 10 22 
RNDRNG_PHYSN_NPI 
Claim Rendering Physician NPI 
Number  
Char 10 23 
RFRG_PHYSN_NPI Claim Referring Physician NPI Number Char 10 24 
AT_PHYSN_NPI 
Claim Attending Physician NPI 
Number 
Char 10 25 
AT_PHYSN_TXNMY_CD 
Claim Attending Physician Taxonomy 
Code 
Char 10 26 
OP_PHYSN_NPI 
Claim Operating Physician NPI 
Number 
Char 10 27 
OT_PHYSN_NPI Claim Other Physician NPI Number Char 10 28 
CLM_ADMSN_DT Claim Admission Date Date 8 29 
PTNT_DSCHRG_STUS_CD Patient Discharge Status Code Char 2 30 
BENE_DSCHRG_DT Beneficiary Discharge Date Date 8 31 
PRNCPAL_DGNS_CD Claim Principal Diagnosis Code Char 7 32 
ICD_DGNS_CD1 Claim Diagnosis Code 1 Char 7 33 
ICD_DGNS_CD2 Claim Diagnosis Code 2 Char 7 34 
ICD_DGNS_CD3 Claim Diagnosis Code 3 Char 7 35 
ICD_DGNS_CD4 Claim Diagnosis Code 4 Char 7 36 
ICD_DGNS_CD5 Claim Diagnosis Code 5 Char 7 37 
ICD_DGNS_CD6 Claim Diagnosis Code 6 Char 7 38 
ICD_DGNS_CD7 Claim Diagnosis Code 7 Char 7 39 
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ICD_DGNS_CD8 Claim Diagnosis Code 8 Char 7 40 
ICD_DGNS_CD9 Claim Diagnosis Code 9 Char 7 41 
ICD_DGNS_CD10 Claim Diagnosis Code 10 Char 7 42 
ICD_DGNS_CD11 Claim Diagnosis Code 11 Char 7 43 
ICD_DGNS_CD12 Claim Diagnosis Code 12 Char 7 44 
ICD_DGNS_CD13 Claim Diagnosis Code 13 Char 7 45 
ICD_DGNS_CD14 Claim Diagnosis Code 14 Char 7 46 
ICD_DGNS_CD15 Claim Diagnosis Code 15 Char 7 47 
ICD_DGNS_CD16 Claim Diagnosis Code 16 Char 7 48 
ICD_DGNS_CD17 Claim Diagnosis Code 17 Char 7 49 
ICD_DGNS_CD18 Claim Diagnosis Code 18 Char 7 50 
ICD_DGNS_CD19 Claim Diagnosis Code 19 Char 7 51 
ICD_DGNS_CD20 Claim Diagnosis Code 20 Char 7 52 
ICD_DGNS_CD21 Claim Diagnosis Code 21 Char 7 53 
ICD_DGNS_CD22 Claim Diagnosis Code 22 Char 7 54 
ICD_DGNS_CD23 Claim Diagnosis Code 23 Char 7 55 
ICD_DGNS_CD24 Claim Diagnosis Code 24 Char 7 56 
ICD_DGNS_CD25 Claim Diagnosis Code 25 Char 7 57 
CLM_1ST_DGNS_E_CD First Claim Diagnosis E Code Char 7 58 
ICD_DGNS_E_CD1 Claim Diagnosis E Code 1 Char 7 59 
ICD_DGNS_E_CD2 Claim Diagnosis E Code 2 Char 7 60 
ICD_DGNS_E_CD3 Claim Diagnosis E Code 3 Char 7 61 
RSN_VISIT_CD1 Reason for Visit Diagnosis Code 1 Char 7 62 
RSN_VISIT_CD2 Reason for Visit Diagnosis Code 2 Char 7 63 
RSN_VISIT_CD3 Reason for Visit Diagnosis Code 3 Char 7 64 
CLM_OBSLT_DT Claim Obsolete Date Date 8 65 
CLM_BPRVDR_CITY_NAME Billing Provider Address - City Char 30 66 
CLM_BPRVDR_USPS_STATE_CD 
Billing Provider Address - USPS State 
Code 
Char 2 67 
CLM_BPRVDR_ADR_ZIP_CD Billing Provider Address - ZIP Code Char 9 68 
CLM_SUBSCR_CITY_NAME Medicare Subscriber Address - City Char 30 69 
CLM_SUBSCR_USPS_STATE_CD 
Medicare Subscriber Address - USPS 
State Code 
Char 2 70 
CLM_SUBSCR_ADR_ZIP_CD 
Medicare Subscriber Address - ZIP 
Code 
Char 9 71 
BENE_CNTY_CD 
Beneficiary County Code from Claim 
(SSA) 
Char 3 72 
BENE_STATE_CD 
Beneficiary Residence (SSA) State 
Code 
Char 2 73 
BENE_MLG_CNTCT_ZIP_CD Beneficiary ZIP Code of Residence  Char 9 74 
GNDR_CD Gender Code  Char 1 75 
BENE_RACE_CD Race Code Char 1 76 
DOB_DT Date of Birth Date 8 77 
BENE_MDCR_STUS_CD Beneficiary Medicare Status Code Char 2 78 
TAX_NUM Provider Tax Number Char 10 79 
BENE_STATE Beneficiary State Postal Code Char 2 80 
 
Revenue Center File 
BENE_ID Encrypted CCW Beneficiary ID Char 15 1 
ENC_JOIN_KEY Unique Encounter Join Key Char 15 2 
CLM_TYPE_CD Claim Type Code Char 4 3 
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CLM_LINE_NUM Claim Line Number Num 13 4 
LINE_NUM_ORIG  Original Claim Line Number Num 13 19 
CLM_THRU_DT Claim Through Date Date 8 5 
REV_CNTR Revenue Center Code Char 4 6 
REV_CNTR_FROM_DT Revenue Center From Date Date 8 7 
REV_CNTR_THRU_DT Revenue Center Thru Date Date 8 8 
REV_CNTR_UNIT_CNT Revenue Center Unit Count Num 8 9 
HCPCS_CD 
HCFA Common Procedure Coding 
System (HCPCS) Code 
Char 5 10 
HCPCS_1ST_MDFR_CD HCPCS Initial Modifier Code Char 2 11 
HCPCS_2ND_MDFR_CD HCPCS Second Modifier Code Char 2 12 
HCPCS_3RD_MDRF_CD HCPCS Third Modifier Code  Char 2 13 
REV_CNTR_IDE_NDC_UPC_NU
M 
Revenue Center IDE, NDC, or UPC 
Number 
Char 24 14 
REV_CNTR_NDC_QTY 
Revenue Center National Drug Code 
(NDC) Quantity 
Num 10 15 
REV_CNTR_NDC_QTY_QLFR_C
D 
Revenue Center NDC Quantity 
Qualifier Code 
Char 2 16 
REV_CNTR_RNDRNG_PHYSN_N
PI 
Revenue Center Rendering Physician 
NPI 
Char 10 17 
LINE_LTST_CLM_IND Line Latest Claim Indicator Char 1 18 
 
Condition Code File 
BENE_ID  Encrypted CCW Beneficiary ID Char 15 1 
ENC_JOIN_KEY Unique Encounter Join Key Char 15 2 
CLM_TYPE_CD Claim Type Code Char 4 3 
RLT_COND_CD_SEQ 
Claim Related Condition Code 
Sequence 
Char 2 4 
CLM_RLT_COND_CD Claim Related Condition Code Char 2 5 
 
Occurrence Code File 
BENE_ID  Encrypted CCW Beneficiary ID Char 15 1 
ENC_JOIN_KEY Unique Encounter Join Key Char 15 2 
CLM_TYPE_CD Claim Type Code Char 4 3 
RLT_OCRNC_CD_SEQ 
Claim Related Occurrence Code 
Sequence 
Char 2 4 
CLM_RLT_OCRNC_CD Claim Related Occurrence Code Char 2 5 
CLM_RLT_OCRNC_DT Claim Related Occurrence Date Date 8 6 
 
Span Code File 
BENE_ID  Encrypted CCW Beneficiary ID Char 15 1 
ENC_JOIN_KEY Unique Encounter Join Key Char 15 2 
CLM_TYPE_CD Claim Type Code Char 4 3 
RLT_SPAN_CD_SEQ Claim Related Span Code Sequence Char 2 4 
CLM_SPAN_CD Claim Occurrence Span Code Char 2 5 
CLM_SPAN_FROM_DT Claim Occurrence Span From Date Date 8 6 
CLM_SPAN_THRU_DT Claim Occurrence Span Through Date Date 8 7 
 
Value Code File 
BENE_ID  Encrypted CCW Beneficiary ID Char 15 1 
ENC_JOIN_KEY Unique Encounter Join Key Char 15 2 
CLM_TYPE_CD Claim Type Code Char 4 3 
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RLT_VAL_CD_SEQ Claim Related Value Code Sequence Char 2 4 
CLM_VAL_CD Claim Value Code Char 2 5 
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Appendix F: Carrier Variables and Names 
 




Base Claim File         
BENE_ID Encrypted CCW Beneficiary ID Char 15 1 
SAMPLE_GROUP CCW  Beneficiary Random Sample Group  Char 2 2 
ENC_JOIN_KEY Unique Encounter Join Key Char 15 3 
CLM_TYPE_CD Claim Type Code Char 4 4 
CLM_FROM_DT Claim From Date Date 8 5 
CLM_THRU_DT Claim Through Date Date 8 6 
SRVC_MONTH Service Month Date 6 7 
CLM_CHRT_RVW_SW Claim Chart Review Switch Char 1 8 
CLM_CNTL_NUM Claim Control Number Char 23 9 
CLM_ORIG_CNTL_NUM Claim Original Control Number Char 23 10 
CLM_FINL_ACTN_IND Claim Final Action Indicator Char 1 11 
CLM_LTST_CLM_IND Latest Claim Indicator Char 1 12 
EDPS_CREATE_DT 
Encounter Data Processing System 
(EDPS) Create Date 
Date 8 13 
CLM_RCPT_DT Claim Receipt Date Date 8 14 
CLM_FREQ_CD Claim Frequency Code Char 1 15 
CNTRCT_NUM Medicare Part C Contract Number Char 5 16 
CNTRCT_PBP_NUM 
Medicare Part C Plan Benefit Package 
(PBP) Number 
Char 3 17 
CLM_MDCL_REC Claim Medical Record Number Char 1 18 
ORG_NPI Organization NPI Number Char 10 19 
ORG_TXNMY_CD Organization Taxonomy Code Char 10 20 
RFRG_PHYSN_NPI Claim Referring Physician NPI Number Char 10 21 
PRNCPAL_DGNS_CD Claim Principal Diagnosis Code Char 7 22 
PRNCPAL_DGNS_VRSN_CD Claim Principal Diagnosis Version Code Char 1 23 
ICD_DGNS_CD1 Claim Diagnosis Code 1 Char 7 24 
ICD_DGNS_VRSN_CD1 
Claim Diagnosis Code I Diagnosis Version 
Code (ICD-9 or ICD-10) 
Char 1 25 
ICD_DGNS_CD2 Claim Diagnosis Code 2 Char 7 26 
ICD_DGNS_VRSN_CD2 
Claim Diagnosis Code II Diagnosis 
Version Code (ICD-9 or ICD-10) 
Char 1 27 
ICD_DGNS_CD3 Claim Diagnosis Code 3 Char 7 28 
ICD_DGNS_VRSN_CD3 
Claim Diagnosis Code III Diagnosis 
Version Code (ICD-9 or ICD-10) 
Char 1 29 
ICD_DGNS_CD4 Claim Diagnosis Code 4 Char 7 30 
ICD_DGNS_VRSN_CD4 
Claim Diagnosis Code IV Diagnosis 
Version Code (ICD-9 or ICD-10) 
Char 1 31 
ICD_DGNS_CD5 Claim Diagnosis Code 5 Char 7 32 
ICD_DGNS_VRSN_CD5 
Claim Diagnosis Code V Diagnosis 
Version Code (ICD-9 or ICD-10) 
Char 1 33 
ICD_DGNS_CD6 Claim Diagnosis Code 6 Char 7 34 
ICD_DGNS_VRSN_CD6 
Claim Diagnosis Code VI Diagnosis 
Version Code (ICD-9 or ICD-10) 
Char 1 35 
ICD_DGNS_CD7 Claim Diagnosis Code 7 Char 7 36 
ICD_DGNS_VRSN_CD7 
Claim Diagnosis Code VII Diagnosis 
Version Code (ICD-9 or ICD-10) 
Char 1 37 
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ICD_DGNS_CD8 Claim Diagnosis Code 8 Char 7 38 
ICD_DGNS_VRSN_CD8 
Claim Diagnosis Code VIII Diagnosis 
Version Code (ICD-9 or ICD-10) 
Char 1 39 
ICD_DGNS_CD9 Claim Diagnosis Code 9 Char 7 40 
ICD_DGNS_VRSN_CD9 
Claim Diagnosis Code IX Diagnosis 
Version Code (ICD-9 or ICD-10) 
Char 1 41 
ICD_DGNS_CD10 Claim Diagnosis Code 10 Char 7 42 
ICD_DGNS_VRSN_CD10 
Claim Diagnosis Code X Diagnosis 
Version Code (ICD-9 or ICD-10) 
Char 1 43 
ICD_DGNS_CD11 Claim Diagnosis Code 11 Char 7 44 
ICD_DGNS_VRSN_CD11 
Claim Diagnosis Code XI Diagnosis 
Version Code (ICD-9 or ICD-10) 
Char 1 45 
ICD_DGNS_CD12 Claim Diagnosis Code 12 Char 7 46 
ICD_DGNS_VRSN_CD12 
Claim Diagnosis Code XII Diagnosis 
Version Code (ICD-9 or ICD-10) 
Char 1 47 
ICD_DGNS_CD13 Claim Diagnosis Code 13 Char 7 48 
ICD_DGNS_VRSN_CD13 
Claim Diagnosis Code XIII Diagnosis 
Version Code (ICD-9 or ICD-10) 
Char 1 49 
CLM_OBSLT_DT Claim Obsolete Date Date 8 50 
CLM_BPRVDR_CITY_NAME Billing Provider Address - City Char 30 51 
CLM_BPRVDR_USPS_STATE_
CD 
Billing Provider Address - USPS State 
Code 
Char 2 52 
CLM_BPRVDR_ADR_ZIP_CD Billing Provider Address - ZIP Code Char 9 53 
CLM_SUBSCR_CITY_NAME Medicare Subscriber Address - City Char 30 54 
CLM_SUBSCR_USPS_STATE_
CD 
Medicare Subscriber Address - USPS State 
Code 
Char 2 55 
CLM_SUBSCR_ADR_ZIP_CD Medicare Subscriber Address - ZIP Code Char 9 56 
BENE_CNTY_CD 
Beneficiary County Code from Claim 
(SSA) 
Char 3 57 
BENE_STATE_CD Beneficiary Residence (SSA) State Code Char 2 58 
BENE_MLG_CNTCT_ZIP_CD Beneficiary ZIP Code of Residence  Char 9 59 
GNDR_CD Gender Code  Char 1 60 
BENE_RACE_CD Race Code Char 1 61 
DOB_DT Date of Birth Date 8 62 
BENE_MDCR_STUS_CD Beneficiary Medicare Status Code Char 2 63 
TAX_NUM Provider Tax Number Char 10 64 
BENE_STATE Beneficiary State Postal Code Char 2 65 
 
Line File 
BENE_ID  Encrypted CCW Beneficiary ID Char 15 1 
ENC_JOIN_KEY Unique Encounter Join Key Char 15 2 
CLM_TYPE_CD Claim Type Code Char 4 3 
CLM_LINE_NUM Claim Line Number Num 13 4 
LINE_NUM_ORIG  Original Claim Line Number Num 13 20 
CLM_THRU_DT Claim Through Date Date 8 5 
PRVDR_NPI Line Rendering Physician NPI Char 10 6 
PRVDR_SPCLTY Line CMS Provider Specialty Code Char 2 7 
LINE_SRVC_CNT Line Service Count Num 12 8 
LINE_PLACE_OF_SRVC_CD Line Place of Service Code Char 2 9 
LINE_1ST_EXPNS_DT Line First Expense Date Date 8 10 
LINE_LAST_EXPNS_DT Line Last Expense Date Date 8 11 
HCPCS_CD HCFA Common Procedure Coding System Char 5 12 
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(HCPCS) Code 
HCPCS_1ST_MDFR_CD HCPCS Initial Modifier Code Char 2 13 
HCPCS_2ND_MDFR_CD HCPCS Second Modifier Code Char 2 14 
HCPCS_3RD_MDFR_CD HCPCS Third Modifier Code  Char 2 15 
HCPCS_4TH_MDFR_CD HCPCS Fourth Modifier Code  Char 2 16 
LINE_NDC_CD Line National Drug Code (NDC) Char 11 17 
LINE_RX_NUM Line RX Number Char 30 18 
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Appendix G: Provider Variables and Names 
 
Variable Name Description Data Source 
ID variables 
npi National provider identifier (NPI)  Claims 
name_last Provider last name NPPES 
name_first Provider first name NPPES 
name_middle Provider middle name NPPES 
 
Demographic variables 
sex 1=Male; 2=Female NPPES 




Broad specialty based on spec_prim_1 .  
1 = Primary care 
2 = Medical specialty  
3 = Surgical specialty  
4 = Obstetrics/gynecology with no primary care specialty. 
5 = Hospital-based specialty (includes designated hospitalists) 
6 = Psychiatry 
7 = Non-physician 
9 = Specialty Unknown 
PECOS 
spec_prim_1 Primary specialty (the most recently reported in PECOS) 
PECOS/claim
s 
spec_prim_1_name Name of primary specialty  
spec_prim_2 Concurrently reported primary specialty 
PECOS/claim
s 
spec_prim_2_name Name of concurrently reported primary specialty  
spec_source 












Place of service (POS) 
pos_office % of line items delivered in office Claims 
pos_inpat % of line items delivered in inpatient hospital Claims 
pos_opd % of line items delivered in hospital outpatient department (OPD) Claims 
pos_er % of line items delivered in emergency room (ER) Claims 
pos_nursing % of line items delivered in nursing facility or skilled nursing facility Claims 
pos_asc % of line items delivered in ambulatory surgery center (ASC) Claims 
pos_resid % of line items delivered in the patient’s residence (i.e., home, assisted Claims 
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Variable Name Description Data Source 
living facility, custodial care facility, or group home) 
pos_other % of line items delivered in other places of service  Claims 
Geographic location 
state 
State abbreviation with the most line items for that NPI  
99=missing 
Claims 
state_multi Multiple state indicator (1=multiple states; 0=single state) Claims 
cbsa_type 




9=missing CBSA code 
Claims 
cbsa_cd 
CBSA code with the most allowed line items for that NPI 
00000=non-CBSA 
99999=missing CBSA code 
Claims 
cbsa_name CBSA name Claims 
cbsa_multi Multiple CBSA indicator (1=multiple CBSAs; 0=single CBSA) Claims 
 
Utilization summary measures 
npi_srvc_lines Count of line items billed by NPI Claims 
npi_allowed_amt Total allowed charges billed by NPI Claims 
npi_unq_benes Number of unique beneficiaries for whom the NPI billed Claims 
   
TIN1 variables   
tin1 Tax identification number (TIN) with the most service  lines Claims 
tin1_legal_name TIN1 legal name PECOS 
tin1_srvc_month 
Twelve monthly flags for whether the NPI billed for any services under 
TIN1. Position 1 pertains to January; position 12 to December. 
1= billed  
0= did not bill 
Claims 
tin1_srvc_lines Count of line items billed under TIN1 Claims 
tin1_allowed_amt Total allowed charges billed under TIN1 Claims 
tin1_unq_benes Number of unique beneficiaries for whom the NPI billed under TIN1  Claims 
 
TIN2 variables 
tin2 Tax identification number (TIN) with the most service  lines Claims 
tin2_legal_name TIN2 legal name PECOS 
tin2_srvc_month 
Twelve monthly flags for whether the NPI billed for any services under 
TIN2. Position 1 pertains to January; position 12 to December. 
1= billed  
0= did not bill 
Claims 
tin2_srvc_lines Count of line items billed under TIN2 Claims 
tin2_allowed_amt Total allowed charges billed under TIN2 Claims 
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Variable Name Description Data Source 
tin2_unq_benes Number of unique beneficiaries for whom the NPI billed under TIN2  Claims 
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ST. CHARLES 540 
ST. CLAIR 6 
ST. FRANCOIS 87 
STE GENEVIEVE 20 
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Adair 1 93 
Andrew 2 0 
Atchison 1 18 
Audrain  1 70 
Barry 1 18 
Barton 1 25 
Bates 1 60 
Benton 3 0 
Bollinger 3 0 
Boone 1 563 
Buchanan 1 393 
Butler 1 410 
Caldwell 2 0 
Callaway 1 37 
Camden 1 130 
Cape Girardeau 1 361 
Carroll 1 25 
Carter 3 0 
Cass 1 106 
Cedar 1 25 
Chariton 2 0 
Christian 2 0 
Clark 2 0 
Clay 1 873 
Clinton 1 58 
Cole 1 268 
Cooper 1 32 
Crawford 1 35 
Dade 2 0 
Dallas 3 0 
Daviess 2 0 
Dekalb 2 0 
Dent 1 55 
Douglas 3 0 
Dunklin 1 116 
Franklin 1 148 
Gasconade 1 24 
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Gentry 1 35 
Greene 1 1957 
Grundy 1 25 
Harrison 1 19 
Henry 1 110 
Hickory 3 0 
Holt 2 0 
Howard 2 0 
Howell 1 139 
Iron 1 15 
Jackson 1 146 
Jasper 1 3030 
Jefferson 1 321 
Johnson 1 62 
Knox 2 0 
Laclede 1 58 
Lafayette 1 32 
Lawrence 1 53 
Lewis 3 0 
Lincoln 1 25 
Linn 1 25 
Livingston 1 25 
Macon 1 25 
Madison 1 144 
Maries 2 0 
Marion 1 99 
McDonald 3 0 
Mercer 3 0 
Miller 2 0 
Mississippi 2 0 
Moniteau 2 0 
Monroe 3 0 
Montgomery 2 0 
Morgan 3 0 
New Madrid 3 0 
Newton 1 729 
Nodaway 1 81 
Oregon 3 0 
Osage 2 0 
Ozark 3 0 
Pemiscot 1 167 
Perry 1 25 
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Pettis 1 99 
Phelps 1 242 
Pike 1 25 
Platte 1 97 
Polk 1 86 
Pulaski 3 0 
Putnam 1 15 
Ralls 2 0 
Randolph 1 99 
Ray 1 34 
Reynolds 3 0 
Ripley 1 30 
Saline 1 60 
Schuyler 2 0 
Scotland 1 25 
Scott 1 125 
Shannon 3 0 
Shelby 2 0 
St. Charles 1 1016 
St. Clair 1 12 
Ste Genevieve 1 47 
St. Francois 1 133 
St. Louis City 1 2715 
St. Louis County 1 4927 
Stoddard 1 48 
Stone 2 0 
Sullivan 1 25 
Taney 1 157 
Texas 1 66 
Vernon 1 140 
Warren 2 0 
Washington 1 25 
Wayne 2 0 
Webster 3 0 
Worth 2 0 
Wright 2 0 
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Appendix M: Tabular Results for Plan Choice CHAID Tree 
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FFS Plan Only 
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All HMO Plans 
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